Behavioural mechanisms and adaptation to climate change : Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in the upper Blue-Nile basin by Nigussie, Yalemzewd
 
 
Behavioural mechanisms and adaptation to climate 
change 
Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in the upper Blue-Nile basin 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yalemzewd Molla Nigussie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis committee 
Promotor 
Prof. Dr E.C. van Ierland 
Professor of Environmental Economics and Natural Resources 
Wageningen University 
Co-promotors 
Dr X. Zhu 
Associate Professor, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, 
Wageningen University 
 
Dr B. Kebede 
Associate Professor, School of International Development and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental 
Social Science (CBESS), University of East Anglia, United Kingdom 
 
Other Members 
Prof. Dr G. Antonides, Wageningen University  
Prof. Dr H. B. J. Leemans, Wageningen University  
Dr M.J.J. Handgraaf, Wageningen University  
Dr Consuelo Varela Ortega, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain 
 
This research was conducted under the auspices of SENSE Graduate School.  
 
 
 
 
 
Behavioural mechanisms and adaptation to climate 
change 
Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in the upper Blue-Nile basin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yalemzewd Molla Nigussie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor 
at Wageningen University 
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus 
Prof. Dr A.P.J. Mol, 
in the presence of the 
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board 
to be defended in public 
on Wednesday 18 January 2017 
at 13:30 pm in the Aula. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yalemzewd Molla Nigussie 
Behavioural mechanisms and adaptation to climate change: Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in 
the upper Blue-Nile basin 
143 pages. 
 
PhD Thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2017) 
With references, with summary in English 
 
ISBN 978-94-6343-042-5 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18174/400431 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my wife and sons. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
Contents 
Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Climate change adaptation decisions and smallholder farmers .................................................................... 1 
1.2 Individuals’ and social preferences in decisions related to adaptation to climate change ................................. 2 
1.3 Agroecosystems and climate change adaptation ....................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Research objective and research questions .............................................................................................. 6 
1.5 Methods ............................................................................................................................................. 7 
1.5.1 Lab-in-the-field experimental approach ............................................................................................. 7 
1.5.2 Econometric models ....................................................................................................................... 8 
1.5.3 MCA ............................................................................................................................................. 9 
1.6 Relevance of the thesis ........................................................................................................................ 9 
1.7 Outline of the thesis............................................................................................................................ 10 
Chapter 2 .................................................................................................................................................. 12 
Implications of smallholders’ risk and time preferences for climate innovation adoption: Evidence from field 
experimental games ................................................................................................................................... 12 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Theoretical background ....................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.1 Risk attitudes and measurement ..................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.2 Time preference and individual discount rate ..................................................................................... 15 
2.2.3 Risk attitudes, time preference and climate change mitigation and adaptation ........................................ 15 
2.3 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 16 
2.3.1 The lottery game .......................................................................................................................... 16 
2.3.2 Time preference game ................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.3 Climate innovation adoption model .................................................................................................. 20 
2.4 Findings and discussions...................................................................................................................... 22 
2.5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 29 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 31 
Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................................................. 40 
How do personality traits and learning determine adaptation to climate change? A study on smallholder farmers in the 
upper Blue Nile basin .................................................................................................................................. 40 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 41 
3.1.1 Background .................................................................................................................................. 41 
3.2 Theoretical framework and literature overview ........................................................................................ 43 
3.2.1 Personality traits and adaptation to climate change ............................................................................ 43 
3.2.2 Theoretical approaches to learning, information acquisition, and adaptation to climate change ................. 44 
3.2.3 Climate change incidences, adaptation practices and determinants ....................................................... 45 
3.3 Empirical modelling of personality traits, learning and adaptation to climate change ..................................... 46 
3.3.1 Measuring personality .................................................................................................................... 46 
3.3.2 Conceptualizing learning and information acquisition .......................................................................... 46 
3.3.3 Econometric model of adaptive response measures ............................................................................ 48 
ii 
 
3.4 Data and samples ............................................................................................................................... 49 
3.5 Results ............................................................................................................................................. 50 
3.5.1 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics ................................................................................. 50 
3.5.2 Results of learning measures .......................................................................................................... 50 
3.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 57 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 60 
Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................................................. 63 
Climate change and common pool resources management: .............................................................................. 63 
A lab-in-the-field experimental approach ........................................................................................................ 63 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 64 
4.2 Climate change, and common pool natural resources in the Choke ecosystem ............................................. 66 
4.3 Common pool resources (CPR): management and experimental games ...................................................... 67 
4.4 Methods ............................................................................................................................................ 69 
4.4.1 Data Sources ............................................................................................................................... 69 
4.4.2 Experimental design ...................................................................................................................... 70 
4.4.3 Social roles .................................................................................................................................. 72 
4.5 Results ............................................................................................................................................. 73 
4.5.1 Relationship between social norm and social role variables .................................................................. 73 
4.5.2 Results of the CPR game ................................................................................................................ 74 
4.6 Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 78 
4.7 Conclusion and recommendation .......................................................................................................... 79 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................ 81 
Chapter 5 .................................................................................................................................................. 86 
Evaluation of climate change adaptation alternatives ....................................................................................... 86 
for smallholder farmers in the upper Blue-Nile basin ........................................................................................ 86 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 87 
5.2 Materials and methods ........................................................................................................................ 88 
5.2.1 Multi-Criteria Analysis .................................................................................................................... 88 
5.3 Identification of adaptation options ....................................................................................................... 90 
5.4 Selection of criteria and weights ........................................................................................................... 92 
5.5 Results of identified adaptation options and their ranking based on MCA ..................................................... 93 
5.5.1 Identified options, criteria and weights for the study area ................................................................... 93 
5.5.2 “Uni-criterion” analysis and outranking results .................................................................................. 95 
5.5.3 Ranking of adaptation options ......................................................................................................... 98 
5.6 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 101 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................................. 104 
Chapter 6 ................................................................................................................................................ 106 
General discussions and conclusions ............................................................................................................ 106 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 106 
6.2 Answers to the research questions ...................................................................................................... 107 
6.3 Discussion and missing elements ........................................................................................................ 114 
6.4 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 116 
iii 
 
6.5 Policy implications ............................................................................................................................ 119 
6.6 Recommendations for further research ................................................................................................ 120 
References .............................................................................................................................................. 122 
Summary ................................................................................................................................................ 138 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... 140 
Education certificate.................................................................................................................................. 142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Climate change adaptation decisions and smallholder farmers  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, climate change has a significant negative impact on the agricultural sector causing 
severe problems for smallholder farmers. Many smallholder farmers in developing countries depend on 
traditional farming systems which have little resilience to unprecedented shock events caused by climate 
change. To overcome the welfare losses that may result from climate change, smallholder farmers need to 
identify the challenges and adjust their farming practices to cope with and adapt to climate change. 
According to Alston (2013), there are limits and barriers to adaptation to climate change; however, 
adaptation to climate change is possible with the right technology and adequate funding. According to IPCC 
(2001), autonomous adaptation is limited by absence of transformation in economic, political, and 
institutional structures in developing countries. Adaptive capacity is also limited by lack of education, 
information and training, and the limited options available to smallholder farmers. Planned adaptation is 
hence considered as an appropriate strategy in tackling climate change impacts. Planned adaptation 
involves the introduction of institutional arrangements and adaptation measures against climate change 
impacts for smallholder farmers. The economic literature has so far identified barriers and opportunities to 
adaptation to climate change. “Barriers are defined as obstacles that can be overcome with concerted 
effort, creative management, change of thinking, prioritization, and related shifts in resources, land uses, 
institutions, ...” (Moser and Ekstrom 2010:2). Opportunities for adaptation to climate change, on the other 
hand, can be facilitated through sustainable economic development practices (Klein et al. 2014). Through 
sustainable economic development, the barriers to adaptation to climate change can be reduced. Hence, 
adaptation measures such as the use of improved crop varieties, soil and water conservation, and irrigation 
technologies are appropriate measures in African countries (Deressa et al. 2011; Juana et al. 2013). Several 
socioeconomic, environmental and institutional factors are also identified as key drivers influencing 
farmers’ choice of specific adaptation methods (Kabubo-Mariara 2008; Bryan et al. 2009; Deressa et al. 
2009). Particularly decision behaviour is identified as a key factor limiting farmers’ adaptation to climate 
change, because it is argued that farmers often have a high time preference or other reasons, such as a lack 
of information, to postpone adaptation. 
Decision behaviour related to adaptation to climate change involves the identification of climate 
related threats, acquiring information and evaluation of adaptation options, and finally decisions on how to 
allocate time and resources. Decision behaviour in the economics literature is often explained by rational 
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choice theory (Gary 1976; Sen 2008). Rational choice theory allows preferences (social and individual 
preferences) to be represented by real-valued utility functions. Optimal decisions are identified by solving a 
problem of maximizing utility (Axelrod 1984). Furthermore, rational choice assumes that decision makers 
have complete information of the consequences of actions or, if not, they can attach probabilities to each 
possible consequence (Watkins 1957; Coleman 1990; Arrow 1994). This theory has faced criticism by 
pioneer behavioural economists like Simon (1950). Empirical questions about the fundamental assumptions 
of rational choice theory have been raised for example by Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), and numerous other behavioural economists. Scepticism towards rational choice theory has 
triggered the idea of bounded rationality to model economic decision making closer to reality. According to 
Simon (1957:198), “rationality of individuals’ in decision-making is limited by the information they have, the 
cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision”. The 
bounded rationality model attempts to understand decision behaviour under limited information, time and 
cognitive capacity of the decision maker. It has originally been tested in laboratory experiments using 
student subjects, and later also in lab-in-the-field, framed, and natural experiments by recruiting subjects 
actually involved in the matters of interest. 
1.2 Individuals’ and social preferences in decisions related to adaptation to climate change 
Modelling micro and macro-economic decision behaviour needs an understanding of individual and social 
preferences (Arrow 1958). In the literature, social preferences have been understood, for instance in terms 
of altruism and reciprocity, in which both own and others’ materials payoffs carry value for individuals’ 
utility (e.g. Becker 1974; Smith et al. 1995). The values and norms embedded in commonly accepted rules 
can also contribute to the sustainability of household level decisions as well as the provisions of public and 
common goods. In the standard economics of choice one can understand the trade-offs between own and 
others’ material payoffs. The approach towards understanding social preferences, however, poses a serious 
aggregation challenge, because social preferences can be individual characteristics or social constructs 
(Carpenter 2005; Carpenter and Seki 2005). Individual preferences, on the other hand, are determined only 
by taste factors (Arrow 1958). Other factors like price, income, and availability of goods have no role in 
individual preferences. Problems related to the public good provision, market mechanism and the 
environment are mostly addressed through a detailed analysis of both social and individual preferences.  
Individual and social preferences constitute a major part in the design of environmental policy. 
Though the conventional method to address environmental problems is welfare economic analysis, 
recently the behavioural economics approach is receiving increasing attention (Brekke and Johansson-
Stenman 2008). “Contrary to conventional economic theory, behavioural economics highlights that we act 
in a social context, and that issues such as social approval and status are central motivators of human 
behaviour” (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008:6). Choices involving time preferences and problems 
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which consider risk preferences can best be explained using behavioural economics. Climate change 
adaptation involves choices which involve both time and risk preferences and thus can be explained using 
behavioural economics approaches, because behavioural economics can provide better predictions of 
human behaviour than traditional approaches (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008). Moreover, 
identifying an appropriate discount rate is central in understanding the economics of climate change. It is 
also evident that shocks and circumstances can shape individuals’ and social preferences (Reynaud and 
Couture 2012; Liu 2013). Environmental problems are concrete natural phenomena and can be reflected in 
social choices. Adaptation to climate change can be considered to take place in a circumstance in which 
people are adjusting themselves (and perhaps their preferences) at times of shocks and uncertainties. 
Different people have different views, perspectives, preferences, and attitudes towards risk and time. Some 
people enjoy a risky situation and others do not; and some have high rates of time preference while others 
are patient.  
In the conventional expected utility theory, utility functions are characterized in three dimensions: 
reflecting preferences over goods, time and uncertainty (Broome 1991; Andersen et al. 2008). The concept 
of risk preference has mainly developed based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (von Neumann-
Morgenstern 1944). Expected Utility Theory (EUT), based on these axioms, suggests to use the probability 
weighted average of all possible levels of utility to select the best action. The criticism brought forward by 
Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961) and others triggered the development of Prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Prospect theory identifies loss aversion as one of the drivers why people make decisions 
deviating from expected utility maximization (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Another important topic in utility theory is the time preference of individuals. Frederick et al. 
(2002) make a distinction between time preference and time discounting that dates back to Böhm-Bawerk 
(1889) (see Weikard and Zhu 2005). Time preference refers to “the preference for immediate utility over 
delayed utility, while time discounting is a broad term that encompasses any reason to care less about the 
future which might be affected by risk and uncertainty” (Frederick 2002:352). The time preference of an 
individual is determined by his/her personal preferences. Time preferences of individuals’ may take into 
account the utility gained from the decisions and opportunity costs (see Dastjerdi 2009). A discount 
function is used in economic models to model the different weights placed on rewards accrued at different 
points in time. Intertemporal choices are most commonly used to derive time preference parameters of 
discounting functions which capture trade-offs between consumption today and consumption in the future. 
Hence, we are interested in risk and time preferences driving the behaviour of individuals and we want to 
see their implications on decisions related to adaptation to climate change.  
Decisions are not only influenced by individuals’ risk and time preference behaviour. Social 
preferences embedded in commonly accepted norms and rules can also play an important role in decisions 
related to cooperative common pool resources (CPRs) management. Cooperative behaviour in the 
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management and use of CPRs depends on social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, and social norms. 
Cooperation is central to human beings for the different social interactions like personal relationships, 
issues related to environmental conservation, political participation, international relations, and the market 
interactions (Schulman 1978). In addition, it also depends on the presence or absence of common interests 
between individuals. Absence or presence of common interest in the interaction of individuals can be 
explained by reciprocity theory of Schulman (1978). Reciprocity theory argues that individuals help other 
non-related individuals in the hope that they will reciprocate. CPRs are characterized by exhaustion and 
non excludability. Understanding cooperative behaviour and individuals’ interactions are central in the 
theory of CPRs management.  
A useful approach to study the interactions between individuals and their choices of behaviour is 
game theory (Lynch 1994). In some standard game theory models of social conflict, cooperation is costly 
from the perspective of an individual and the model predicts that individuals would not cooperate (see 
Doebeli and Hauert 2005). However, this prediction hinges on the setting. In repeated games cooperation is 
possible through reciprocity. Following this line of argument, we hypothesize that cooperation is possible in 
repeated game settings where subjects have equal material incentives and symmetric information. This will 
be the setting in the CPR game that we study. Lack of cooperation in the management of common pool 
natural resources is a serious problem in developing countries both for food security and climate change 
adaptation and mitigations. Though there is an established literature on adaptation to climate change, the 
possibility of climate mitigation through carbon sinks in common agricultural and forested lands is however 
over looked in developing countries. Due to high population density, deforestation and land use land cover 
changes are significantly increasing causing higher greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. 
Hence, we need to improve our understanding of the possibility of carbon sequestration and carbon sinks 
through managing common agricultural and forested lands. 
Social networks, groups’ interactions and experience sharing depend on social preferences. 
Through an approach that combines the methods of neuroscience and economics, it is possible to study the 
brain processes on how human social interaction are made (Fehr and Camerer 2005). According to Fehr and 
Camerer (2005), the neuroeconomic approach is built on the hope that it will unify mechanistic, 
mathematical and behavioral measures and constructs. “There is now a large body of experimental 
evidence indicating that many people exhibit social preferences, that is, their preferred choices are based 
on a positive or negative concern for the welfare of others, and on what other players believe about them” 
(Fehr and Camerer 2005:419). Learning from social groups and networks is important for decisions related 
to adaptation to climate change. Learning from groups (e.g. group of homophilic adopters), and other social 
networks is a social interaction phenomenon that is embedded in either positive or negative concern for 
the welfare of others. For instance, people can learn from their social groups and networks either for a 
negative concern related to envy or a positive concern related to environmental conservation.  
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1.3 Agroecosystems and climate change adaptation  
Climate change requires adaptation of agro-ecosystems in order to deal with the changes in precipitation 
patterns and temperature. The concept of agroecosystem based adaptation planning is important, because 
it is believed that extreme climatic events can severely impact smallholder farmers who depend on natural 
resources and traditional farming. Previous studies and the available data only give us a gross 
approximation regarding the heterogeneity of small scale agriculture. According to Altieri and Toledo 
(2005), such an approach, however, has ignored the different strategies that thousands of traditional 
farmers have used and still use to deal with climatic variability. Design of agricultural related technologies 
failed to consider agroecosystem characteristics. Scientists have now realized that many smallholder 
farmers cope with and even prepare for climate change, minimizing crop failure through a series of agro-
ecological practices (Altieri and Nicholls 2013). According to Altieri and Nicholls (2013:1), “to rescue 
traditional management systems, it should be combined with the use of agro-ecosystem based 
management strategies which may represent the only viable and robust path to increase the productivity, 
sustainability and resilience of peasant-based agricultural production under predicted climate scenarios”. 
Engaging stakeholders in an inclusive and coordinated manner would also help to come up with an 
appropriate priority list of adaptation options, looking through the lens of agro-ecosystems. 
By bringing different actors together through a broader and participatory approach, it is possible to 
prioritize possible adaptation options (Few et al. 2006). Stakeholders remain the sources of diverse views 
and ideas in creating an enabling atmosphere for social planning. The process of analysing stakeholders’ 
decision behaviour follows an approach to determine overall preferences among alternative options 
(UNFCC 2008). Analysing stakeholders’ decision behaviour starts with the selection of an alternative 
(choice) from sets, followed by prioritization which considers resource scarcity, feasibility and many other 
criteria, and finally ranking. Previous interventions in the upper Blue-Nile basin either failed to incorporate 
stakeholders’ opinion in planning and implementation or simply followed a blanket approach disregarding 
agro-ecosystem characteristics and the natural resources base. We put stakeholders’ preferences into 
perspective and rank agricultural and water related adaptation options using relevant and context specific 
evaluation criteria. Specifically, we want to give due emphasis to the performance of adaptation options 
under the criterion “agro-ecosystem relevance”. Stakeholders’ dialogue and opinions would also give us a 
concluding remark to the findings under behavioural and micro level studies. 
Individuals’ and social preferences are constructs of the social and environmental systems. Risk and 
time preferences can, for instance, be influenced by agro-ecosystem characteristics like soil and natural 
resources bases. Traditional agriculture practices in parts of the developing world are place specific; over 
time the particular habitat and culture that they are living in can shape farmer’s behaviour (Altieri and 
Nicholls 2013). This in turn would affect one’s risk and time preferences. Effects of climate change on agro-
ecosystems have received considerable research attention (see Rosenzweig and Hillel 2008; Simane et al. 
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2012). Rosenzweig and Hillel (2008) underline that maintaining agro-ecosystem balance under climatic 
stresses can help to achieve sustainable agricultural production; while Simane et al. (2012) stress the 
importance of agroecosystem based adaptation strategies and propose to scrutinize adaptation strategies 
from an agro-ecosystem point of view.  
1.4 Research objective and research questions 
In the context of the development of behavioural economics, this thesis contributes to the economic 
decision making literature by using experimental approaches to understand smallholder farmers’ 
adaptation decisions to climate change in developing countries, specifically by a case study in Ethiopia. The 
thesis presents and analyses field experimental data to elicit social and individual preferences in decisions 
related to adaptation to climate change. The thesis further deals with psychological factors like personality 
traits. There are many definitions of personality traits available in the literature. The most commonly used 
is the definition by Johnson (1997:74). According to Johnson (1997:74) “personality traits are defined as 
consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, or actions that distinguish people from one another”. Learning 
behaviour through social networks and groups are also examined in conjunction with personality traits. It is 
evident that one’s personality has the potential to determine the tendency for social interaction.  
The scope of the thesis is further extended to understand social preferences, and commonly 
accepted norms and values in the management and use of common pool natural resources. Common pool 
natural resources, such as forests, water bodies and common agricultural lands are essential in adaptation 
to climate change for smallholder farmers in developing countries. Finally, the thesis gives a priority rank 
for a list of adaptation options based on stakeholders’ survey and evaluations. Our approach makes the 
climate adaptation analysis comprehensive and inclusive, because it includes individual, social and 
stakeholders preferences on decisions related to adaptation to climate change by combining experimental 
approaches and surveys. 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate the behavioural mechanisms that are important in 
smallholder farmers’ adaptation decisions to climate change, and to explore the possibility of cooperative 
management of common pool resources in the context of adaptation to climate change. To this end, the 
following sets of research questions are addressed:  
1. What behavioural factors determine decisions related to adoption of climate innovations in a 
smallholder economy? 
There is a hypothesis that decisions related to adaptation to climate change are influenced by both 
risk and time preferences of individuals (Brekke and Johansen-Stenman 2008; Jin et al. 2015). To 
address this hypothesis, we elicit risk and time preferences of farmers using lab-in-the-field 
experiments and see their influence on the adoption of climate innovations. There is a growing 
evience showing that preferences are evolving and changing over time. To test this hypothesis, we 
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try to understand how risk and time preferences are constructed through social systems and 
environmental factors like agro-ecosystems.  
2. How do personality traits, learning from social networks and groups, and the recursive relationship 
of technologies determine adaptation to climate change? 
As part of this question, we are keen to study whether personality traits influence one’s 
information acquisition process. We also hypothesise that farm related technologies are related 
recursively, i.e. the adoption of an option depends sequentially on the adoption of another option. 
To consider this hypothesis, we look into whether there is a recursive relationship between the 
adoptions of different farm related technologies. We further study how social interactions through 
social groups and networks, and occurrence of exogenous shocks contribute to learning behaviour 
and preferences. 
3. Do social norms and ecological variables (favourable and non-favourable climate change) 
determine cooperative behaviour of smallholder farmers in the climate resilient management and 
use of common pool natural resources?  
In conjunction with this question, we look into the possibility of carbon sinks and sequestration in 
developing countries through managing common pool resources and using them as carbon sink. In 
this context, we also adhere to understand how social norms and social roles are associated.  
4. What are the priority ranks of climate adaptation options in the upper Blue-Nile basin?  
As part of this question, we try to identify a set of evaluation criteria and study whether there is a 
consistent priority ranking by farmers and experts in the upper Blue-Nile basin for the various 
adaptation options considered.  
The research questions are addressed in Chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis.  
1.5 Methods 
1.5.1 Lab-in-the-field experimental approach 
“Economics as viewed by economists, and as viewed by professional methodologists was generally taken to 
be a non-experimental science” (Bardsley et al. 2010:1). The work of Friedman (1953) inspired behavioural 
economists on methodological self-perceptions in the last three decades. Friedman (1953:10) proposed 
that “we can seldom test particular predictions in the social sciences by experiments explicitly designed to 
eliminate what are judged to be the most important disturbing influences”. Moreover, for environmental or 
natural resource issues (like air pollution or biodiversity protection), and for the use of open and common 
pool resources, markets are absent making the conventional economic methods problematic. As an 
alternative to the conventional economic approaches, experimental methods are largely applied in 
different social contexts.  
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Experimental data can be generated either in a lab, to test the behaviour of students, or in the field 
using subjects who are directly involved in the domain of interest. Lab based generated data has 
importance in terms of having higher response rate and reducing contaminations, however, there is a 
problem of external validity and drawing inferences. To bridge this gap, experimental economists are 
increasingly using field experiments (see Harrison and List 2004; Gerber and Green 2012). Field 
experiments can be classified in three broad categories (List 2014): (i) Artefactual field experiments also 
known as lab-in-the-field experiments which use participants from the domain of interest (e.g. Fehr and List 
2004; Gneezy et al. 2009), (ii) Framed field experiments which are similar to artefactual field experiments 
except that they reflect the real contexts in the experiment (Harrison and List 2004); and (iii) Natural field 
experiments take place in the very environment where participants normally undertake a certain task, and 
subjects may be unaware that they are taking part in an experiment (e.g. Gneezy and List 2006). Field 
experiments are becoming popular because they help to study relationships that can hardly be gauged 
through observational data (Banerjee and Duflo 2008) and address many of the limitations in conventional 
economics. The assumptions in conventional economics have limitations, because it assumes that decision 
makers have perfect knowledge and mental model in all environmental and market mechanisms (Watkins 
1957; Coleman 1990; Arrow 1994). In the thesis we apply lab-in-the-field experiments (Chapters 2 and 4) by 
drawing participants from smallholder farmers who are struggling with climate change impacts in their daily 
lives.  
1.5.2 Econometric models  
This thesis does not limit itself to experimental methods; it also makes use of a variety of econometric 
models. In Chapter 2 we use a multivariate probit model. The multivariate probit model (MVP) is used to 
explore whether risk and time preference behaviour and other socioeconomic, natural resources, and 
demographic characteristics have implications in decisions related to adoption of climate innovations. The 
multivariate probit model is a generalized probit model used to estimate several correlated binary 
outcomes jointly. We model three binary climate innovation decision problems: (i) Farm, (ii) Off-farm, and 
(iii) Institutional related climate innovations. Including variables such as risk and time preference 
parameters in the MVP regression could cause possible endogeneity, because behavioural variables could 
in turn depend on socioeconomic and demographic variables. To avoid possible endogeneity problem in the 
MVP regression, we further use an instrumental variable probit (IVProbit) regression after identifying 
plausible instrumental variables.  
In Chapter 3 we use a trivariate probit model. A trivariate probit model is used to understand 
interrelated binary decision problems simultaneously by allowing a correlation between unobserved 
disturbances. Multivariate probit models have limitations to allow correlation among unobserved 
disturbance. The trivariate probit model is designed to exploit the limitations in multivariate probit models. 
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According to Terracol (2002), a multivariate normal distribution function can be expressed as the product of 
sequentially conditioned univariate normal distribution functions, which can be easily and accurately 
evaluated. The trivariate probit model procedure is written based on the GHK recursive simulator (after 
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane). As a result, we employ a trivariate probit model procedure that was written 
by Terracol (2002) to understand whether adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties (HYV) 
recursively depends on the adoption of soil and water conservation practices, and irrigation technologies, 
and to understand research question 2.  
1.5.3 MCA 
In Chapter 5, we want to come up with a prioritized list of adaptation options in the upper Blue-Nile basin. 
A stakeholder based multi criteria analysis (MCA) supported by the PROMETHEE II procedure is used to 
outrank and evaluate list of possible adaptation options. There are more than 40 or more approaches that 
can be distinguished in the literature (Nijkamp et al. 1990; Janssen and van Herwijnen 2006; Cinelli et al. 
2014). The methods encompass from simple to complex rating systems. In common, the methods can give 
a broad framework for assessing the impact of making a choice, simplifying the decision into its constituent 
elements (Nijkamp et al. 1990; Nijkamp et al. 1990; Janssen and van Herwijnen 2006; Cinelli et al. 2014). All 
sorts of MCA methods requires first to develop a complete set of alternative, a tool to assess all relevant 
performance information for criteria, and a weight showing the relative significance of the criteria to 
resolve the problem.  
1.6 Relevance of the thesis 
In each chapter we address a research question that leads to novel contributions to the literature. The 
chapters are linked to each other in the following way: the empirical feasibility of policy options proposed 
in Chapter 2 have been tested and verified in Chapter 3. The limitations in Chapters 2 and 3 are addressed 
in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapters 2 and 3 are limited only to individuals’ preferences; hence we extend to 
understand cooperative behaviour and stakeholders’ opinion and evaluations in the process of adaptation 
to climate change in Chapters 4 and 5. The thesis can, thus, position itself in providing a comprehensive 
analysis to the adaptation decision to climate change, because it strives to understand micro level 
behavioural traits, cooperative behaviour (group context) and finally stakeholders’ preferences, opinion, 
and evaluation.  
Each chapter in turn contributes to the literature: Chapter 2 contributes to the debate on the 
relevance of behavioural economics in understanding smallholder farmers’ adaptation decision to climate 
change in developing countries. It complements an understanding by drawing inferences from multiple 
price elicitation exercises of risk and time preference behaviour using lab-in-the-field experiments. It also 
opens an opportunity for further study by highlighting the possibility of eliciting risk and time preferences 
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under different contexts including frameworks and heuristics of individuals. The effect of social and 
environmental constructs on subjects’ preferences is also examined, and shows the possibility of climate 
adaptation through adjusting agro-ecosystem and institutional arrangements.  
Chapter 3 contributes to the innovation adoption literature in two ways. First, it attempts to 
understand smallholder famers’ personality using a short personality test, and its effect on information 
inquiry in the process of adaptation to climate change. Second, it shows the recursive relationship of the 
different farm related climate adaptation options. Future studies are hence possible to understand these 
relationships under different context and sample size. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by drawing a conclusion to the hypothesis that cooperation 
is possible in the management and use of commons under repeated game settings. We tried to understand 
subjects’ behaviour under symmetric material incentives and information in a CPR game. It also brings the 
possibility of drawing subjects from smallholder farmers in the dynamic CPR games which have been 
confined to lab experiments using student subjects. Important insights are also gained regarding the 
environmental and social constructs of preferences and social norms. Above and more it shows the 
possibility of climate mitigation through commons management which is open for further inquiry under 
different climate scenario and settings.  
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature in developing countries by presenting the outranking and 
prioritization preferences of farmers and experts for a list of climate change adaptation options. It also adds 
to the literature by highlighting agro-ecosystem relevance as an important criterion in the evaluation of 
adaptation options. The different adaptation options are compared and ranked. Key evaluation criteria are 
also identified that allow farmers and experts of developing countries to outrank and compare adaptation 
options. The insights obtained in the upper Blue-Nile basin are likely to be relevant to other parts of 
Ethiopia and may also be important to other developing countries.  
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
The research questions are addressed in Chapters 2 to 5. Chapter 2 looks into the implication of risk and 
time preference on climate innovation adoption by first generating data using lab-in-the-field experiment 
and estimating parameters using an EUT approach, and see their implication on decision related to 
adoption of climate innovations using a multivariate probit model. Chapter 3 considers the problem how 
personality traits, learning from social groups and networks, and information affect the adoption of farm 
related adaptation options. A trivariate probit model is used to understand how the different farm level 
technologies are recursively related, and to look into how learning and personality traits influence adoption 
of the different farm related technologies. Chapter 4 applies a CPR and a “route choice” experiment to 
understand how social norms and preferences, and ecological variables play a role in the sustainable 
management and use of common pool resources, and further facilitate climate change mitigation through a 
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possible carbon sink. Chapter 5 applies an MCA using PROMETHEE II evaluation technique to outrank and 
prioritize possible adaptation options from agriculture, natural resource management and water related 
adaptation options. The thesis ends with a general discussion and synthesis of results and a summary of 
findings in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Implications of smallholders’ risk and time preferences for climate innovation adoption: 
Evidence from field experimental games1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter uses experimental lottery and time preference games combined with socio-
economic survey to elicit subjects’ decisions to adopt climate innovations in a smallholder economy in 
Ethiopia. Expected utility theory (EUT) with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification is used to 
derive risk aversion parameter and discount rate. The average risk aversion parameter and discount rate 
found in this chapter are 0.57 and 0.58 respectively. Multivariate Probit (MVP) and instrumental variable 
probit (ivprobit) models show that risk and time preference parameters significantly determine adoption 
decision of climate innovations. It is also observed that there is strong correlation between risk behaviour 
and different agro-ecosystems, and lower correlation between individual discount rate and willingness to 
invest in adaptation options. Institutional innovations are shown to be important for adaptation to climate 
change. We argue that credit, market access and expansion of learning systems should be in place to 
enhance uptake of climate innovations. 
  
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on: 
Nigussie YM, van Ierland EC, Zhu X, Kebede B, Klomp J (2016). Implications of smallholders’ risk and time preferences 
for climate innovation adoption: evidence from field experimental games. Working paper 
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2.1 Introduction 
As the threat of climate change is increasing, the concept of mitigation and adaptation to climate change 
through applying climate innovation and new technologies in low income societies needs more attention. 
Climate-innovation is “a transformative technology (non-fossil, non-nuclear product, system or service) that 
can have a significantly positive effect on climate change mitigation and adaptation if applied at a specific 
scale” (WWF 2011:23). The current practices of climate innovations are focused on clean energy 
technologies; however, climate innovations need not be limited to technological advancement: social and 
cultural innovations could also help to address the 21st century climate challenges (Suarez et al. 2011). 
Hence, there is a need to establish innovative technologies, energy systems, services, and institutions that 
could support communities in the generation of knowledge on mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change. Technical and institutional innovations addressing the livelihoods of smallholder farmers should be 
in place so that mitigation and adaptation to climate change would be possible (Chhetri et al. 2012). Simane 
et al. (2012) proposed community based innovation platforms (CBIPs) as an innovative approach to adapt 
to climate change in the upper Blue-Nile basin in Ethiopia. CBIPs are institutional arrangements designed to 
help smallholders realize a climate resilient economy through four integrated pillars: (i) innovation; (ii) 
natural resources management; (iii) market linkage, and (iv) stakeholders’ involvement. 
Farmers’ behaviour towards adoption of new technology is shaped by socio-economic, physical and 
behavioural factors (Doerr et al. 2011). Pro-poor institutional arrangements and their working environment 
(Devereux 2000), market development and access (Schmidt and Tadesse 2014), and climatic factors 
(Deressa et al. 2008 and 2010) are relevant in shaping smallholders’ behaviour. As summarized by Ihli et al. 
(2013), farmers’ economic decisions such as crop selection (Price and Wetzstein 1999), technology 
adoption (Purvis et al. 1995), conservation (Worku and Friederich 2016), and crop insurance (Hill and 
Viceisza 2012) depend on many factors including their risk and time preferences. Understanding risk and 
time preference behaviour would help to devise a strategy that facilitates the adoption of climate 
innovations. Investment on mitigation and adaptation options involves costs and benefit at present and in 
the future. Such inter-temporal distribution of costs and benefits influences the investment decision on 
mitigation and adaptation options (Stern 2007), which in turn is affected by individual rates of time 
preferences (Butt et al. 2005). 
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to improve our understanding of how behavioural factors 
contribute to smallholder’s decisions on adapting to climate change through adoption of climate 
innovations. We focus on farmers in the upper Blue-Nile basin in Ethiopia and derive individual level risk 
aversion parameters and discount rates using field experimental games. We, therefore, contribute to the 
literature by studying behavioural factors such as risk and time preferences in an experimental setting and 
analysing how behavioural, climatic, institutional and socio-economic factors affect smallholder’s 
adaptation decisions through adoption of climate innovations.  
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical background. Section 2.3 covers 
the methods and the theoretical and empirical model. Section 2.4 presents the discussion on experimental 
and econometric results. Lastly, in Section 2.5 we present the conclusions. 
2.2 Theoretical background 
2.2.1 Risk attitudes and measurement  
Starting with Binswanger (1980, 1981, 1982), many experimental studies were devoted to assess risk 
attitudes in developing countries (e.g. Barr 2003; Humphrey and Verschoor 2004; Harrison et al. 2010; 
Doerr et al. 2011; Ihli et al. 2013; Liebenehm and Waibel 2014). Risk is often measured through individual’s 
risk perception. Recently, application of experimental studies introduced lottery choices which are either 
framed as a single choice among a set of predetermined prospects (Binswanger 1981; Eckel and Grossman 
2008) or as an investment decision (Charness and Gneezy 2010). Alternatively, subjects might be asked to 
make multiple decisions between risky and non-risky pairs or sets of lotteries that reflect different risk 
structures (Holt and Laury 2002). 
Previous studies which dealt with risk behaviour following individuals’ risk perception include 
Holden et al. (1998), Cardenas and Carpenter (2008), Barr and Genicot (2008), Yesuf (2008), and Bezabih 
and Sarr (2012). Though, experimental elicitations of farmers’ risk preferences in the context of developing 
countries were rare (Pennings and Smidts 2003; Reynaud and Couture 2012), currently there is a growing 
literature in the application of lottery games to elicit risk preferences (e.g. Kebede and Zizzo 2015; Doerr et 
al. 2011; Charness and Viceisza 2012; Ihli et al. 2013; Liebenehm and Waibel 2014).  
Estimation of risk preferences is based on various procedures. The studies by Harless and Camerer 
(1994) and Hey and Orme (1994) applied econometric methods to estimate decision models from observed 
behaviour. Expected utility theory (EUT) (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) is widely used to estimate 
risk parameter of individuals based on data generated in field experiments. EUT studies on risk preferences 
implicitly assume that risk aversion comes solely from the concavity of a subject’s utility function 
(Binswanger 1980; Brick et al. 2012). This theory, however, has faced criticism from Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979 and 1992). According to Kahneman and Tversky decisions made by subjects are based on the 
potential value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome, i.e., subjects evaluate each choice 
independently of the other choice opportunities in an experiment. Recent studies by Cox et al. (2014) and 
Harrison and Swarthout (2014)2, however, refuted this proposition. Cox et al. (2014: 29), argued that “if it 
were true that subjects isolate each individual decision in multiple decision experiments, then choice of 
payoff mechanism would be an unimportant detail”. Empirically, Cox et al. (2014) found that there are large 
                                                 
2 Harrison and Swarthout (2014) find that “preferences estimated with a model that assumes violations of the Independence axiom are significantly 
affected when one elicits choices with procedures that require the independence assumption, as compared to choices elicited with procedures that 
do not require the assumption”.  
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differences across mechanisms in subjects’ revealed risk preferences, showing a clear violation of isolation 
of each decision task i.e., a violation of the independence axiom proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979 
and 1992).  
2.2.2 Time preference and individual discount rate  
In neoclassical economics, the rate of time preference (RTP) is usually taken as a parameter in an 
individual's utility function to capture the trade-off between consumption at present and in the future. It is 
also the underlying determinant of the real rate of interest (Laubach and Williams 2003). The rate of return 
on investment is generally seen as a return on capital, with the real rate of interest equal to the marginal 
product of capital at any point in time. Consumers, who are facing a choice between consumption and 
saving respond to the difference between the market interest rate and their own subjective rate of time 
preference; which is a reflection of subjective time preferences (Harrison et al. 2002). Studies on the rate of 
time preference have given much emphasis on investment and consumption theories; an association with 
climate change has rarely been addressed.  
Studies on RTP use various methods: for instance, hypothetical questions (Holden et al.1998), field 
experiments (Coller and Williams 1999) and large scale elicitations (D’Exelle et al. 2012). Multiple price 
elicitation technique is the most recent approach where subjects are faced with choices involving different 
discount rates. Related studies following the multiple price elicitation technique include the work of Liu 
(2013), Frederick et al. (2002) and Harrison et al. (2002).  
There is a growing literature on estimating risk and time preference jointly. Liebenehm and Waibel 
(2014) for small scale cattle farmers in West Africa; Andersen et al. (2006) for the general public in 
Denmark; Nielsen (2001) for a study on Madagascar ; and Tanaka et al. (2010) for Vietnamese villages. Joint 
elicitation helps to avoid over estimation due to the default assumption of risk neutrality. The discount 
rates defined in terms of temporally dated utility with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) avoids this 
problem (Andersen et al. 2006). Parameterization often follows the classic estimation procedure of 
exponential discounting (with a constant discount rate) or hyperbolic discounting (with a discount rate 
decreasing with time) (Frederick et al. 2002).  
2.2.3 Risk attitudes, time preference and climate change mitigation and adaptation  
There is extensive literature that identifies the impact of climate change on agriculture (e.g., Mendelsohn et 
al. 1994; Deressa et al. 2008 and 2010). These studies classify adaptation options at the farm, off-farm and 
institutional levels (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Deressa et al. 2008; Simane et al. 2012). Uptake of innovations to 
deal with climate change impacts is limited by many factors including economic interests, social, ecological 
values and norms, awareness, and self-perception (Grothmann and Patt 2005). Deprived farmers either lack 
money to invest in new technologies, or may have already suffered economic difficulties before any climate 
 
  
16 
 
catastrophe (McLeman et al. 2008). Since climate change poses uncertainty on the outcomes of 
innovations, risk behaviour is an important determinant of adoption. Climate mitigation and adaptation 
investment costs can also be explained through individuals’ rate of time preference (Harrison et al. 2002; 
Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008) as it involves an investment today and a return sometime in the 
future. The discount rate employed in the benefit and cost calculations over time can be thought of as the 
opportunity cost of investment, but it can also be seen as the relative value of consumption over time 
(Anthoff et al. 2009). Therefore, an individual's discount rate is an important parameter for individual’s 
decision to support a public good (Kovacs and Larson 2008). Although many empirical studies on time 
preferences and risk behaviour are available in the literature (e.g. Harrison et al. 2002 and 2004; Andersen 
et al. 2006; Yesuf 2008), detailed studies that link these issues to climate adaptation decisions are still 
lacking. 
2.3 Methodology 
We used a lottery game to estimate the risk attitude of individual farmers; and a time preference game to 
estimate individual discount rates. We played the games on a sample of 280 individuals in the upper Blue-
Nile basin in Ethiopia from November 2013 to January 2014. Randomly selected subjects were invited to 
take part in the games. A socioeconomic survey was conducted after the game sessions. We estimated the 
risk aversion parameter and individual discount rate following a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
utility specification. We further study how these behavioural factors influence climate innovation adoption 
using a multivariate Probit (MVP), and instrumental variable Probit (ivprobit) model. An ivprobit model is 
estimated for a possible endogeneity and to identify whether MVP model is more suitable than single 
equation ivprobit model.  
2.3.1 The lottery game 
2.3.1.1 Experimental design and procedure 
We used stratified random sampling following Simane et al. (2012) agro-ecosystem classification taking an 
agro-ecosystem as the largest first strata. However, without compromising the stratification, we selected 
two agro-ecosystems based on innovation uptake and future climate mitigation and adaptation potentials 
following the recommendations of Simane et al. (2012). The second stratum was the random selection of 
two districts from each agro-ecosystem followed by random selection of two Kebeles3 from each district. 
Caution was taken to avoid communication and experience sharing through common market places among 
sampled Kebeles. Accordingly, a total of eight Kebeles from each district and 35 subjects from each Kebele 
were selected.  
                                                 
3 Kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia. 
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The games were conducted in a nearby farmers’ training centre. Before conducting the games, 
subjects were informed through development agents for a possible 2.0-2.5-hour experimental session and 
the expected prizes and participation fee for showing up, in line with the literature on incentive effects 
(Holt and Laury 2002; Ihli et al. 2013). Based on Ihli et al. (2013) we also modified the lottery task by 
changing the monetary values and probabilities to different colours of balls (see Appendix 2.1). Before 
playing the game, an experimental protocol (see Appendix 2.3) was read to participants and 
demonstrations were shown. Finally, subjects played one of the choices for real by randomly drawing a 
rolled paper (written 1-10) from a basket and received the prize based on their choice of A or B. In each 
game session, a maximum of 8 subjects and four assistant experimenters took part. After the gaming 
session, they were guided to leave in different directions to avoid possible communication. We made an 
appointment with selected individuals to conduct a further focus group discussion.  
The experimental design follows the multiple price elicitation exercises of Holt and Laury (2002). 
Charness and Viceisza (2012) and Ihli et al. (2013) applied the method in Senegal and Uganda. The use of 
visual aids is recommended to make the lottery choice easier under the present lower literacy level of 
African smallholders. During the field experiment subjects were, therefore, supported with visual aids, and 
received real lottery payments. 
In the succession of pairs of binary lotteries, each pair is composed of a less risky lottery (option A) 
and a riskier lottery (option B). Subjects are asked to pick one lottery in each row (see Appendix 2.1). In the 
first row, the expected value of lottery A (10.2) is higher than lottery B (3.3); however, as one proceeds 
down the rows, the expected value of lottery B increases more quickly than lottery A. Subjects who are very 
risk-averse may never switch from choosing lottery A, while subjects who are very risk-seeking, may never 
switch from choosing the risky lottery B. Risk neutral subjects, on the other hand, would switch when 
lottery B overtakes lottery A in terms of the expected value (sixth row). 
In a lottery game, subjects would behave as risk averse, risk neutral, risk loving, or show 
inconsistent behaviour due to multiple switching. Including inconsistently behaving subjects in the 
estimation would be problematic. This can, however, be handled by introducing an “indifference” option 
during the choice task (Harrison et al. 2002; Andersen et al. 2008), or treated as indicative of confusion, in 
which case the data can be removed from the analysis. In our case, a small number of subjects (13%) 
switched more than once and we opted to drop these observations. Parameter estimation and inference 
require a unique switching point to rationalize under standard assumptions on preferences (Charness et al. 
2013).  
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2.3. 1.2 Estimation procedure 
We assumed that smallholder farmers behave in accordance with CRRA preferences. Following Anderson et 
al. (2006), we assumed that the utility of income from outcome ݆ א ሼͳǡʹሽ in lottery 
݇ א ሼ݈݂݁ݐሺܣሻǡ ݎ݄݅݃ݐሺܤሻሽ that individual ݅ א ሼͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሽ gets, denoted by ௜ܻ௞ǡ௝ is defined as:  
ܷ൫ ௜ܻ௞ǡ௝൯ ൌ
௒೔ೖǡೕ
ሺభషೝಶೆ೅ሻ
ଵି௥ಶೆ೅ , for ݎா௎் ് ͳ,      (2.1)
 
where ܷ൫ ௜ܻ௞ǡ௝൯ is the utility function of individual i, and ݎா௎்is the risk aversion parameter, with ݎா௎் = 0 
for risk neutrality, ݎா௎்0 for risk aversion; and ݎ௜ா௎்< 0 for risk seeking behaviour. In our lottery game each 
lottery ݇ in row ݉ (݉ א ሺͳǡʹǡ ǥͳͲሻሻ has two possible outcomes, each with probability ݌௠௝ . For a binary 
lottery, farmers are assumed to obtain the following expected utility for each m (see Harrison et al. 2002 
and Anderson et al. 2006): 
ܧ ௜ܷǡ௠௞ ൌ σ ݌௠௝ כ ܷ൫ ௜ܻ௞ǡ௝൯ଶ௝ୀଵ ,        (2.2) 
and to choose either option A or option B according to the value of the following latent index or choice 
rule: 
οܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ ൌ ܧ ௜ܷǡ௠௅ െ ܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ோ ൅ߤ௜,       (2.3) 
where οܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ is the difference between the expected utility of option A and option B, ߤ௜  denotes the 
errors made by subject ݅ due to noises in the process of calculating the expected utilities. It is  assumed to 
be normally distributed and uncorrelated across decision rows, 
ߤ௜̱ܰሺͲǡ ߪఓ೔ଶ ).        (2.4) 
In studies by Loomes (2005), Galarza (2009) and Wilcox (2011), it is indicated that different types of error 
specifications have profound implication on estimates of the risk aversion parameter. However, a recent 
study by Drichoutis and Lusk (2014) has compared the different types of errors in EUT and rank dependent 
utility (RDU) models and concluded that EUT is least affected by the selection of error specification. The 
estimation, thus, follows by transforming the latent index in equation (2.3) to a Probit function. The 
probability that an individual chooses lottery left (option A) over lottery right (option B) is estimated by the 
following Probit function: 
Pr (ܧ ௜ܷǡ௠௅ െ ܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ோ ൅ߤ௜ ൐ Ͳሻ= pr( ఓ೔ఙഋ೔ ൐ െ
ா௎೔ǡ೘ಽ ିா௎೔ǡ೘ೃ
ఙഋ೔
ሻ 
 =ͳ െ ʣ൬െா௎೔ǡ೘
ಽ ିா௎೔ǡ೘ೃ
ఙഋ೔
൰ ൌ ʣ൬ா௎೔ǡ೘
ಽ ିா௎೔ǡ೘ೃ
ఙഋ೔
൰, (2.5) 
where ߪఓ೔  is the standard error of the stochastic term ߤ௜, giving rise to the stochastic expected utility 
indicator: 
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οܵܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ ൌ ൬ா௎೔ǡ೘
ಽ ିா௎೔ǡ೘ೃ
ఙഋ೔
൰.       (2.6) 
ʣ(οܵܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ሻ denotes the probability of choosing lottery A, and ͳ െʣ(οܵܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ሻ represents the probability 
of choosing lottery B. Subject specific characteristics may change the average risk aversion parameter, and 
hence we include individual characteristics ௜ܺ  (see Galarza 2009) in the analysis. Accordingly, the log 
likelihood function for individual i can be written as: 
ܮ௜ா௎்൫ݎா௎்ǡ ߪఓ೔ǡ ܫ௜௠ǡ ௜ܺ൯ ൌ ς ൣʣሺοܵܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ሻூ೔ǡ೘൧ଵ଴௠ୀଵ כ ʣൣെሺοܵܧ ௜ܷǡ௠ሻଵିூ೔ǡ೘൧,  (2.7) 
where ܫ௜௠ is an indicator variable of the choice made by individual ݅ in row ݉ א ሺͳǡʹǡ ǥͳͲሻ, which takes the 
value of 1 when lottery A is chosen in row ݉, and 0 otherwise. ௜ܺ  is a vector of individual݅ǯݏ characteristics. 
Primarily, we assumed homogeneity among subjects and only include the wealth of individuals 
measured by the monetary value of fixed and variable assets. In later stages, we consider heterogeneity 
among subjects by including vector of households’ characteristics ( ௜ܺ). Subject specific risk aversion 
parameters ሺݎƸ௜ሻ can then be predicted as a linear function of the covariates of ௜ܺ  (in our case, age, sex and 
education level) and the average risk aversion parameter (ݎா௎்ሻ estimated under EUT. Accordingly, 
individual level risk aversion parameters ሺݎƸ௜ሻ can be derived following equation (2.8),  
ݎƸ௜ ൌ  ݎா௎் ൅ݎƸ௔௚௘ כ ܽ݃݁௜ ൅ݎƸ௦௘௫ כ ݏ݁ݔ௜ ൅ݎƸ௘ௗ௨ כ ݁݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ,   (2.8) 
where, ොୟ୥ୣ, ොୱୣ୶, and ොୣୢ୳ are risk aversion parameters due to heterogeneity in age, sex and education 
level, respectively. 
2.3.2 Time preference game 
2.3.2.1 Experimental design and procedure 
The experimental procedure for discount rates follows the procedures for risk games explained in Section 
2.3.1. In the multiple elicitation approach, we present subjects with 15 choices having a payment of ETB 
200 to be paid at the end of one month and a payment ܧܶܤʹͲͲ plus interest payments R (ܧܶܤʹͲͲ ൅ ܴ) 
at the end of month 7 (Appendix 2.1) (Anderson et al. 2008; Tanaka et al. 2010; Liebenehm and Waibel 
2014).  
2.3.2.2 Estimation procedure of the individual discount rate 
A similar specification with the risk aversion parameter is employed (see Andersen et al. 2006). To estimate 
the discount rate, the curvature of the utility function is determined by the risk preference of individuals 
ሺݎሻ and replacing the expected utility by the present value of the two outcomes (option A and option B). 
Including the risk preference ሺݎሻ provides valuable information about the curvature of the utility function, 
otherwise, assuming risk neutrality results in an over estimation of the discounting factor (see Andersen et 
al. 2006). Thus, the present value of the utility of payments at the end of the first month ( ௧ܻሻ at time ݐ is 
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ܲ ஺ܸ ൌ ܷሺ ௧ܻሻ,         (2.9)
and the present value of the utility of payments made at time ݐ ൅ ߬ ( ௧ܻାఛሻ is 
ܲ ஻ܸ ൌ ଵሺଵାఋሻഓ כ ܷሺ ௧ܻାఛሻ,       (2.10) 
where the subscripts A and B refer to the options A and B in the choice tasks. The following equations show 
the parametric form for the utility function in (2.9) and (2.10), and the CRRA form is given in equation (2.11) 
and (2.12): 
ܲ ஺ܸ ൌ  ௧ܻଵି௥Ȁሺͳ െ ݎሻ and       (2.11) 
ܲ ஻ܸ ൌ  ቂ ଵሺଵାఋሻഓቃ כ ሾ ௧ܻାఛଵି௥Ȁሺͳ െ ݎሻሿ      (2.12) 
The index of the difference between these two present values conditional on the discount rate (δ) and ݎ 
(the risk aversion parameter assuming a CRRA specification) can then be defined as: 
οܸܲ ൌ ܲ ஺ܸଵȀఔȀሺܲ ஻ܸଵȀఔ ൅ܲ ஺ܸଵȀఔሻ,      (2.13) 
where ߥ denotes the errors made by subject ݅ due to noises in the choice of a discount rate which is implicit 
in the choice task. The conditional log-likelihood is conditional on the EUT, CRRA and exponential 
discounting specifications being true: 
݈݊ܮூ஽ோሺݎǡ ߜǡ ߥǢ ܼǡ ࢄሻ ൌ σሾሺ݈݊ሺοܸܲሻכ ܼ௜ ൌ ͳሻ ൅ሺ݈݊ሺοܸܲሻכ ܼ௜ ൌ Ͳሻሿ, (2.14) 
where ܼ௜ ൌ ͳ denotes the choice of the right (option B) and ܼ௜ ൌ Ͳthe left (option A) in discount rate task ݅ǡ 
and ࢄ is a vector of individual characteristics which would help us to derive individual level discount rates as 
shown in equation (2.8).  
2.3.3 Climate innovation adoption model 
2.3.3.1 Multivariate Probit model 
Climate related innovations in this chapter include farm related climate innovations (FARM), off-farm 
climate innovations (OFFFARM) and institutional climate innovations (INSTITUTION). FARM includes 
technologies like water and soil conservation, improved varieties, fertilizer, and modern farming 
technologies (Simane et al., 2012). In the OFFFARM, we include bee hiving, bamboo works, cattle fattening 
through cooperatives, petty trading, fodder, agro-business, renting of some agricultural utilities and 
forestry programs4. INSTITUTION, on the other hand, includes memberships to innovation platforms 
introduced by government, non-government and private sectors which help smallholders adapt to climate 
change.  
To understand how risk, individual rate of time preference and other socioeconomic and 
demographic factors influence innovation adoption decisions, we follow Greene (2000) and use a 
Multivariate Probit (MVP) model. The MVP approach can simultaneously model the influence of the set of 
explanatory variables on each of the different practices, while allowing for the potential correlation 
                                                 
4 A subject is said to be an adopter of any given technology if at least he/she adopts one of the list. 
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between unobserved disturbances as well as the relationship between the adoptions of different practices 
(Belderbos et al. 2004). Hence, a farm household (i) is facing a decision on whether to adopt climate 
innovations (j), given subject’s risk aversion parameters (ݎƸ௜), individual discount rate ሺߜ௜), observed 
characteristics of households explained by (ݔᇱ), and unobserved characteristics (ߝ௜௝). The MVP econometric 
approach has j binary dependent variables ௜ܻ௝  such that: 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ͳ݂݅ݔᇱߚ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൐ Ͳǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊Ǣ ݆ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ͵Ǥ
ൌ Ͳǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁,         (2.15) 
where ݔᇱ is a vector of explanatory variables, ߚ௜ᇱݏ are vectors of parameters, and ߝ௜௝  are random error 
terms. The error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with zero means, unitary variance and J×J 
contemporaneous correlation matrix R=ߩ௜௝  (see Belderbos et al. 2004), with density function 
߰ሺߝ௜ଵǡ ߝ௜ଶǡ ߝ௜ଷǡ ܴሻǤ Thus, the likelihood that each observation contributes is the J-variant standard normal 
probability: 
  (2.16) 
2.3.3.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) method 
Endogeneity is considered as a problem in the estimation procedure when behavioural measures are 
included with adoption decision. It is possible that unobservable characteristics that affect adoption of a 
technology will also influence risk aversion and rate of time preference. The presence of such endogeneity 
would result in a misleading conclusion on the significance level and direction of relationships. The solution 
is to explicitly account for such endogeneity by using an instrumental regression technique that assumes a 
joint normal error distribution (Di Falco et al. 2011).  
Accordingly, the instrumental variable estimation follows a first stage estimation of the OLS 
regression of individual risk aversion parameter (ݎƸ௜) and discount factor ሺߜ௜) on a set instruments and 
explanatory variables௜. Hence, 
ݎƸ௜ ൌ Ⱦ௜ ൅ ρ୧ 
ߜ௜ ൌ Ƚ௜ ൅ ୧,       (2.17) 
where ρ୧ and ୧ are random error terms in the first stage OLS regression of endogenous variables. The use 
of OLS regression guarantees the presence of consistent estimates that are uncorrelated with the residuals 
(Greene 2008). Combining different estimation methods in the first and second stages is difficult unless a 
theoretical foundation justifies their use (see Newey 1987). Accordingly, our outcome variable based on a 
Probit model can be explained as: 
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ͳ݂݅ݔᇱߚ௜ ൅ ߛݎƸ௜ ൅ ߩߜ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൐ Ͳ 
ൌ Ͳǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ǡ     (2.18) 
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where ௜ܻ௝  is the observed variable indicating the adoption decision. The impact of ݎƸ௜ and ߜ௜  on the outcome 
variable is measured by the estimates of the parameter in a two-stage instrumental probit (ivprobit) 
regression by the parameters ߛ and ߩ. The ivprobit model for FARM, OFFFARM and INSTITUTION would 
also help us to test the hypothesis on whether decisions are made jointly using the MVP model.  
The identification of instruments was a difficult task. However, to reduce the possible causal 
relationship, we tried to find variables that are much more collinear to risk and time preference than 
adoption decision variables. Variables to be a strong instrument should be collinear (instrument relevance) 
with risk and time preference but non-collinear (instrument exogeniety) to adoption decision. Accordingly, 
access to health services, access to school in a village, proximate to financial institution and loss of farm 
animals are considered as instruments. Health education and access has been identified as a tool that 
would reduce risky undertakings related to health (Jackson et al. 2012). Access to schools is also expected 
to affect behaviour in villages which are closer to schools and main roads who would have better 
behavioural make up than those who are in distant. Besides, farmers with access to financial institution, 
have a better attitude towards saving and borrowing. Since, behaviour can be shaped over time, and it is a 
cumulative effect of environment and society, the presence of financial institutions shapes risk and RTP 
over time more than adoption decision. Finally, animals are main assets for farmers, a loss of these vital 
assets could negatively affect farmers risk and time preference behaviour.  
2.4 Findings and discussions  
2.4.1 Risk estimation results  
The risk parameter estimate of the sample assuming that choices are entirely explained by EUT and the 
assumption of CRRA preferences being true is ݎா௎்= 0.577, with a relatively small standard deviation of the 
random mistakes ߪఓ೔  =0.015 (see Appendix 2.2). Including selected individual characteristics as covariance 
of the structural model, we find that those households with access to credit have a coefficient of risk 
aversion parameter close to zero (at p-values=0.014), indicating that access to credit reduces risk aversion 
behaviour (see in Appendix 2.2). A summary of the estimated risk parameters is given in Figure 2.1 showing 
that majority of individuals (85%) are under the risk averse category.  
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Figure 2.1. Distribution of risk aversion parameters  
Source: own calculation.  
We can derive subject specific risk parameters using equation (2.8). It is also possible to calculate individual 
level risk aversion parameter at the switching point during the lottery task. However, due to inclusion of 
the average risk aversion parameter (ݎா௎்ሻ in equation (2.8), individual level risk aversion parameters 
differ from the ones calculated at the switching points (See Appendix 2.2). Thus, we opted to report the 
values based on switching, as they are showing actual choices between risk categories.  
We also considered how shock experience (drought and flood experience) and location dummies 
(representing differences in agro-ecosystems) are correlated with risk behavior (see Appendix 2.2). The 
variation in correlation coefficient could have been from differences in endowment of natural resources, 
soil type, shock experience and accessibility to public infrastructure (Simane et al. 2012). The correlation 
coefficient between risk loving behavior and location dummy “Machakil” is strong (0.317) compared to 
others. This implies that farmers in Machakil may be more risk loving than other farmers in our study; the 
district has better access to markets and credit facilities compared to the other districts.  
2.4.2 Individual discount rate estimation results  
The maximum likelihood estimation result for the discount rate is 58% (G=0.58) and the risk aversion 
parameter in estimating the discount rate is 13.7% (ݎ=0.137) (see Appendix 2.2). Andersen et al. (2006) 
have shown that it is necessary to estimate time preferences jointly with risk preferences as it provides 
valuable information about the curvature of the utility function in eliciting RTP. The standard error ߤ௜G is 
found to be (ߪఓ೔G =0.080), showing that randomness in choices and the extent of noise is very small. From 
the follow up focus group discussion, we understand that subjects who preferred option A throughout the 
game have better awareness about alternative investment options like cash crops. On the other hand, 
those who preferred option B have taken training on saving and credit. In order to characterize elicited 
discounting behaviour, Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of individual discount rates (G௜ሻ estimated at the 
switching point. With the same reasoning as individual level risk aversion parameters, we preferred to 
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derive individual discount rates at the switching point. The majority of subjects’ (50%) have a discount rate 
(G) above the median (22%). Under such high discount rates, it would be difficult to find climate innovation 
investment options that generate positive net present values.  
 
Figure 2.2. Box plot for the distribution of individual level discount rates in the case study 
Source: own calculation. 
To see how G௜  and the willingness to invest in some mitigation and adaptation practices, we derived the 
correlation coefficients between G௜  and selected adaptation measures (see Appendix 2.2). The result shows 
a weak correlation between individual level discount rate and willingness to invest in adaptation options. 
This is in line with the findings from focus group discussions and the study of Yesuf (2004) for Ethiopia.  
2.4.3 Adoption decision, risk aversion parameter and individual discount rate 
To understand the effect of risk behaviour, individual discount rate and other socioeconomic variables, we 
employed an MVP model. Table 1 presents the results of the MVP model. The descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables are reported in Appendix 2.2. Table 2.1 shows the estimated coefficients, the level of 
significance and the direction of influence of variables. The likelihood ratio test statistic (ݔଶ(3) =78.42, 
Prob> χ2 = 0.000), tells us that parametric coefficients are different from zero, i.e., rejecting the null 
hypothesis on the restricted model. The regression results of the MVP model are summarized below. 
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Table 2.1. Multivariate probit model estimation results with standard errors and coefficients  
Variables 
              FARM                       NONFARM INSTITUTION  
Coeff          SE              Coeff                SE            Coeff                    SE           
PRODUC 0.002 0.012 0.036 0.013* 0.033 0.012* 
DISCRATE-DROUGHT 1.476 0.808*** -0.414 0.783 0.866 0.891 
RISK-DROUGHT 2.117 0.635* -1.28 0.609** 0.117 0.533 
FAMSIZE 0.152 0.059* 0.086 0.054 0.084 0.057 
FARMSIZE -0.209 0.308 -0.312 0.338 0.797 0.340** 
CREDI 0.033 0.235 0.506 0.243** 0.442 0.242*** 
EXTHYV 0.804 0.285* 0.552 0.348 0.034 0.269 
EXTCH -0.156 0.344 0.948 0.378* -0.682 0.316** 
EXTSOILC 0.184 0.407 -0.611 0.406 0.196 0.404 
DROUGHT 1.249 0.670** 0.508 0.599 -0.728 0.586 
FLOOD 1.055 0.672 -1.162 1.131 5.368 0.516* 
TEMP 0.219 0.074* -0.531 0.079* 0.008 0.071 
RAIN -0.039 0.014* 0.041 0.012* -0.008 0.012 
LIVSIZE 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.011*** -0.014 0.001 
HSEX 0.402 0.317 -0.107 0.427 0.112 0.359 
AGEH -1.626 0.730** -0.001 0.013 0.013 0.011 
EDUH 2.123 0.615* -0.189 0.262 0.297 0.218 
DISINPUT 0.014 0.007** 0.022 0.009** -0.003 0.006 
MARKACESS -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.004* 
DISCOUNTRATE (ߜప෡ ) -1.675 0.744** -0.017 0.725 -0.46 0.832 
RISKAVERSION(ݎపෝሻ -2.121 0.635* 1.299 0.610** -0.081 0.534 
_CONS 1.018 1.988 2.417 2.508 -8.48 2.339* 
Likelihood ratio test  
   χ2  (3)=78.42 
 
Prob> χ2= 0.0000 
Sample size= 245 
Wald 
χ2(63) = 
 
1779.7 Prob> χ2= .0000 
Note: *,**,*** denotes p < 0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.10, respectively. 
Source: own calculation. 
Demographic and socioeconomic variables: 
In this category of variables, sex of household head (AGEH), family size (FAMSIZE) and education level 
(EDUH) of head of the household are found to relate positively and significantly with adoption of farm 
related measures. This is consistent with the findings of Teklewold et al. (2006). On the other hand, we find 
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that farm size (FARMSIZE) and adoption of institutional innovation is found to be positively related. 
Households with larger farm size might tend to participate in institutions which help them improve 
agricultural productivity.  
Climate shocks and stresses: 
Climate related shocks and stresses were measured by temperature, precipitation, and experience of 
drought and flooding. Change in temperature and precipitation at village level was approximated by taking 
averages for last ten years (2003-2012) at district level. As a result, we find that the change in temperature 
(TEMP) and change in precipitation patterns (RAIN) are found to relate negatively and positively 
respectively with the adoption of farm related and off-farm related climate innovations. Climate change 
related shock indicator variable (DROUGHT) measured by frequency of occurrence is found to influence 
adoption of farm related innovations positively. Flood (FLOOD) occurrence, on the other hand, is positively 
related to the adoption of institutional innovations. These findings are consistent with studies by Deressa et 
al. (2008 and 2010) 
Social and physical variables: 
Distance to input market (DISINPUT) and market access (MARKACESS) both measured by the time it takes 
to reach an input market and all product markets are among physical variables used. DISINPUT is found to 
be significant in determining adoption of farm and off-farm climate innovations. MARKACESS is significant 
in determining institutional innovations. Credit is another capital indicator variable measured by the 
amount borrowed (CREDI). It is found to influence off-farm and institutional innovations adoption positively 
and significantly. This suggests that rural infrastructure expansion is at the centre of climate adaptation 
programs. Access to markets and credit provide opportunities to farmers which enable them to acquire 
farm and off farm technologies. These findings are consistent with the studies by Teklewold et al. (2006), 
Deressa et al. (2008) and Yesuf (2010).  
2.4.4 Risk behavior, individual discount rates and marginal effects  
In the MVP model individual level risk aversion parameters (ݎƸ௜) found to relate negatively and significantly 
(p=1%) to the adoption of farm related innovations. The interaction term (RISK-DROUGHT) between 
drought occurrence and risk parameter is found to relate positively with the adoption of farm related 
innovations. In other words, those who are risk averse but have experienced drought have a higher 
probability of adopting farm related climate innovations. Furthermore, the risk aversion parameter is found 
to influence the adoption of off-farm innovations positively. Subjects who are more risk averse tend to 
invest in off-farm innovations and avoid risky farm investments. This is in line with the literature on this 
topic for developing countries (e.g. Liu 2013). With regard to individual discount rate, the MVP model show 
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that individuals with a higher discount rate are reluctant to adopt climate innovations, which is evidenced 
by the negative relationship between the individual level discount rates and adoption of farm related 
innovations (FARM) (see Table 2.1). The high individual discount rate is consistent with Yesuf (2004) and 
Bezabih and Sarr (2012) for Ethiopian cases. 
However, the estimated coefficients in the MVP are not interpreted directly; rather they show a 
change in the z-score due to a change in the independent variable. We are, therefore, interested to 
understand whether a change in risk aversion parameter, risk behavior and individual discount rate 
changes the probability of climate innovation adoption decision significantly. The marginal effects of risk 
aversion parameter, individual discount rate and risk attitudes are reported in Table 2.2. The risk aversion 
parameter is found significant (p=5%) in explaining the probability of innovation adoption. On average, a 
change in the risk aversion parameter by one unit changes the probability of innovation adoption 
negatively by 0.34; whereas a unit change of the individual level discount rate does not affect the 
probability of innovation adoption significantly. To understand a switch from one behavioral domain to the 
other, we measure the marginal effect of a shift from risk averse (used as the reference) to risk loving and 
risk neutral behavior. The marginal effect of a change in risk loving behavior changes the probability of 
innovation adoption by 4.9% indicating that a shift from other behavioral categories to risk loving behavior 
(from 0 to 1) significantly influences the probability of innovation adoption which is in line with most of the 
literature (see Ross et al. (2010) for an overview).  
Table 2.2. Marginal effects of risk parameter, individual discount rate and risk attitude  
Variable                dy/dx        Std. Err.             P>|z|   
 Parameters: 
    DISCOUNT RATE  -0.414 0.455 0.363 
   RISKAVERSION -0.340 0.164 0.038 
Risk attitudes: 
         RISKLOVER 4.911 0.106 0.000 
        RISKNEUTRAL  0.031 0.328 0.925 
Source: own calculation. 
 2.4.5 Instrumental variable regression results (two step ivprobit) 
In this section we present a two-step Probit regression with instrumental variables (see Table 3). We 
considered risk aversion and time preference parameters as endogenously determined by subject specific 
characteristics. 
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Table 2.3. Two-step Probit regression results with coefficients and standard errors 
 
VARIABLES 
FARCI  NONFARM INSTITUTION 
Coef.    Std. Err.     Coef.    Std. Err.      Coef.   Std. Err.      
INDIVIDUAL DR 0.221 0.185 -0.411 0.150* -0.0393 0.1662 
RISKAVERSION -2.886 0.484* 0.273 0.395 -1.0098 0.4198* 
HSEX -0.110 0.173 0.177 0.14 0.0122 0.1423 
AGEH -0.211 0.181 0.404 0.148* 0.0560 0.1636 
EDUH 0.796 0.411** -1.115 0.336* 0.1533 0.3676 
LIVSIZE     -0.034 0.006* 0.016 0.005* -0.0179 0.0057* 
EXTHYV    0.954 0.130* 0.587 0.114* 0.0674 0.1049 
EXTCH    -1.259 0.161* 1.283 0.119* -1.0391 0.1310* 
EXTSOILC   -0.816 0.125* 0.346 0.094* -0.2424 0.1188* 
DROUGHT     0.543 0.118* -0.443 0.103* -0.4845 0.0963* 
FLOOD    -0.348 0.135* -0.237 0.144* 0.2093 0.1064** 
RAIN    -0.039 0.005* 0.033 0.005* -0.0024 0.0046 
TEMP     0.250 0.034* -0.455 0.032* 0.0335 0.0283 
CREDI     -0.147 0.293 1.186 0.237* 0.6275 0.2646** 
MARKACESS   0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0146 0.0018* 
DISINPUT   0.022 0.002* 0.019 0.002* -0.0062 0.0022* 
FARMSIZE    -0.558 0.145* 0.176 0.116 1.0004 0.1318* 
FAMSIZE 0.327 0.032* 0.069 0.025* 0.1543 0.0265* 
PRODUC 0.024 0.006* 0.042 0.006* 0.0475 0.0058* 
CONS 0.001 1.025 2.283 0.868* -4.9025 0.9181* 
Wald chi2(19)    =    460.76    =    870.94    =    375.41 
Prob > chi2      =    0.0000     =    0.0000   =    0.0000 
INSTRUMENTED: RISKAVERSIONPAR  INDIVIDUAL DR 
INSTRUMENTS:  
  HSEX, AGEH, EDUH, LIVSIZE, EXTHYV, EXTCH, EXTSOILC DROUGHT, CHANFLOOD, 
CHARAIN, CHTEMP, CREDI, 
 
MARKACESS, DISINPUT, FARMSIZE, FAMSIZE, PRODUC DISSCHOOL,  DISHEALTH, 
DISFINANCEINS, LOSSANIMAL 
Note: *,**,*** denotes p < 0.01, p< 0.05, and p< 0.10, respectively. 
Source: own calculation. 
Steps in instrumental variable regression include the identification of valid and strong instruments. Though, 
we may not be prefect in identifying perfect instruments we tried to show how our instruments are strong. 
The instruments are access to school in a village (DISSCHOOL), access to health services (DISHEALTH), 
access to financial institution (ACCFINANCINS) and loss of animals (LOSSANIMAL). Accordingly, to test for 
correlation, an F-test was done after regressing a reduced form first stage regression and find that (F (21,  
241))= 36.35, and (F (21, 3474)) = 14.97 for risk aversion and individual level discount rate respectively, 
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indicating that the identified instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous variables (see Stock et 
al. 2002). The validity of our selected instruments was also tested by running an auxiliary first stage 
regression which reveals that socioeconomic and demographic variables significantly influence risk aversion 
parameter (ݎƸ௜ሻ and individual discount rates ሺߜ௜) (see Appendix 2.2). This shows that both risk and time 
preference are shaped by many factors including climatic factors, such as rainfall and change in 
temperature.  
Initially, we were arguing that the decisions on adoption of the various types of climate innovations are 
simultaneously made. However, as we compare the two-step probit and MVP regression results, the 
different adoption decisions tend to be independent. The signs and directions of significance are different 
in most explanatory variables. For instance, individual discount rate (DISCRATE) at household level and 
market access (MARKACCESS) are insignificant in influencing farm related climate innovations in the case of 
ivprobit and significant in the case of MVP. Besides, the number of significant variables increased in the 
case of two-step Probit model. This is an indication that climate innovations adoption decisions are made 
independently of each other.  
2.5 Conclusions  
Primarily, the aim of this chapter was to improve our understanding of how behavioural factors like risk and 
time preferences influence decisions on climate innovation. We performed a field experiment in the upper 
blue-Nile basin in Ethiopia on risk attitudes and time preferences. The risk aversion parameter and 
individual discount rate were estimated following an EUT approach with CRRA specification. From the 
maximum likelihood estimation, we found that subjects are highly risk averse (ݎா௎்=0.577) and apply a 
high discount rate (G=0.584). Risk and time preference behaviour have paramount importance in 
interventions related to rural development programs. Individual risk and time preferences are shaped by 
many factors including education, shock experience, and access to credit and markets. This is found true in 
our first stage regression of the ivprobit model where market access (MARKACESS), and drought and flood 
(FLOOD and DROUGHT) are significant in determining risk aversion and rate of time preference behaviour. 
Strategies to counter act against risk aversion and high discounting behaviour include institutions that 
support farmers through the market mechanism and these are important in the smallholder economy in 
the upper Blue-Nile basin. Enhancing education level, expansion of farmer extension services and pro-poor 
institutions are fundamental in changing the high discounting behaviour. As observed in the focus group 
discussion, on-going training and awareness helped famers to weigh the costs and benefits of the different 
investment options. It is therefore recommended to mainstream mitigation and adaptation policies in 
education and training programmes.  
To see whether individual level risk aversion (ݎƸ௜) and discount rates (ߜ௜) are related to climate 
innovations adoption, we use an MVP model. We found thatߜ௜  and (ݎƸ௜) are negatively and significantly 
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related to adoption decision of farm related innovations; indicating that those who have a higher discount 
rate and that are more risk averse can be classified as non-adopters.  
Climatic variables such as temperature (TEMP), drought (DROUGHT) and flooding (FLOOD) are found 
significant in determining climate innovation adoption decisions. Farm households that have experienced 
flooding and drought are inclined to adoption of new technologies.  
Our sampled households are classified based on agro-ecosystems (see Simane et al. 2012). These agro-
ecosystems have different climatic, natural resources, soil and ecology. The suitability of the agro-
ecosystem for the farm and off-farm innovations basically has implication for adoption decisions. Agro-
ecosystem 3, for instance, which is characterized by mid land plains and brown soil, and which is well-
known for its excess cereal production, is found to have a negative correlation with risk loving behaviour.  
Distance to input markets and access to credit facilities positively influence the adoption of farm 
related climate innovations suggesting that rural development programs would bring a climate resilient 
economy if supported by access to markets and credit facilities.  
Expecting endogeneity in the MVP model, we run a two-step probit (ivprobit) regression. The 
estimation results and tests suggest the presence of endogeneity. This is clearly shown in the differences in 
the significance level of some of the parameters between MVP and ivprobit regression. More variables are 
found significant in the case of ivprobit.  
We conclude that behavioural factors like risk and time preference elicited following a field set up can 
best describe adoption decisions as explained in this chapter. Policy options including expansion of farmer 
training and experience sharing as observed from this chapter shows that training on saving and extension 
services have a positive impact on the decisions to adopt new innovations. Enabling access to credit, as it is 
evidenced from the empirical work, reduces risk aversion. Developing a strategy that would reduce high 
discounting would be favourable, since high discounting discourages investment in climate innovations. 
Access to input markets and to product markets would help to reduce the challenges and pressures 
through diversified livelihoods. Finally, we conclude that farm related institutional innovations, in particular 
community based experience sharing and learning platforms, cooperative groups based on agro-ecosystem 
and natural resources, and institutions for dissemination and introduction of agroecosystem relevant 
technologies are important for farmers in Ethiopia in the process of climate adaptation and mitigation. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 2.1. Experimental aids and payoff matrices  
 
  = ETB 12         = ETB 10   =  ETB 1        = ETB 24 
 
Figure A 1. Pictorial diagrams of lottery games (choice task 1, 5 and 10) 
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Table A1. Choice options (A, B) and related probabilities (p(x1), p(x2)) and pay-offs (x1, x2) for the lottery 
experiment 
Choice 
Choice A Choice B Constant 
relative risk 
aversion 
intervals 
Choice  
( A or B) p(x1) x1 p(x2) x2 p(x1) x1 p(x2) x2 
1 0.1 12 0.9 10 0.1 24 0.9 1 -∞, -1.71   
2 0.2 12 0.8 10 0.2 24 0.8 1 -1.71, -0.95   
3 0.3 12 0.7 10 0.3 24 0.7 1 -0.95, -0.49   
4 0.4 12 0.6 10 0.4 24 0.6 1 -0.49, -0.15   
5 0.5 12 0.5 10 0.5 24 0.5 1 -0.14, 0.14   
6 0.6 12 0.4 10 0.6 24 0.4 1 0.15, 0.41   
7 0.7 12 0.3 10 0.7 24 0.3 1 0.41, 0.68   
8 0.8 12 0.2 10 0.8 24 0.2 1 0.68, 0.97   
9 0.9 12 0.1 10 0.9 24 0.1 1 0.97, 1.37   
10 1 12 0 10 1 24 0 1 1.37, ∞   
 
Table A2. Pay off table for time preference games  
S.N Option A (to be paid in one 
month) 
Option B (to be paid at the 
end of month six) 
Annual Interest 
rate (non- 
compounded 
applied to option B) 
Choice (A or B) 
1 ETB 200 ETB 204 4%   
2 ETB 200 ETB 205 5%   
3 ETB 200 ETB 206 6%   
4 ETB 200 ETB 207 7%   
5 ETB 200 ETB 210 10%   
6 ETB 200 ETB 212.5 12.5%   
7 ETB 200 ETB 215 15%   
8 ETB 200 ETB 217.5 17.5%   
9 ETB 200 ETB 220 20%   
10 ETB 200 ETB 222.5 22.5%   
11 ETB 200 ETB 227 27%   
12 ETB 200 ETB 237 37%   
13 ETB 200 ETB 252 52%   
14 ETB 200 ETB 272 72%   
15 ETB 200 ETB 300 100%   
Session_________  Date __________ Seat_________ 
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Appendix 2.2. Descriptive statistics and suplemental estimation results  
Table A3. Definitions and summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
 
 
Variables  
 
 
Description  
 
 
Mean   Std. Dev.  
AGEH  Age of head of the household 42.425 0.597 
HSEX  1=if head of the household is male 0.905 0.019 
MARH 1=if the head is married 0.941 0.005 
CREDI 1=if access to credit is present  0.697 0.007 
LIVSIZE     Livestock size 16.920 0.649 
EDUH 1=if the head of the HH is educated  0.594 0.008 
FAMSIZE Family size 6.432 0.039 
FARMSIZE Farm size in Ha. 1.301 0.005 
RISK-DROUGHT 
Interaction term between risk par. and drought 
occurrence 0.316 0.025 
DISCRATE-DROUGHT Interaction term between IDR and drought occurrence 0.283 0.006 
MARKACESS     Distance in minutes to reach in a nearby  market 58.832 1.891 
DISINPUT      Distance in minutes to input market 38.085 1.594 
EXTHYV    1=if get extension service on HYV 0.922 0.018 
EXTCH    
1=if the farmer receives extension service on climate 
change related 0.743 0.029 
TEMP Change in temperature at village level 15.007 13.600 
RAIN    Change in rainfall patterns at village level 1350.000 15.630 
DROUGHT    1=if experienced drought for the last ten year 0.918 0.018 
FLOOD      1=if experienced flooding for the last ten year 0.992 0.006 
LOCELIA 1=if belonging to Debreelias district 0.269 0.007 
LOBASO 1=if belonging to Basoliben district 0.246 0.007 
LOCGOZ 1=if belonging to Gozamin district 0.285 0.007 
LOCMACH 1=if belonging to Machakil district 0.203 0.007 
DISSCHOOL Time to the nearest school in a village (min)  26.9 0.348 
DISTHEALTH Time to the nearest health Centre (min). 54.78 0.55 
DISTFINANCIST Time to reach to the nearest fin. Inst. (min) 72.36 0.50 
LOSSANIM 1=if lost animal due to unexpected shocks 0.68 0.01 
ݎƸ௜ Individual level risk aversion parameter 0.412   0.594      
ߜ௜ Individual level discount rate 0.415   0.351 
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Table A4. EUT estimates of CRRA coefficient with stochastic error (Ɋ௜ா௎்), homogenous agent case  
Coefficient 
     
Variable  
     
Estimate     
 
Std. Err.     
 
P>|z|   
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
 
 
CONSTANT 
 
 
0.5774 
 
 
0.03472 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.5093 
 
 
0.6456 
 
 
CONSTANT  
 
0.118 
 
 
0.01481 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.0888 
 
 
0.1471 
*Note: ݎா௎் refers to the whole sample risk aversion parameter; and Ɋ௜ா௎்is the stochastic error term 
assuming a Fechner error story. 
Table A5. EUT estimates of CRRA coefficient with stochastic error (Ɋ௜ா௎்), heterogeneous agent case 
 
Coefficient      
   
Variable        
 
Estimate      
          
Std. Err.       
   
P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
   
HSEX 0.0468 0.051 0.358 -0.0531 0.1469 
AGEH -0.0009 0.0068 0.8883 -0.0143 0.0125 
EDUH -0.0279 0.0212 0.1881 -0.0695 0.0136 
CREDIT 0.1431 0.0581 0.0142 0.0291 0.2571 
CONS 0.5778 0.2799 0.0392 0.0291 1.1264 
 
  
 
CONS 
 
0.1019 0.0145 
 
0.000 
 
0.0734 0.1304 
 
Table A6. Comparison of predicted and switching point values of risk and discount rate parameters 
  Variable         Mean          Std. Dv.       Min Max. 
RISK_PREDICTED  0.570 0.0210 0.4960 0.6090 
DR_PREDICTED 0.433 0.0895 0.2090 0.7190 
RISK_SWITCH 0.4121 0.5940 -1.7100 1.3700 
DR_SWITCH 0.415 0.3510 0.040 1.000 
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Table A7. Tetrachoric correlation matrix between location dummies, climatic shock and risk behavior 
Covariant  
Risk behavior type 
 Risk averse Risk lover          Risk neutral  
Location/Agroecosystem: 
       DEBRE-ELIAS 
 
0.347* 
 
-0.537** 
 
-0.119** 
       BASOLIBEN -0.076** 0.136*** 0.052** 
       GOZAMIN 0.002 -0.073*** 0.111*** 
       MACHAKIL -0.184*** 0.317** 0.013 
Shock type: 
      DROUGHT 
 
-0.259** 
 
0.381** 
 
0.111*** 
      FLOOD  0.075* -0.045 0.529 
Note:*, **,*** denotes p <0.01, p <0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
Table A8. Estimates of individual time preferences assuming CRRA utility function  
Coefficient     Variable         Estimate          Std. Err.    
   
P>|z|     
 [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
Constant 0.1374 0.0177 0 0.026 0.1721 
 
 
Constant 0.6755 0.0802 0 0.5183 0.8327 
LNdelta* 
Constant -0.538 0.2394 0.03 -1.008 -0.0688 
G 0.5839 0.1398 0 0.3099 0.8579 
* Note: ݎ is the risk aversion parameter, X the error term in the decision choice and LNdelta -the natural 
logarithm of delta (discount factor) which can be transformed through the syntax: delta= exp([LNdelta] 
Table A9. Correlation matrix between individual discount rate and adaptation practices  
G௜  Soil conservation   Tree planting Water harvesting 
G௜  1       
Soil conservation   0.079 1   
Tree planting 0.177** 0.707** 1 
Water harvesting 0.194** 0.377** 0.579 1 
Note: ** indicates p<0.05 significant level. 
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Table A10. First stage OLS regression results of endogenous variables       
VARIABLES 
risk aversion parameter individual discount rate 
Coef. Std. Err.     P>t     Coef.    Std. Err.     P>t     
HESEX -0.146 0.034 0 0.355 0.050 0 
AGEH 0.004 0.001 0 0.981 0.002 0 
EDUH -0.014 0.021 0.517 -2.259 0.031 0 
LIVSIZE -0.010 0.001 0 -0.008 0.001 0 
EXTHYV 0.050 0.026 0.052 0.246 0.038 0 
EXTCH -0.098 0.028 0.001 0.510 0.042 0 
EXTSOILC 0.051 0.027 0.06 0.362 0.041 0 
DROUGHT -0.100 0.024 0 -0.116 0.036 0 
FLOOD 0.006 0.026 0.83 0.336 0.039 0 
RAIN 0.007 0.001 0 -0.013 0.002 0 
TEMP 0.031 0.006 0 0.118 0.009 0 
CREDI -0.001 0.024 0.977 1.565 0.036 0 
MARKACESS 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
DISINPUT 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.074 
FARMSIZE -0.075 0.032 0.019 0.355 0.047 0 
FAMSIZE 0.053 0.005 0 0.008 0.007 0.243 
PRODUC 0.008 0.001 0 0.015 0.002 0 
DISTSCHOOL -0.004 0.001 0 0.005 0.001 0 
DISHEALTH -0.002 0.000 0 -0.005 0.001 0 
DISFINANCEINS 0.003 0.000 0 -0.002 0.001 0.005 
LOSSOFANIMAL -0.027 0.022 0.217 -0.243 0.032 0 
CONS -1.291 0.200 0 2.457 0.297 0 
  
F( 21,  
474)= 
  36.35 
  
F( 21,  3474) =   14.97 
  Prob > F= 0          Prob > F      =  0.0000 
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Appendix 2.3. Instructions for the experimental game sessions  
Preparation:  
x Arrange participants in farmers training centres meeting so that there is enough space among the 
different groups. Besides, the facilitator can move easily. 
Record names on Participant List.  
x Put a sticker with participant ID on each participant on his/her chest and back. Since, they are informed 
to come at different time, recording their name and checking who else is absent. Considering that some 
subjects would be absent, some reserve lists have been made ahead of time  
x When people come in give them the informed consent sheet and talk them through it. 
x Change the instructions in to local language 
What we will do today 
Dear participants I would like to thank for coming in this session. In the beginning of each experiment, you 
will receive a personal number, which randomly determined your seat that is your location throughout the 
session. Today we are going to play a lottery and time preference game. We have about two rounds of 
games that each of you will undertake i.e., you will play the lottery games first and time preference second.  
After you finish playing each game, you will play randomly one of the choices of both games for real and 
get a real money award based on the outcome of the play. Finally, prior to the choice task of the first game, 
the experimenter will illustrate you the randomization devices in a trial experiment which utilized different 
colored balls as payoffs. We have four colored balls; red representing ETB 10, yellow ETB 1, green ETB 12 
and Blue ETB 24. Accordingly, in the trial the assignee will be paid the outcome of the lottery based on the 
value written on the ball.  
Trial questions for Lottery games (following IFPRI) 
The experimenter handed out the sheet of paper for the HL game.  
A. Subjects will first be asked about what they thought the pictures on the form represented (Boxes with 
different color balls representing different values). 
B. After this mini brainstorming, the experimenter will explain the following steps:  
i. The brainstorming has shown that the task today has to do with bags and the balls of different 
color.  
ii. Specifically, suppose there are two types of boxes (A and B) that contain two different types of 
balls (A -less-risky and B risky). We are going to ask you which of these two boxes you 
prefer.  
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C. How are these two boxes different? Let’s focus on the first row.  
i. Balls in Box A  
  ii. The balls in Box A have 9 green balls representing ETB12 and one red ball representing ETB 10, 
while Box B have 9 yellow balls representing ETB 1 and one Blue ball representing ETB 24  
A. Explain the payoff Box A 
B.  Explain the payoff Box B 
D. What do we know about the chances?  
1. As in real life, you are asked to play a lottery, having a chance of win/loss.  
2. The number of balls represents the chance of having the value indicated on the balls 
3. In the first row, BOX A, 1 green ball out of the ten balls will bring you ETB 12,the rest 9 red balls 
have ETB 10.  We can see that the difference in amounts is very minimal. In BOX B, on the other 
hand, there is one blue ball having a relatively greater amount (ETB 24) and 9 yellow balls having 
only ETB 1. Therefore, you are asked to choose between these boxes. 
E. Questions/quiz for understanding  
i. How much you will get if you draw one green ball?  
ii. How much you will get if you draw one yellow ball?  
iii. How the outcome differs across the rows? Compare row one with row 5. 
Trial Questions for Time preference games (second round ) 
The experimenter will hand out the sheet to subjects 
A. Brain storming questions  
1. Subjects will be asked about what they feel of on receiving money today and tomorrow.  
2. Consider row 1, what is the advantage of choosing option A over B? 
3. What is the difference between row 1 and row 10? 
B. Trial exercises 
1. Pick randomly one of the players and bring him to the front 
2. ask  him/her to choose between option 1 and option 2 on row 5 and 11 
1. Playing the lottery games: Welcome again to this gaming session: While you are involving in this game, 
you will gain a real monetary equivalent to one of the randomly chosen choices (from the ten). Consider 
there is box having 10 balls, having red and green colours. These balls are assigned different values which 
are divided in to two choices, A and B (see the poster on the wall). In the first choice, for instance, in box A, 
there is 1 red ball which have a value of birr 10, and 9 green balls which have a value of birr 12. Whereas, in 
box B, there is 9 yellow balls which has a value of birr 1 and 9 blue balls which have a value of 24. 
Accordingly, you are asked to choose between these two boxes. Remember, if you chose box A, you will 
draw one of the balls and expect to win birr 12 or birr 10, and if chose box B, you will draw again randomly 
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one of the balls and gain birr 24 if you draw the blue ball (which is only one) and get birr 1 if you draw the 
yellow balls which are nine out of ten. As you can see from the demonstrations, there is a difference in the 
payoffs of each alternative. Therefore, you are asked to choose among the given alternatives.  
3. Time preference games (Game-2)  
In this session, you will play a game that involves the choice between two payments having different due 
date: the first choice involves a payment that will be due within one month and the second choice involves 
a payment that will due in less than seven months. There are about 15 choices which you are asked to 
choose. In choice A, you will get birr 200 throughout the choice, while in choice B, you will earn varying 
payments starting from birr 2002.   As you can see across the row, there is a difference in the payoffs of 
each alternative. Finally, you will play randomly one of the choices for real and get paid based on the 
outcome. You will take the money from the farmers kebele administration of you prefer choice after 6 
month or take within a month if you choose A. There are no additional costs to collect the money in the 
future. During the game you are asked to follow the following rules:  
x There are research assistants here who will help you to clarify about the choices and write the 
choices you made if you cannot read and write.  
x There is a sheet on your table and consider it for your choice elicitation.  
x The game involves the choice between getting the money in less than a month and in less than 
seven months, but choice B has always higher payments 
x You are not allowed to talk to anybody until you are told to do so 
x You have to keep your sit until instructed so.  
Ok, understand? Let then now start playing the lottery game/ time preference games go! Start! 
The facilitator  
o Check whether the sampled household attends or not. If he/she doesn’t, follow the 
sampling procedure and appoint for another session 
o Look at the player ID and record the outcome of the game 
o Write down the payoff for each round. 
o Then write the ID number of the participants. 
o Keep track of time by stating when each minute has passed. 
o At the end of each stated time announce the game period is over. 
o Before the game session, ask participants and fill the personality measure and take a socio-
economic survey. 
For the experimenter and assistant experimenters (the next game session) 
x Follow the above steps 
x Record all payments on a record sheet 
x MAKE SURE PARTICIPANTS SIGN THE RECORD SHEET.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
How do personality traits and learning determine adaptation to climate change? A study 
on smallholder farmers in the upper Blue Nile basin5 
 
 
 
Abstract: It is essential to understand how psychological and behavioural factors explain farmers’ 
adaptation decision to climate change. In this chapter, we study how decisions on adaptation to climate 
change through adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties can be explained by learning through 
past experience of shock events, learning from social groups and networks, by individual’s personality 
traits, and adoption of related technologies. A regression analysis using a trivariate probit model revealed 
that learning, personality trait variables and other socioeconomic variables are statistically significant in 
determining adoption decisions. Moreover, the results show that individuals’ personality traits and the 
information acquisition process are significantly correlated. We also find evidence that agricultural related 
climate change adaptation options are recursively related to each other. This causes possible endogeneity, 
i.e. adaptation decision of high yield crop and livestock varieties are found to depend on the adoption of 
soil and water conservation and irrigation technologies. Interventions designed to address climate change, 
therefore, should consider behavioural and personality factors, and it is important to understand how 
adoption of one technology creates an enabling environment for the adoption of another technology.  
  
                                                 
5This chapter is based on: 
Nigussie YM, van Ierland EC, X Zhu, B Kebede; J Klomp (2016). How do personality traits and learning determine 
adaptation to climate change? A study on smallholder farmers in the upper Blue Nile basin. Under Review at Climate 
and Development. 
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3.1 Introduction  
3.1.1 Background  
The literature has identified factors that inherently limit adoption of technologies in developing countries, 
such as mismatch between the farmers’ interest and the innovation (Harper 2005); lack of understanding of 
existing farmers practice (indigenous knowledge) (Hildebrand 1981; Norman 1986; Fresco 1986; Jouve 
1986); failure of innovation (Panne et al. 2003); failure in extension work (Srinivas 1988; Hagmann et 
al.1997; Belay 2003; FAO and GTZ 2006); high cost of innovation due to credit constraint (Feder et al.1985), 
and other social factors (Fujisaka 1993; Pannell 1999; Glendenning et al. 2010). Yet, there are some 
important dimensions that deserve more attention. These include personality traits, learning and 
information acquisition processes, and the inter-linkage between different farm level adaptation options. 
The role of learning and personality traits are not yet explicitly studied in the literature of adaptation 
decisions under climate change. Apart from the work of Heinström (2003) who tried to link personality with 
the information acquisition process of students in Finland; Conley and Udry (2010) who studied how 
learning from neighbours influence adoption; and Kebede and Zizzo (2015) who linked personality factors 
with agricultural innovations in Ethiopia, there is a lack of studies on the combined effect of learning and 
personality traits on farmers’ decisions to adapt to climate change.  
Adoption of farm related technologies are linked to each other. In this chapter, we argue that a 
strategy for improving food security and adapting to climate change in a smallholder economy would focus 
on a combination of investment in soil and water conservation (SWC), irrigation technologies and uptake of 
high yield crop and livestock varieties. The current theoretical and empirical literature recognizes that 
adoption behaviour is complex and it provides a blend of theoretical models (Upadhyay et al. 2003). It is 
indicated in the literature that all adoption decisions are preceded by an information acquisition period, 
also called an awareness or learning period (Saha-Love and Schwart 1994; Adegbola and Gardebroek 2007; 
Posthumus et al. 2010). Thus, the three sets of technologies that we consider in this chapter are assumed 
to be interlinked, because an investment in soil and water conservation (SWC) and irrigation technologies 
facilitates the introduction of high yield crop and livestock varieties. Investments in practices for soil and 
water conservation (SWC) cover a larger spectrum of measures which are linked to each other and act as a 
learning platform to enhance crop production, food security and household income (Narayana and Ram 
Babu 1985; Adgo et al. 2013). Irrigation, on the other hand, has long been seen as an option to improve and 
sustain rural livelihoods by increasing crop production. “It can reduce dependency on rain-fed agriculture in 
drought prone areas and increase cropping intensities in humid and tropical zones by ’extending' the wet 
season and introducing effective means of water control” (FAO 2001:1). Most high yield varieties and 
technologically modified crops and livestock require a specific farming system (FAO 2002) which can be 
created through SWC and irrigation technologies. Posthumus et al. (2010) found that a decision to 
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participate in programs and projects influences the adoption of soil conservation in Peru. In a similar 
approach, Tzouvelekas et al. (2006) found that the information acquisition process influences adoption of 
organic farming recursively. In climate change studies, Deressa et al. (2011) modeled households’ 
perceptions of climate change and decisions to adapt to climate change in a recursive approach.  
Thus, the general objective of this chapter is to understand how farm level adaptation to climate 
change through adoptions of crop and livestock varieties, SWC and irrigation technologies are influenced by 
a set of behavioural and personality factors, learning from social groups and networks and from past shock 
experience. Furthermore, we study how the interaction between personality traits and the information 
acquisition process affect adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties; and how the adoption of high 
yield crop and livestock varieties recursively depend on adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies.  
The first specific objective is to understand how personality traits affect individuals’ response to 
climate change. According to Johnson (1997: 74) “personality traits are defined as consistent patterns of 
thoughts, feelings, or actions that distinguish people from one another”. The personality differences in 
perception, acting and responding to external treats like climate shock incidences can play a significant role 
in climate change adaptation decisions (Marra 2002; Suarez 2011).  
The second specific objective of this chapter is to study how learning (i) based on past shock 
experience, (ii) through instruction and (iii) from social networks and groups affect farmers’ decisions to 
adapt to climate change in the upper Blue Nile basin in Ethiopia. Learning through past shock experience is 
a common traditional learning platform built in the social system. Learning through instructions includes 
extension visits, participation in demonstrations and experimental fields (Hanna et al. 2014). Learning 
through social networks and groups assumes that farmers share and learn new ideas and innovations 
through their social networks (Munshi 1999). Lwin et al. (2015) indicated that documenting existing 
agricultural practices can enhance successful adaptation to climate-change impacts. Indigenous knowledge 
plays an important role in local-level decision makings (Warren 1991; Anaeto et al. 2013). Hence, we study 
learning6 from past experiences and social networks and groups.  
The third objective is to understand how the information acquisition process is related with 
personality trait. We assume that personality traits affect farmers' general information acquisition 
processes, which would then further induce a shift in the probability of adopting a new technology. 
Information gathering is expected to enhance resource allocation skills increases efficiency in adoption 
decisions. Hence, a correlation analysis is employed to understand how farmers’ personality is related with 
information acquisition. This further motivates us to study the interaction effects of personality traits and 
information acquisition process on adoption of farm related adaptation options.  
                                                 
6 Learning through instruction can be studied using gross margin differences between the old and new technology as indicated by Abadi-Ghadim 
(2000), Cameron (1999) and Abera (2008). However, our data are generated through cross sectional means and we cannot trace back panel 
evidences on adoption of a technology. We tried to get evidence based on recall, but failed to obtain sufficient information for modelling purposes. 
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Finally, we wanted to model adoption decision in a recursive approach. We assume that adoption 
of high yield crop and livestock varieties depends recursively on adoption of SWC and irrigation 
technologies. Because of the recursive character of the three decision problems (decision to adopt SWC, 
irrigation technologies and crop and livestock varieties), a trivariate probit analysis based on the Geweke-
Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator is used (Teracol 2002) because 
standard maximum likelihood methods are not appropriate (Greene 2003). Trivariate probit models have 
been applied in studies by Posthumus et al. (2010), Mokhtarian and Wei (2011), and a trivariate heckit 
approximation by Anders and Jacob (2013).  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines a theoretical framework and presents a short 
literature overview. While Section 3.3 discusses the methodological approach and Section 3.4 presents the 
data and samples. We present results in Section 3.5; and conclude in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Theoretical framework and literature overview 
3.2.1 Personality traits and adaptation to climate change  
Psychological factors, mainly personality traits can play an important role in decision makings. Gifford 
(2011) introduced the notion of psychological barriers. Psychological barriers can potentially impede 
individuals’ choices in the process of mitigation and adaptation decisions. “Economists have tended to 
concentrate on decision-making and actions; while psychologists have often taken the view that decision-
making involves deliberate choice, the formation of attitudes and beliefs may be beyond our conscious 
control, and therefore outside a discussion of rationality” (Wilkinson and Klaes 2012:9). Unlike the 
economic foundation of decision making, the psychological foundation has received little or no attention in 
innovation adoption studies except that it has been rarely addressed using proxy measures (e.g. Genius et 
al. 2013). The personality dimension of individual differences in perception, acting and responding to 
external treats plays a significant role in climate change adaptation decision (Marra 2002; Suarez 2011). 
Thus, identifying individuals’ personality traits and mental models is important to understand climate 
change adaptation (Grothmann and Patt 2005).  
Empirical models in economics literature have given little attention to personality traits (Greaves 
and Ellison 2011). An important contribution has been made by Rogers (1962 and 2003) who identified that 
individuals have personal characteristics that influence their adoption decisions fairly and consistently. 
Pannell et al. (2006:7), on the other hand, argued that “personality may potentially play a major part in the 
style of decision making used by farmers, although because of measurement complexity, it has rarely been 
studied”. Shrapnel and Davie (2001), in a study on Australia, tried to understand farmers’ tendency to 
introversion and discomfort within group situations. They found that many farmers prefer a one-on-one 
relationship over group settings which would influence the extent and nature of a farmer’s personal 
networks. Personal networks influence individuals adoption decision behaviour and are increasingly 
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important for government and public policy and strategy interventions. Personality traits, therefore, 
influence the extent and nature of farmer’s personal networks (Shrapnel and Davie 2000; Pannell et al. 
2006).  
There is also a presupposition that personality traits and the information acquisition process are 
correlated. Information acquisition behaviour according to Wilson (1997) includes the need for information, 
inner processes and environmental factors affecting the individual’s way of responding to the information 
need. Personality traits are, thus, expressed in learning styles; and learning styles in turn reflected in 
learning strategies and finally produce a certain learning outcome (De Raad and Schouwenburg 1996). 
Blickle (1996) has compared the Big Five Personality trait Model with learning strategies and learning 
outcome. We therefore also study how the information acquisition process in climate change adaptation is 
affected by personality traits.  
3.2.2 Theoretical approaches to learning, information acquisition, and adaptation to climate 
change 
There are different theoretical approaches to address learning and innovation adoption decision behaviour. 
The pioneering theoretical model is the Target-input model (see for e.g.Jovanovic and Nyarko 1994; Foster 
and Rosenzweig 1995; Wilson 1997). The Target-input model needs a panel of farmers to observe learning 
behaviour over time. This include observing individuals decision on input use, deriving their payoffs as 
function of a distance between actual input use and the target, and drawing an inference. Because of high 
cost consideration in generating panel data, it is rarely applied in developing countries. The second 
prominent learning theory is the Bayesian learning theory. It is based on the Bayesian School of statistics 
and has a different view of what it means to learn from data, in which probability is used to represent 
uncertainty. However, previous studies have found empirical evidence suggesting that individuals rely more 
on a variety of learning heuristics than a pure probabilistic approach (e.g. Camerer and George 2003; Gans 
et al. 2007). The other theory in the learning and innovation literature is the Transformative learning 
theory. Transformative learning theory primarily relies on psychological foundations (see Elias 1997; 
Mezirow 1994 and 1997). Transformative learning theory applied by Tarnoczi (2011) on adaptation 
practices of Prairie farmers in Canada, and found that transformative learning is rare. In an attempt to 
avoid the complexities of more sophisticated theoretical learning models, researchers usually use proxies to 
measure learning.  
The use of proxies to measure information access and the characteristics of the inquiry process are 
getting attention in the literature. Lindner (1987) argued that firm level innovation adoption can be 
explained by proxies like costs of acquiring information, education level, distance to the nearest current 
adopter and availability of extension services. Another approach that is closely related to proxy measures 
of learning is the experiential learning approach. Experiential learning implies learning through reflection 
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on doing (Kolb 1984). According to this approach, learning can be explained through sharing experience 
from neighbours and seeing the respective change in production.  
Although application of learning in climate change adaptation is rare, there are some studies which 
applied learning in the climate change adaptation literature. Tschakert and Dietrich (2010) stated that 
learning is a prominent component in managing climate extremes and shocks and in efforts to bring 
resilience. Walker et al. (2002) also introduced the idea of resilience management to prevent social–
ecological systems by incorporating learning, memory and creativity. The United Nations Climate Change 
Learning Program and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Adaptation for 
Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP), considered learning as central in adaptation to climate change 
(IFAD 2013). CARE has introduced the Adaptation Learning Program (ALP) for Africa (see CARE 2012) to 
facilitate Community-Based Adaptation (CBA). As a result, learning to adapt is pivotal and can contribute to 
decisions and plans involving mitigation and adaptation to climate change.  
Empirical evidence on learning and micro level decision making processes includes the work of Abadi-
Ghadim and Pannell (1999), Abera (2008), and Genius et al. (2013). The work of Genius et al. (2013) 
addresses information and learning inquiry process using a model that includes social networks to 
understand the farmer’s decision making process regarding new technology adoption such as drip 
irrigation, Conley and Udry (2010) tried to link how learning from neighbours influence adoption decision. 
Hence, one can study how learning through social networks and groups is related to climate change 
adaptation in a smallholder economy. 
3.2.3 Climate change incidences, adaptation practices and determinants 
According to UNFCCC (2007), societies can respond to climate change by adaptation and mitigation efforts 
through reducing greenhouse gases (UNFCCC 2007). Since the agricultural systems are more vulnerable to 
climate change impacts; efforts to improve the adaptive capacity of the agricultural systems should get 
more and more attention. Because, climate change impact on agriculture is already evident and the trends 
to increase in the future if emissions are not stabilized at their current level (World Bank 2006). The 
Ethiopian agricultural system is characterized by smallholding farming which is vulnerable to climate 
change impacts (Deressa et al. 2009). Climate change projections in Ethiopia show that there would be a 
great variation in precipitation and temperature patterns (Hellmuth et al. 2007).  
Previous studies have focused on adaptation options. For instance, Nhemachena and Hassan (2008) 
used an econometric approach to understand farmers’ choices of available climate adaptation options. It 
was found that awareness of climate change incidences facilitate uptake of adaptation measures. The 
influence of age of household head on adaptation has been studied by Wegayehu and Drake (2003); a 
study by Nyangena (2007) and Dolisca et al. (2006) also found a similar correlation between age and 
adaptation decision. However, different studies have different conclusion as how age affects adaptation 
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decision. Previous experience in temperature and rainfall change increases the probability of uptake of 
adaptation measures to climate change (Maddison 2006; Nhemachena and Hassan 2008; Aymone 2009; 
Deressa et al. 2009; Lwin et al. 2015). Education level is also studied by Deressa et al. (2009) and found that 
education significantly increases the probability of adopting of soil conservation and changing planting 
dates as an adaptation method. Sex of head of household is also an important variable affecting adaptation 
decision at farm level ( Nhemachena and Hassan 2008; Deressa et al. 2009). Physical capital, land and labor 
are also found to be important factors for coping with and adapting to climate change (Nhemachena and 
Hassan 2008; Aymone 2009). In general, it was concluded that the choice of adaptation measure depends 
on factors like age, education, experience, awareness level about climate change, family size, land area, 
income sources and capital resources. Yet, studies related to the combined effect of learning and 
personality traits are limited in climate change adaptation literature and adoption decision models. 
3.3 Empirical modelling of personality traits, learning and adaptation to climate change 
In this section we present the empirical models employed in this chapter. Firstly, we model personality 
traits following the standard Big Five Personality model based on the Ten Item Personality Inventory survey 
(Gosling et al. 2003; Herzberg and Brahler 2006). Secondly, we model learning from social networks and 
groups, and learning through past shock experience. We further model adaptation decision of smallholder 
farmers by means of a trivariate probit model following Terracol (2012). 
3.3.1 Measuring personality 
The Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) (Gosling et al. 2003; Herzberg and Brahler 2006) is an instrument 
that has been developed to measure the Big Five personality dimensions i.e. extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to new experiences. It is generally a short personality 
measure which is helpful in saving time and money and is capable to give an estimation that is still 
compatible with the big five personality traits derived through a comprehensive personality survey (Gosling 
et al. 2003). In Gosling et al. (2003) one can find the TIPI scale and scoring procedure in to the big five 
personality domains. The TIPI is presented in Apendix 3.2. The Big Five personality dimensions of 
individuals’ are defined in Goldberg (1993).  
3.3.2 Conceptualizing learning and information acquisition 
We argue that a response to climatic shock events comes partly from learning and information acquisition. 
The first source of learning is participation in demonstrations and trialling a technology over years (see 
Panell et al. 1999; Abadi-Ghadim 2000; Abera 2008). The second source of learning and knowledge comes 
through experience sharing among social networks and groups. Social groups including neighbours and 
rural based farmers associations, traditional informal gatherings and homophilic groups can contribute to 
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the process of technology diffusion. We measured learning through social networks and groups in two 
ways: (i) by the number of individuals having the same age and education level adopting a technology (i.e. 
the stock of homophilic adopters), and (ii) by the number of individuals adopting a technology at a given 
year (i.e. the stock of adopters (Roger 1995; Genius et al. 2012)). Learning through social networks and 
groups follows the communication channel principle of Rogers (2003). Diffusion of innovation and 
information according to Rogers (2003) is a very social process that involves interpersonal communication 
relationships. Gershon et al. (2004) found that social groups composed of trained farmers and untrained 
farmers enable the diffusion of knowledge. In this chapter, therefore, we consider social networks and 
groups as the main sources of information exchange and learning points. The third learning source is 
through past shock experience. One’s past shock experiences can influence an approach towards future 
climate change and weather threats which can be direct or indirect: direct in the sense that it is acquired 
through one’s own unmediated participation in the threat; whereas indirect when mediated by reading, 
viewing, or hearing (Demuth 2015). In Figure 3.1, therefore, we present a conceptual framework showing 
the relationship between learning sources and adaptive responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. A framework showing farmers’ learning process to adapt to climate extreme. 
The model assumes that learning starts from occurrence of climate shock events which further stimulates 
interventions by different actors. Interventions that are deemed and prioritized by other agencies are 
referred to as external; whereas, internal sources are the learning process that an individual acquires 
through his/her own effort, either from own past experiences or learning from neighbours, social networks 
and groups.  
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Thus, modifying Genius et al. (2013) to determine whether the individuals under consideration 
have gained knowledge or skill from the social groups7 in their reference group, we consider the following 
variables as proxy measures: 
i) The stock of adopters in a year when the farmer considers an adaptation option. The stock of 
knowledge of technology k can be estimated by the number of adopters in the specific year:  
ܭ௞௝௧ ൌ σ ሺ݄௜௞௝௧ே௜ୀଵ ሻ    (3.1) 
where, ܭ௞௝௧ refers to the stock of knowledge of technology k accumulated in the network at time ݐ is found 
by the sum of adopters ݄i of technology k in village j at time t. Since our data included household level 
adoption decision of selected farm level technologies, we can obtain the relevant data for the application 
of  Equation 1 from our data.  
ii) The stock of homophilic adopters: these groups are those adopters in the same village but with 
similar age group and education level (within 6 years range according to Rogers (1995) and 
Genius et al. (2013)). Related to this variable, we collected data on individual’s decision to 
adoption of high yield crop and livestock, SWC and irrigation, and then we derive stock of 
homophilic adopters based on the definition given.  
iii) Finally, learning through past climatic and non-climatic shock experience is measured by 
developing an index for individuals’ binary response to shock events for the past ten years. A 
list of such climatic and non-climatic shock experiences is given in Appenix 2.2. 
3.3.3 Econometric model of adaptive response measures 
To model adaptation decisions in a smallholder economy, it would be difficult to disentangle food security 
issues from climate change adaptation decision (FAO 2001). Accordingly, we select three farm level 
strategies that can jointly address food security and climate change adaptation. These are the application of 
irrigation systems, soil and water conservation technologies, and crop and livestock varieties.  
3.3.3.1 Trivariate probit model  
Since our model considers interrelated binary decisions that a farm household has made, a trivariate probit 
model is employed. A trivariate probit model enables the simultaneous estimation of the decisions on farm 
related climate adaptation options by allowing a correlation between unobserved disturbances. More 
importantly, it can be shown that parameter estimates in such a model are not affected by self-selection 
bias (Greene 2003), which may arise if unobserved determinants of adoption of SWC and irrigation 
technologies also affect adoption of high crop and livestock varieties. It is assumed that adoption of SWC 
                                                 
7 Social networks and groups in this chapter are referred to as traditional gatherings in Mahiber (local traditional religious association), Debo 
(seasonal work group during harvest season), Idir (traditional insurance mechanism for funeral activities) and Iqub (traditional saving mechanism) 
that mostly do not depend on age and gender. 
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and irrigation technologies influence the expected utility of high yield crop and livestock varieties by 
changing awareness or attitude, or by providing incentives that are attractive to farm households (see 
Posthumus et al. (2010). Adoption of SWC, irrigation technologies, and high yield crop and livestock 
varieties are observed, so we can define variables ݕ௝  that equal one for positive decisions and zero 
otherwise. This leads to the following trivariate probit specification. 
  ݕ஼௅ ൌ ቄͳ݂݅ܺ஼௅ߚ஼௅ ൅ ݕௌௐ஼ߛଵ ൅ ݕூோߛଶ ൅ ߝଵ ൐ ͲͲ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁        
  ݕௌௐ஼ ൌ ቄͳ݂݅ ௌܺௐ஼ߚௌௐ஼ ൅ ߝଶ ൐ ͲͲ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁        (3.2) 
   ݕூோ ൌ ቄͳ݂݅ ூܺோߚூோ ൅ ߝଷ ൐ ͲͲ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  , 
with ቆఌభఌమఌయ
ቇ ՜ ܰሺͲǡ ȭሻ.          (3.3) 
ܥ݋ݒሺߝଵǡ ߝଶሻ ൌ ߩଵଶǡ ܥ݋ݒሺߝଶǡ ߝଷሻ ൌ ߩଶଷǡ ܥ݋ݒሺߝଵǡ ߝଷሻ ൌ ߩଵଷ 
where X refers to exogenous variables, ߚ refers to covariates of parameters and the subscript CL refers to 
high yield crop and livestock varieties, IR-irrigation, and SWC refers to soil and water conservation. 
According to Wild (2000), such a system of three equations results in eight unique probabilities which 
enable estimation of three intercepts, two parameters from adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies 
and three correlation parameters ߩ which make the model exactly identified. The equation for adoption of 
high yield crop and livestock varieties (ݕ஼௅) indicates that besides to ܺ஼௅, adoption of SWC and irrigation 
technologies are assumed to influence adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties through ߛଵ and ߛଶ 
respectively. These variables, however, can potentially correlate with ߝଵ which leads to a biased estimation. 
Unobserved disturbances influencing adoption of SWC (ߝଶ) and irrigation technologies (ߝଷ) may influence 
the residual of adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties (ߝଵሻ. This might be due to selection bias 
(Green 1998, and 2003). To address such a limitation we employed a trivariate probit model procedure that 
was written by Terracol (2002), which is based on the GHK recursive simulator (after Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane). The GHK simulator has a number of desirable properties in the context of multivariate normal 
limited dependent variable models and has been shown to generally outperform other simulation methods 
(e.g. Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud 1996). The model exploits the fact that a multivariate normal 
distribution function can be expressed as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal 
distribution functions, which can be easily and accurately evaluated (Terracol 2002).  
3.4 Data and samples  
Data for this chapter come from a socio-economic survey conducted from November to January, 2014 in 
four districts in Ethiopia. We surveyed 280 households that were randomly selected from two purposely 
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selected agro-ecosystems. In the study area, there are six agro-ecosystems classified based on soil, natural 
resources base and ecology (Simane et al. 2012). We further randomly select two districts from each agro-
ecosystem followed by random selection of two kebele from each district. Finally, we selected eight sample 
kebeles and from each kebele, 35 households were randomly selected. Before the final survey, training has 
been given to enumerators on how to administer the multi-purpose structured questionnaire. We used two 
sets of questionnaires: (i) a structured questionnaire designed to collect data on households’ 
socioeconomic and demographic variables, climate adaptation behaviour and major adaptation practices, 
climate and non-climatic shock experience, and (ii) a TIPI survey to collect data on farmers’ personality 
traits.  
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
We summarized variables that are used in this chapter including socioeconomic and demographic, learning, 
personality traits, climatic and non-climatic shocks, and adaptation options in Appendix 3.1. The summary 
shows that the majority of the participants of the survey (91%) are male headed households. Learning 
measured by stock of homophilic adopters shows that there are about 3.79 individuals per each age and 
education group adopting crop and livestock varieties, 2.81 adopting SWC, and 6.68 adopting irrigation 
technologies in each sampled village. Regarding personality indicator variables, average extraversion score 
is (6.08) and conscientiousness has a score of (4.72). The proportion of climatic and non-climatic shocks 
experience of households’ is shown in Appendix 3.1. Accordingly, 78% of the respondents have experienced 
flooding for the last ten years, and non-climatic shocks like animal disease (85%) and pests (75%). 
3.5.2 Results of learning measures 
 3.5.2.1 Learning through social networks ad groups  
Social networks and groups are considered as major source of farmers’ learning. Figure 3.2 shows the stock 
of adopters in each technology group in the sampled population estimated using Equation 3.1. The stock of 
adopters in this group disregards age and education, rather considers adopters of a given technology in a 
given year living in the same village.  
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Figure 3.2. Learning measured by the stock of adopters of irrigation technology, SWC and high yield crop 
and livestock varieties living in the same village in a given year in Ethiopia 
Hence, 50% of the stocks of irrigation adopters in a village have a group size of 12 (Figure 3.2). In the case 
of high yield crop and livestock varieties, 50% of the stocks of adopter have a group size of more than 4. 
Comparably, the group size is higher in the case of irrigation adopters.  
3.5.2.2 Learning from homophilic groups  
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of learning measured by homophilic adopters. The largest stock 
of homophilic adopters of irrigation technology (25) is found in village Alias-Zuria, while the smallest is in 
Yewula. With regard to SWC, the largest homophilic adopter group is in Kerer village, and the smallest in 
Lemechim. Dendegeb and Lemechim villages have also the largest stock of homophilic adopters of high 
yield crop and livestock varieties. In environments where there are informal institutional gatherings, 
learning and information diffusion is possible. Informal institutional arrangements like Debo, are common 
in the study area and are mostly made by peer groups. These gatherings only happen during the harvest 
seasons potentially facilitate experience sharing. Based on this view, we assume that social groups within 
these institutional arrangements would play a greater role in individual farmer’s decision to adapt to 
climate change.  
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Table 3.1. Learning measured by the stock of homophilic adopters for high yield crop and livestock, SWC 
and irrigation by sampled villages in Ethiopia 
Sampled villages  
Stock of homophilic adopters 
High yield crop and 
livestock varieties 
SWC Irrigation 
AliasZ 2 2 25 
Abesheb 5 2 7 
Lemechim 6 0 2 
Dendegeb 6 1 2 
Enerata 3 2 5 
Wonka 2 5 5 
Kerer 3 8 2 
Yewula 4 5 1 
Total Average 4 3 6 
 
Gershon et al. (2004) found that the presence of social groups composed of trained farmers and untrained 
farmers resulted in high rates of knowledge diffusion. Likewise, inclusion of the variable indicating “stock of 
adopters” and “stock of homophilic adopters” results in a significant positive impact on the adaptation 
decisions for the selected farm level adaptation options. 
3.5.2.3 Information acquisition process and personality traits 
To deal with the association between information acquisition processes and personality, we use a Pearson 
correlation analysis. The Pearson correlation analysis is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Pearson correlation coefficients of information acquisition behaviour and personality traits, and 
t-values in brackets  
Information acquisition 
behaviour 
Personality traits  
Extraversion Agreeable-ness 
Emotional 
stability  
Conscientious-
ness 
Openness to 
experience 
Training participation 
0.019 0.127 0.026 0.212 -0.156 
(0.766) (0.048**) (0.694) (0.0009***) (0.0156**) 
Experience sharing 
0.042 0.003 0.053 0.037 -0.007 
(0.520) (0.968) (0.411) (0.571) (0.913) 
Extension contact for high 
yield varieties  
0.025 0.258 0.197 0.200 0.175 
(0.700) (0.001***) (0.002***) (0.002***) (0.007***) 
Extension contact for SWC 
0.03 -0.069 0.034 -0.165 -0.01 
(0.64) (0.289) (0.600) (0.010***) (0.873) 
Extension contact for 
environmental protection 
-0.03 0.187 0.038 0.127 -0.065 
(0.641) (0.004***) 0.56 (0.050**) (0.318) 
**, and *** shows significant at 5% and 1% respectively.  
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The correlation analysis shows that willingness to participate in training is associated with the personality 
traits high agreeableness, high cconscientiousness, and low openness. Extension contact regarding high 
yield varieties is related to high agreeableness, high emotional stability, high cconscientiousness and high 
openness personality. Extension contact regarding SWC and environmental protection are related to low 
conscientiousness and high conscientiousness.  
3.5.2.4 Findings of the trivariate probit model 
The regression results of a trivariate probit estimator using the GHK recursive simulator (Terracol 2012) is 
presented in Table 3.3. In Table 3.3, we can see that the Wald test statistic (Wald chi2(51) = 150.90, Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000) indicates that the null hypothesis that all slope parameters ߚ௝are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected. In addition, the correlation coefficients of disturbance terms (RHO12, RH13) are insignificant 
showing that decisions related to adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties are independent of  
adoption of SWC and irrigations technologies.  
As we explained in section 3.3.1, inclusion of the three correlation terms (RHO12, RH13, and RH23) 
in the regression model guarantee identification of the model under the presence of endogenous dummy 
variables (Greene 2003). In addition, we included more exogenous variables that would help identify the 
dummy endogenous adoption decision variables (ADAP_SWC and ADAP_IRRI). Variables like extension 
service regarding SWC (EXTSOILC), stock of adopter of SWC (STOCKSOIL) and stock of homophilic adopters 
of SWC (SHOMO_SWC) are assumed to correlate with adoption of SWC; while membership in water groups 
(MEMBWATERG), stock of adopter of irrigation technologies (STOCKIRR), and stock of homophilic adopters 
of irrigation technology (SHOMO_IRR) are assumed to correlate with adoption of irrigation technologies. In 
the regression model, therefore, we can have four layers of independent variables (i.e. socioeconomic, 
learning, personality trait variables, adaptation decision variables, interaction variables and correlation 
coefficients). Interaction variables are derived from the five personality traits and information acquisition 
variables. The interaction gives rise to 25 interaction variables. Inclusion of all interaction terms in the 
model results in a serious of convergence problem. Hence, we run a naïve probit regression and considered 
only significant variables.  
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Table 3.3. Estimation results of the trivariate probit regression for ADAP_CL, ADAP_SWC and ADAP_IRRI, 
coefficients and standard errors (See Annex 1 for the full explanation of the variables and their names). 
Y1 (ADOPTION OF HIGH YIELD CROP 
AND LIVESTOCK VARIETIES (ADAP_CL)) 
COEF.   STD.ERR 
ADAP_SWC 5.306*** 2.11 
ADAP_IRRI 6.926*** 2.024 
HSEX    1.113 3.073 
AGEH    0.035 0.039 
EDUH    0.265 0.665 
SHOMO_CL    0.033 0.066 
STOCKCL    -0.089 0.074 
EXTRAVERSION   0.147 0.201 
AGREEABLENESS    0.048 0.101 
EMOTIONALSTABILITY   -0.167 0.216 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS   -0.286 0.201 
OPENNEXPERIENCE    -0.665* 0.303 
AGREE_EXPSH   -0.131 0.139 
EXTR_EXTENVI    0.174* 0.112 
PRODC      0.014 0.018 
EXPCLIM    -1.159** 0.528 
EXPNCLIM    0.106 0.424 
_CONS    0.548 3.861 
Y2 ( ADOPTION OF SWC (ADAP_SWC)    
HSEX    -0.301 0.384 
AGEH     0.015 0.012 
EDUH    0.079 0.227 
SHOMO_SWC    0.025 0.019 
STOCKSOIL    0.060*** 0.025 
EXTSOILC    0.439* 0.239 
EXTRAVERSION   -0.095 0.079 
AGREEABLENESS    -0.002 0.051 
EMOTIONALSTABILITY   -0.033 0.091 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS  0.111* 0.063 
EXTR_EXPS    0.058* 0.035 
OPENNEXPERIENCE           0.069 0.079 
PRODC    0.004 0.005 
EXPCLIM    0.166 0.125 
EXPNCLIM     0.698*** 0.112 
_CONS    -3.561*** 1.08 
Y3 (ADOPTION OF IRRIGATION 
TECHNOLOGIES  (ADAP_IRRI))                
HSEX   -0.199 0.422 
AGEH     0.033*** 0.012 
EDUH    0.457* 0.246 
SHOMO_IRR    0.021 0.021 
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Table 4 continued  
Y3 (ADOPTION OF IRRIGATION 
TECHNOLOGIES  (ADAP_IRRI))                
COEF.   STD.ERR 
STOCKIRR   0.036** 0.015 
EXTRAVERSION    0.047 0.065 
AGREEABLENESS    -0.037 0.086 
EMOTIONALSTABILITY    -0.263** 0.127 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS       0.107 0.088 
OPENNEXPERIENCE    0.117 0.081 
PRODC  0.027*** 0.007 
EXPCLIM  0.464*** 0.135 
EXPNCLIM   0.636*** 0.135 
MEMBWATERG   -0.009 0.219 
AGREE_EXTSOILC    0.136** 0.067 
EMOTI_EXTENVI    0.378*** 0.116 
CONSC_EXTENVI    -0.262** 0.119 
_CONS    -5.930*** 1.183 
RHO12=   0.218 0.176 
RHO13=  -0.145 0.261 
RHO23=   0.574 0.118 
Wald chi2(51)   =     150.90 
Log likelihood = -205.2404                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000;  
LR test of RHO12=RHO13=RHO23=0: chi2(3) =  17.429497  Prob > chi2 =   .0005766 
Note: *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively,  
Adoption of SWC (ADAP_SWC) 
The results of the trivariate probit regression indicate learning and information acquisition variables like 
stock of SWC adopters (STOCKSOIL), learning from past non climatic shock experience (EXPNCLIM), and 
information acquisition from extension service related to SWC (EXTSOIL) significantly influence adoption of 
SWC. Personality trait variables like conscientious (CONSCIENTIOUSNESS) (+), an interaction term between 
extraversion and experience sharing (EXTR_EXPS) (+) significantly related to adoption of SWC technologies. 
The findings are in line with the hypothesis that personality trait and learning indicator variables are related 
to the adoption of farm related adaptation options. The presence of adopters in a social network (stock of 
SWC adopters) have an influence on non-adopters. People with high conscientious score i.e. those who are 
careful are also determined adoption of SWC technologies. People with high emotional stability i.e. having 
high energy and been participated in experience sharing are positive to adopt SWC practices. Previous 
models on adoption decision related to SWC identified variables like age, sex and education level as the 
main determinants. These variables, however, have no significant effect in our model.  
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Adoption of irrigation (ADAP_IRRI) 
Adoption of irrigation technologies, on the other hand, are significantly related to socioeconomic variables 
like age of head of household (AGEH), and education level of head of household (EDUH). Learning indicator 
variables like stock of adopters of irrigation technology (STOCKIRR) and learning from past climatic and non-
climatic shock experience (EXPCLIM) and (EXPNCLIM) respectively are significant in determining adoption of 
irrigation technology. Personality trait variables including emotional stability (EMOTIONALSTABILITY), and 
interaction terms between agreeableness and extension service related to SWC (AGREE_EXTSOILC), 
emotional stability and extension service on environmental conservation (EMOTI_EXTENVI), and 
conscientiousness and extension service on environmental conservation (CONSC_EXTENVI) significantly 
determine adoption of irrigation technologies. Income indicator variable (PRODUC) also determines 
adoption of irrigation technologies significantly. This is also in line with previous studies by Wegayehu and 
Drake (2003), Nyangena (2007), Dolisca et al. (2006) with regard to the influence of age and education on 
innovation adoption. The effect of learning and personality trait variables on adoption decision is in line 
with the hypothesis that personality and learning from social networks and groups influence adoption 
decision of farmers. Besides, the results related to the effect of learning from social networks and groups 
and adoption decision are in line with previous studies by Gershon et al. (2004) and Conley and Udry (2010) 
who found that learning from social groups and networks have a positive effect on adoption decisions.  
Adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties (ADAP_CL) 
Variables like adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies are considered as main determinants in the 
adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties. The regression results show that these variables 
significantly and positively determine adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties. In other words, 
adoption of SWC, and irrigation technology are effective in inducing adoption of high yield crop and 
livestock varieties. A farming system that targets diffusion of high yield crop and livestock varieties then 
should first focus on adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies. High yield varieties developed for a 
specific agroecology and farming system will only successfully be introduced through enhancing SWC and 
irrigation technologies.  
The influence of learning through social groups, i.e. the stock of adopters of high yield crop and 
livestock varieties (STOCKCL) and the stock homophilic adopters of crop and livestock varieties 
(SHOMO_CL), is not significant in the case of adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties. This might 
be due to the fact that people already have the knowledge through previous exposures to SWC and 
irrigation technologies. The presence of such social groups at this stage has, therefore, nothing to do with 
adoption decisions of high yield crop and livestock varieties.  
Personality trait variables, like openness to experience (OPENNEXPERIENCE), and an interaction 
term between extraversion and extension service related to environmental conservation (EXTR_EXTENVI), 
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significantly determine adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties. The openness trait includes both 
being open to new experiences and open to new ideas. The result shows that individuals being conservative 
and cautious are responding positively to innovation adoption process. The result on the effect of the 
interaction term EXTR_EXTENVI indicates that those who have high score in extraversion and having access 
to extension work regarding environmental conservation are responding positively to adoption of high yield 
crop and livestock varieties.  
Previous studies emphasized the role of socioeconomic and demographic variables in influencing 
adaptation decision to the impacts of climate change (see e.g. Nhemachena and Hassan 2008; Wegayehu 
and Drake 2003; Nyangena 2007; Dolisca et al. 2006; Maddison 2006; Aymone 2009; Deressa et al. 2009). 
There are, however, related works by Kebede and Zizzo (2015) which find that personality trait is related to 
agricultural innovation adoption in Ethiopia. Abera (2008) found that learning from past trailing and 
practicing significantly determines adoption of teff and wheat technologies in Ethiopia. Our study stresses 
the importance of personality traits, learning outcome variables and the recursive relationship between the 
different adaptation options. The importance of learning from social groups has been introduced in the 
literature mainly by and Conley and Udry (2010) and Genius et al. (2014). However, there is no adequate 
literature related to climate change adaptation. Furthermore, treating adoption processes in a recursive 
approach is very rare in previous studies, apart from Posthumus et al. (2010) who tried to see how 
participation decisions in programs further influence adoption of soil conservation,  and Gershon et al. 
(2004) who tried to see how knowledge acquisition decision and diffusion on adoption of pest management 
are recursively related. In this regard, our results give a chance to understand how different adaptation 
decisions are interrelated.  
3.6 Conclusions  
This chapter follows an empirical model of learning and personality measures to see how climate adaptive 
response is influenced in the upper Blue-Nile basin, Ethiopia. Climate change is a real threat towards the 
livelihood of smallholder famers. As a response to this, different measures have been introduced, yet 
smallholders are facing climate related catastrophes and shocks. Based on this fact, we wanted to 
understand the behavioural factors that limit adaptation to climate change at the farm level. Accordingly, 
we collected data on socioeconomic, demographic, climate related and non-climate related shocks, and the 
different adaptation decisions made at farm household level. Besides, we applied a short personality test 
following the ten item personality inventory (TIPI) to come up with the Big Five personality traits. Learning 
indicator variables are also derived following two interrelated approaches (i) learning through social 
networks and groups (stock of adopters in a village and stock of homophilic adopters), and (ii) learning from 
past climate and non-climate shock experiences.  
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To address the overall objective of the paper i.e. the effect of learning and personality traits on 
adaptation decisions, we adopt a trivariate probit model. Because of potential endogeneity and recursive 
relationships between the adoption decision problems (i.e. decision to adopt SWC and irrigation 
technologies with high yield crop and livestock varieties) a trivariate probit model based on a recursive 
simulated maximum likelihood (SML) is appropriate. More importantly, it can be shown that parameter 
estimates in such a model are not affected by self-selection bias which may arise if unobserved 
determinants of adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies also affect adoption of crop and livestock 
varieties.  
Having empirically derived learning measures and personality traits, we first see how the 
information acquisition process is related with one’s personality traits. Future adaptation to climate change 
starts with learning and accumulation of knowledge through information acquisition. A correlation analysis 
of selected information acquisition process: participation in farmer’s training, and experience sharing; 
extension contact to trail and demonstrate HYV, SWC and environmental protection with the Big Five 
personality traits shows that there is a significant correlation with personality traits. Secondly, the trivariate 
probit regression results show that there is a strong relationship between learning and personality trait 
variables and adaptive response. The stocks of adopters of SWC and irrigation technologies have positive 
influence on decisions related to adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies respectively. The stocks of 
homophilc adopters have no significant relationship with adoption decisions, indicating that the presence 
of such social groups have no influence on individuals decisions or there is an overlap between stock of 
adopter and homophilic adopters. This opens an opportunity to design further behavioural underpinnings 
like, household economic and social status, membership in development groups and other income sources 
(Suresh et al. 2012) that would affect information seeking behaviour of farmers. As part of the main 
findings of this chapter, we learned that adoption of irrigation technologies and SWC have a positive and 
significant effect on the adoption of high yield crops and livestock varieties. This indicates that there is a 
strong recursive relationship between adoptions of irrigation technologies and SWC, and adoption of high 
yield crops and livestock varieties. However, we find that correlation coefficients in the case of adoption of 
irrigation technologies and SWC (RHO23) is significantly different from zero. This shows that the two 
decisions are made jointly. This would result in high correlation between disturbance terms in the trivariate 
probit model. A further study using a heckit approximation (Holm and Arednt 2013) is recommended 
provided that the sample size is sufficiently large.  
Policy recommendations are derived both from the conceptual framework and the empirical results. In 
the framework, we indicated the main sources of learning and possible response approaches to climate 
change by individual famers. The empirical results support the propositions implied in the framework 
shown in Figure 3.1. Policy makers in agriculture and climate change should address the limiting factors in 
the process of learning to adapt to climate change. With regard to this, we recommend the following: 
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x Strengthening the social fabrics to intervene in technology diffusions. Social networks can enhance 
learning and information exchange as evidenced by the strong relationship between learning 
through social groups (stock of adopters) of a technology with adaptation decision. 
x Personality traits should be considered as they are limiting factors in climate change adaptive 
practices. Though personality traits are consistent pattern of thoughts which cannot be changed 
over time, a comprehensive psychological foundation of the adoption model is recommended.  
x Learning outcomes as evidenced by information acquisition processes have higher degrees of 
correlation with personality traits. This implies that personality traits need to be considered, 
because they are influencing the search for and acquisition of information.  
x The presence of a recursive relationship among the different adaptation decisions is evidenced in 
this chapter; therefore, failure in adoption of high yield varieties could have partially been rooted in 
a lack of a fertile ground from SWC and irrigation technologies. This stresses the need to further 
promote SWC and irrigation technologies not only for food security but also for successful 
adaptation to climate change in small holder economies. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 3.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table A1. Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
Variable       Mean Std. Dev. Min Max description of variables  
Socioeconomic variables 
 
HSEX 0.909 0.289 0 1 =1 if head of the Household is male 
AGEH  42.548 9.042 22 72 Age of head of Household head 
EDUH   0.593 0.492 0 1 =1 if  head the Household is literate 
Income indicator  
PRODC 37.336 1.566 8 146 
Total grain harvest in quintal in most 
recent harvest period 
Personality trait  
EXTRAVERSION 6.083 16.5 -10.5 1.83 
AGREEABLENESS 4.77 36 2.5 2.6 
EMOTIONAL STABILITY 5.39 8.5 2.5 1.29 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 4.72 8.5 -9 1.92 
OPENNESS TO 
EXPERIENCE 
5.37 8 2.5 1.48 
 
Learning variables  
SHOMO_CL 3.79 2.34 0 10 
Stock of homophilic crop and 
livestock variety adopters in a village  
SHOMO_SWC 2.81 2.84 0 10 
Stock of homophilic SWC adopters in 
a village 
SHOMO_IRR 6.68 8.5 0 29 
Stock of homophilic irrigation 
adopters in a village 
STOCKIRR 13.075 11.439 0 34 
Stock of irrigation adopters in a 
village 
STOCKCL 9.946 9.009 1 26 
Stock of high yield crops and livestock 
varieties adopters in a village 
STOCKSWC  5.992 5.815 0 5 Stock of SWC adopters in a village 
EXPCLIM 3.506 0.987 0 5 
An index showing climate related 
shock experience 
EXPNCLIM 2.282 1.012 0 4 
An index showing non-climate related 
shock experience 
TRAIN  0.68 0.467 0 1 
=1 if participated in farm related 
training  
EXPSHAR 0.66 0.471 0 1 
=1 if participated in farm related 
experience sharing 
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Table A2. Proportions of households experiencing climatic and non-climatic shock experiences in the upper 
Blue Nile basin, Ethiopia 
  
Experience of climatic events Experience of non-climatic events 
TEMP. 
Var. 
DROUGHT EROSION FLOOD 
RAIN Fall 
VARIATION 
LIVESTOCK 
LOSS 
DEATH 
HH 
MEMB 
ANIMAL 
DISEASE 
CROP 
PEST 
mean 0.95 0.69 0.94 0.78 0.31 0.04 0.01 0.85 0.75 
Std.Dev 0.21 0.46 0.23 0.41 0.93 0.22 0.11 0.35 0.43 
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Appendix 3.2. Ten Item personality inventory questionnaires  
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number 
next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies 
more strongly than the other. 
 
 1= Disagree strongly 2 = Disagree moderately 3 = Disagree a little 4 = Neither agree nor disagree 5 = 
Agree a little 6 = Agree moderately 7 = Agree strongly 
I see myself as: 
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome. 
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined. 
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset. 
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex. 
6. _____ Reserved, quiet. 
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm. 
8. _____ Disorganized, careless. 
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable. 
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Climate change and common pool resources management:  
A lab-in-the-field experimental approach8 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter applies a common pool resources (CPR) game to understand the possibility of 
climate change mitigation through identifying the determinants of successful common pool resources 
governance in the Choke ecosystem, upper Blue Nile basin. We conducted two lab-in-the field experimental 
games with farmers: a “route choice” and a CPR experiment. The former is used to classify farmers as either 
“rule followers” or “rule breakers” in the CPR game. Our results reveal that groups of rule-followers 
preserve the resource indefinitely under sufficient regrowth of the resource due to favourable climate 
change. Furthermore, subjects with a rule following social norm tend to depend more on their social role 
and their role as an elderly person. Bringing together “rule followers” and “rule breakers” in a local 
institution would enhance the sustainable management and use of the commons thereby contributing to 
mitigation of climate change through increasing the carbon sink function of commons. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
8This chapter is based on: 
NigussieY M, E C van Ierland, B Kebede, H -P Weikard, X Zhu (2016). Climate change and common pool resources 
management: A lab-in-the-field experimental approach. Working paper 
 
 64 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Addressing climate change through mitigation strategies in developing countries is a fundamental challenge 
(Chandler et al. 2002). For many, emission reduction is not a viable option in the near term. Agricultural 
practices in developing countries have, however, the potential to degrade the environment through land 
reclamation from forests and wetlands (Niyibizi and Komakach 2013). The use of pesticides, chemicals and 
management of livestock are also considered as sources of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the agricultural 
sector in developing countries (Houghton et al. 1996). In the smallholder economy, the mounting 
deforestation and land cover change is a major contributor to GHGs (Carr 2004; GOFC- GOLD 2009). The 
contribution of the agricultural sector to GHGs is predicted to rise by about 40 percent by 2030 largely due 
to the increasing demand for food from a growing population and the changing patterns of diets, including 
an increasing demand for ruminant meats (Smith et al. 2007).  
Recently, some developing countries have introduced a green economic development initiative. For 
instance, Ethiopia’s Green Economy Initiative is designed to achieve the economic ambitions of the country 
through clean development trajectories (FDRE 2011). The Ethiopian government has designed a climate 
resilient green economy (CRGE) initiatives consisting of four main strategies. These include exploiting the 
vast hydropower potential, large-scale promotion of advanced rural cooking technologies, efficiency 
improvements to the livestock value chain, and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) (FDRE 2011).  
Agricultural and forested lands are believed to be a major potential sink to carbon if trees are 
maintained and managed together with crops and/or animals (Albrecht and Kandji 2003). According to the 
Stern review, avoided deforestation could potentially reduce CO2 emissions for under $5/tCO2 (Stern 2007). 
Mitigation options in the agricultural sector are related to improved agricultural systems and the reduction 
of deforestation or the restoration of degraded lands. These options require land-management alternatives 
in land-based activities related to agriculture and forestry (Smith et al. 2007; Golub et al. 2009).  
Water bodies and forests are often characterized by non-excludability and rivalry. Such resources are 
called Common Pool Resources (CPR), for which any individual has rights to use but it is costly to exclude 
any user (Fuentes-Castro 2009). In his seminal paper, Hardin (1968) argued that unregulated CPR would be 
degraded. In more recent years Ostrom (1990) provided a broader view of the characteristics of CPR and 
discussed management options to prevent overuse and degradation of communal resources. Ostrom (1990 
and 1994) argued that a cooperative self-governing institution can be created so that the resources can be 
used indefinitely.  
Experimental game theoretic approaches have helped to understand the dynamics of cooperation in 
CPR management. Recent studies have identified the situational factors that accompany and reinforce 
cooperative behavior and the possibility of local institutions for the management of the commons (see for 
e.g. Pérez-Cirera 2001; Winter 2004; Cardenas et al. 2013; Reddy et al. 2014; Meinzen-Dick 2014; 
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Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015). Situational factors include defining property rights, acceptance of rules 
by the users and assignment of supervisors. However, few studies are available to address climate change 
mitigation through cooperative management of forests and agricultural lands.  
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to understand the factors that determine cooperative 
behavior of smallholder farmers to manage and sustainably use the common natural resources under high 
and low intrinsic growth rates of the resource due to favorable or unfavorable climate change scenarios 
respectively. We study this using a framed lab-in-the-field experiment. The CPR game is used to understand 
how climate change through its effect on intrinsic growth of resources, social norms (like “rule following” 
behavior), and social roles determine the sustainable use of commons. The CPR game is conducted in a 
setting where subjects have equal access to the commons and symmetric information. We follow the 
theoretical developments proposed by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015), which in turn constitute 
important extensions of the contributions proposed by Ostrom et al. (1992 and 1994). They develop a 
theoretical model to capture cooperative behavior in a dynamic common pool resources game using 
student subjects in a lab.  
The novelty of this chapter is twofold. Primarily, to understand social norms like rule following 
behavior, we introduce a repeated “route choice” experiment in a lab-in-the-field setting provided that it is 
relevant to the context. Subsequently we classify subjects as either “rule-followers” or “rule-breakers” 
based on the outcomes from the “route choice” experiment. We also introduce the importance of social 
roles in the literature of commons dilemma. Secondly, we introduce the possibility of climate change 
mitigation through management of commons. Climate mitigation involves restoration and reforestation of 
degraded forest and agricultural land; hence, we try to understand the degree at which rule followers and 
rule breakers cooperate in the restoration and reforestation of commons under favorable and unfavorable 
climate change prospects. In order to mimic climate change effects we set up a CPR problem with high and 
low growth rates of the resource representing favorable and unfavorable climate change, respectively. 
Under favorable climate change the resource might be sustained indefinitely. However, lack of cooperation 
can result in untimely depletion of the resource.  
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the effect of behavioral, ecological and social roles in 
the overharvesting of shared common pool resources and its implication to climate change mitigation by 
using experimental data from smallholder farmers. Some important aspects covered in previous studies 
include the effects of  
x economic and social heterogeneities (Taylor and Singleton 1993; Agrawal 1998; Varughese and 
Ostrom 1998; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015), 
x subjective satisfaction on the CPR games over standard measures of objective behavior of 
players (Becchetti et al. 2016), 
x impatience and cooperation (Schlager and Heikkila 2009),  
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x asymmetry in field experiments on CPR problems (Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Cardenas et al. 
2011; Janssen et al. 2011), 
x the influence of different institutional arrangement on CPR extraction (Cardenas and Ostrom, 
2004; Rodriguez-Sickert et al. 2008; Cardenas et al. 2011), 
x culture and ecology on cooperation (Sebastian et al. 2011), 
x social norms and ecological variables on cooperation and sustainable management of CPRs 
(Ostrom 2009; Lo 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015).  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the study site, the Choke ecosystem in 
Ethiopia. Section 4.3 reviews results from common pool resource games in the literature. Section 4.4 
explains our experimental set-up. Section 4.5 presents the results based on the experiment and Section 4.6 
discusses the implications of the results. We conclude in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Climate change, and common pool natural resources in the Choke ecosystem  
Land degradation and nutrient depletion is a major environmental and socio-economic problem in 
Ethiopian highlands. In the decades, problems related to land degradation and nutrient depletion have 
remained a critical challenge to the agricultural sector (Legesse 2003). The consequences of this made the 
country vulnerable to recurrent food shortages, in most cases it has claimed the lives of thousands and 
caused millions underfed. A strategy to counteract against land degradation, effective and efficient natural 
resource conservation strategies are needed (Legesse 2003). Mountain ecosystems are highly degraded 
and become vulnerable to changes in climate and population. Choke Mountain ecosystem is among those 
hotspots that attracted many researchers to identify options that help sustain natural resources. In the 
Choke ecosystem resources like water, irrigation systems, forests, watersheds, and soil have frequently 
been affected by excessive exploitation and climate change impacts, and frequently local institutional 
arrangement are malfunctioning (Simane 2011). In 2008, a local cooperative institution was organized 
under the Choke rehabilitation program (see Simane 2011). However, due to lack of binding agreement, ill-
defined incentive structures, users’ rights and appropriations (Epstein et al. 2014), the local institutions 
failed to bring tangible changes to the ecosystem as well as to communities. 
The Choke ecosystem soil structure is in critical conditions (Temsegen et al. 2008; Teferi et al. 2010). 
Due to climate change and anthropogenic factors, extensive agricultural practices on marginal lands are 
increased by 206% from 1986 to 2011 in the Choke ecosystem. Shrubs, forest cover and grasslands were 
reduced by 79%, 40% and 17%, respectively in the same period (Fetene 2014). Investment in the common 
forest and agricultural land through afforestation, the construction of diversion ditches, ridge banking and 
destocking are essential to combat soil degradation (FAO 2011). This strategy would also help to mitigate 
climate change through carbon sinks in soil and forests.  
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The Choke Mountain ecosystem is also the origin of many rivers and streams which make up the 
tributaries of the upper-Blue Nile. Rivers are currently decreasing in volume and some are becoming 
seasonal. Teferi et al. (2010) indicated that there was a loss of 607 km2 of seasonal wetland and 22.4 km2 of 
open water in the Choke Mountain range from 1986 to 2005. Due to the reduction in volume and size of 
rivers and streams, there is frequent conflict over user rights for irrigation water (Getnet 2012). Water 
allocation rules are deemed important and hence the relevance of cooperative management (Biswas 2004; 
Davis 2007). Cooperative management and use of irrigation and ground water as a commons dilemma has 
been the focus of previous studies (e.g. Cardenas et al. 2013; Reddy et al. 2014; Meinzen-Dick 2014). 
Cooperative and compromising group interests are identified as playing a significant role in the 
management and use of the common water resources. Beyond food security objectives, water resources 
management has paramount importance for global climate change mitigation. According to Earth Institute 
(2009), water resources are major carbon sinks absorbing more than a quarter of the anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide emissions.  
The forest cover in the Choke ecosystem is degraded due to high population pressure and climate 
change. Increasing poverty, long history of human settlement, overgrazing, cutting trees and bushes made 
the forest cover susceptible (Getnet 2012; Simane et al. 2012). Deforestation and loss of the ecosystem 
remain an important challenge. To come up with a socially optimal use of common forest resources and 
achieve the national target of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in the 
Choke Mountain, a strategy to realize cooperative local institutions should be devised.  
Social and ecological factors have been considered as limiting factors in the literature (Ostrom 1990; 
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015) to realize cooperative local institutions. However, the possibility of 
climate mitigation through cooperative management of commons has been largely overlooked. Recent 
studies by Cochran (2012) and Javier and Alejandro (2015), have tried to link the possibility of climate 
mitigation through cooperative commons management. Aliaga and Herrera (2015), based on climate 
scenarios, tried to understand the possibility of cooperative management of commons. Use of climate 
scenarios, however, requires the presence of sufficient and reliable forecasts. For instance, Calow et al. 
(2013) note that climate forecasts in Ethiopia are generally based on inaccurate and unreliable information. 
According to Calow et al. (2013), there are several gaps in the observations recorded in the Ethiopian 
climate forecasts mainly due to high variability in climate and topographic conditions. However, even in the 
absence of sound climate scenarios a stylized dynamic ecological model can shed light on management 
responses to climate change under favorable or unfavorable climatic conditions.  
4.3 Common pool resources (CPR): management and experimental games 
The theory of Common Pool Resources (CPR) describes collective action arrangements to devise institutions 
to cope with over exploitation of resources, and it addresses what types of rules would make such 
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institutions successful. Ostrom (1990) provides evidence from long enduring, locally managed, common 
pool resource settings from around the world to show that the social dilemma, often dubbed “tragedy of 
the commons” can be overcome. After the seminal work of Ostrom, many others have tested and applied 
the possibility of overcoming the social dilemma in a variety of CPR settings around the world (see for e.g. 
National Research Council 1986; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994; Baland and Platteau 1996; Kimbrough 
and Vostroknutov 2015). Consequently, the emergence of self-governing institutions and factors for 
sustainable CPR have become central issues in the debate. For example, Blomquist (1992) examined how 
social capital supports collective action in groundwater management in Southern California. The 
relationships between some of the key variables underlying CPR theory, such as the effects of group size on 
participation in collective choice activities, or the effects of economic and social heterogeneities on rule 
breaking and rule following have also been addressed (Taylor and Singleton 1993; Agrawal 1998; Varughese 
and Ostrom 2011; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015). Schlager and Heikkila (2009) explore how collective 
choice processes that govern CPRs compare in resolving the conflicts that can emerge among CPR users 
over time. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) studied how impatience and cooperation in CPR management are 
related; Cardenas et al. (2011) and Janssen et al. (2011) draw conclusions from asymmetric field 
experiments on CPR problems; Cardenas and Ostrom (2004), Cardenas et al. (2011) and Rodriguez-Sickert 
et al. (2008) study how different institutional arrangements influence CPR extraction. The work of 
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015) introduced how social norms and ecological variables affect 
cooperation and sustainable management of CPRs following Ostrom (2009). Recent developments in the 
application of CPR theory include the management problem of water resources like ground water 
management (Wang et al. 2003 and 2008; Dinar et al. 2013; Esteban and Dinar 2013); and fisheries (Fehr 
and Leibbrandt 2011; Carpenter and Seki 2005). In general, non-cooperative experimental approaches have 
contributed a profound literature in addressing the commons problems (see Brosig 2002).  
Methodologically, CPR studies can be conducted either in a laboratory setting, often with students, 
or in a field set-up using subjects actually involved in resource management (see e.g. Camerer 2003; 
Harrison and List 2004; Cardenas and Carpenter 2005; Janssen et al. 2011 and 2014; Cardenas et al. 2013; 
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015). Carpenter and Seki (2005) conducted public goods experiments with 
two groups of fishermen and students in Japan, and find that fishermen in general contribute more than 
students do. Janssen et al. (2011) conduct asymmetric-access irrigation games and found similar results 
when comparing students’ and villagers’ responses. Baggio and Janssen (2013) compare field data from 
irrigation games to agent-based models with a varying set of parameters including the degree of altruism, 
extraction, and investments in delivery infrastructure. In general CPR games using subjects who are directly 
involved in resources extraction offer a higher degree of external validity compared with laboratory 
experiments with students.  
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Ostrom’s (2009) proposed that CPRs can be understood as “social-ecological systems” in which 
multiple interacting factors influence successful resource governance. Ecological characteristics of the 
resource system, like the speed of re-growth, and social and behavioral factors need to be incorporated in 
the analysis of the CPR problem. Ecological characteristics of commons can be affected by short term (e.g. 
extraction) and long-term climate change drivers. Climate change can potentially alter growth of resources 
and lead to the loss of species and ecological imbalance (Ecological Impacts of Climate Change Collection, 
2013).  
A comparison of different dynamic CPR games is made by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015). Our 
CPR game structure follows the CPR framework developed by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015). 
However, instead of students, our subjects are farmers who struggle with a real common pool resource 
problem in their daily life. Based on the evidence that climate change has direct effect on the ecology 
mainly through affecting growth rate of CPRs, we introduce unfavorable and favorable climate change 
(Ecological Impacts of Climate Change Collection 2013). Furthermore, our results will be discussed in the 
context of CPR management for climate change mitigation in Ethiopia.  
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Data Sources 
Data for this chapter come from lab-in–the-field experiments conducted in 2015 in four villages in the 
Choke ecosystem, upper Blue-Nile basin. These particular villages are selected because of larger coverage 
of open access and common pool natural resources including forests, water bodies, and protected areas. A 
total of 192 farmers participated after being carefully selected with the help of development agents and 
Kebele administrators. Subjects received a formal call to participate in an experiment that would involve 
incentives and would take about 3-4 hours. The day selected for the field experiment is a “local holiday”9. 
There were three stages in the data collection process: the first was to conduct the “route choice” 
experiment which on average took one and a half hours. Results of this experiment were used for 
classifying rule-following and rule-breaking subjects. Then we conducted a CPR game that took about two 
hours. Finally, a short demographic and socio-economic survey was conducted. Each subject earned on 
average ETB 110 from all rounds of game play. Each group had a size of four subjects and we had 12 groups 
per village. Two groups were called in one session with two assistant experimenters for each group. Before 
each game session, the instruction for the games (the “route choice” and the CPR game) was read (see 
Appendix 4.3), and demonstrations were shown. The village’s farmers training center and administration 
halls were used as field lab. The instruction was translated into local language, and posters and displays 
were used to facilitate understanding.  
                                                 
9 Local holidays are those days in which people are not working in commemoration of angels and saints. 
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4.4.2 Experimental design 
4.4.2.1 The “route choice” experiment  
We developed a “route choice” experiment to understand subjects’ rule following behavior. The objective 
of the rule-following game is to understand how social norms affect collective management of the CPR. 
Subjects were asked to choose between route types displayed in a big poster showing a zigzag and a 
shorter route (see Appendix 4.2 for the pictorial diagram). It was announced that, as a rule one is supposed 
to go over the zigzag road. To avoid biases from risk and time preferences of subjects, subjects were 
informed that there is no penalty or cost in choosing the route types. In addition, the return from choosing 
the shorter road, i.e. the rule breaking option, involved a successively higher return10. Accordingly, we avail 
subjects with a payoff (see Table 4.1) from choosing either route types. The stage at which players shift 
from the zigzag road (choice A) to the shorter road (choice B) is used as a measure of rule following: the 
later the stage of switch, the stronger the rule following behavior.11 To understand how rule following 
behavior determines CPR management, we match subjects based on their switching point from choice A 
(rule following) to choice B (rule breaking). Accordingly, we allocate subjects to three groups, (i) only rule-
followers, (ii) only rule-breakers and (iii) mixed groups.  
Table 4.1. Payoff table showing the “route choice” experiment  
Game round Payoff from zigzag route (A) Payoff from shorter route (B) Choice (A or B) 
1 ETB10 ETB10  
2 ETB10 ETB 12  
3 ETB10 ETB 15  
4 ETB10 ETB 18  
5 ETB10 ETB 21  
6 ETB10 ETB 24  
7 ETB10 ETB 28  
8 ETB10 ETB 30  
4.4.2.2 The CPR dynamic game  
Our CPR game protocol follows the framework developed by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015). We 
adopted their design because it helps to understand the inter-temporal dynamics of common pool 
resources in developing countries. It also has features to capture the effect of history of harvests on state 
of resources stocks, and enables to introduce the effect of heterogeneity (like social norms) on sustainable 
commons management. More importantly it helps to apprehend the effect of climate change through its 
influence on the regrowth of the CPRs. Accordingly, the CPR model enables all beneficiaries to have equal 
access to the stock and material incentives which is termed as “common business” in the experiment. 
Parameterization follows a standard problem of harvests from a CPR by 4 subjects. We consider an initial 
                                                 
10 see Botelho et al. (2014) and Cardenas (2011) on the effect of preferences over risk and time on the equilibrium solutions of commons. 
11 Switching at higher stages also indicates the effect of monetary incentive on subjects’ behavior than a pure social norm. Incentive effects on social 
norms could also play a significant role. The scope this chapter, however, is limited  to understanding the effect of social norms on rule following. 
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resource stock which at the same time reflects the carrying capacity of the system (ܵ଴ ൌ Ͷ͸Ͳ) which might 
be due to exogenous environmental or technical factors (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015). At any time 
ݐ ൐ Ͳ the available stock depends on the stock in the previous period, extraction efforts ݁௜௧ and the re-
growth rate ߚ. We assume ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ for favorable and ߚ ൌ ͲǤͳʹͷ for unfavorable climate change.12 We also 
assume a the critical stock ܵҧ ൌ ͵Ͳ of the resource below which it cannot replenish, i.e. ߚ=0 if ܵҧ ൏ ͵Ͳ. 
Furthermore in each round an individual’s total effort endowment is ܧ௜௧ ൌ ͶͲ. It can be allocated to 
extraction from the commons ݁௜௧ with a productivity parameter ߙ ൌ ʹ causing higher GHGs. The remainder 
is allocated to private activities like farm or off-farm labor. Hence, the payoff function of individual i is given 
as, 
ߨ௧ሺ݁௜௧ȁܵ௧ሻ ൌ ሺܧ௜௧ െ ݁௜௧ሻ ൅ ߙ݁௜௧       (4.1) 
where, ߨሺ݁௜௧ȁܵ௧ሻ is the benefit of individual ݅at time ݐ from the effort allocated (݁௜௧) to extracting CPR 
given that the resource stock at time t is ܵ௧ ൒ σ݁௜௧Ǥ According to payoff function (1), the payoffs from 
extraction and other private activities are (ߙ݁௜௧ሻ and ሺܧ௜௧ െ ݁௜௧) respectively. We will assume that income 
from private activities boosts adaptive capacity to climate change (ܧ௜௧ െ ݁௜௧) and is not constrained by 
scarcity like commons. Therefore, the maximization of individuals’ benefit ߨ௧ሺ ௜݁௧ȁܵ௧)13 at time t is 
constrained by the available resource stock after harvests made in period t-1 and is explained in equation 
(2).  
ܵ௧ ൌ ܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚሺܵ଴ െ ܵ௧ିଵሻ.        (4.2) 
Note that Equation (4.2) implies that if the remaining resource falls short of the threshold ܵ଴ െ ܵ௧ିଵ ൏ ܵҧ ൌ
͵Ͳ growth ceases to regenerate and subjects share the remaining stock (ܵ௧) following a simultaneous 
eating algorithm, i.e. proportional to demands. The game was designed in an infinite fashion, but we only 
play ten rounds ሺܶ ൌ ͳͲ). Under low literacy level and cognitive capacity of farmers (to recall previous 
harvest decisions), playing 10 rounds can provide useful information.  
To understand the effects of ecological variables on cooperative management and use of CPRs, subjects 
were divided to play a high growth rate treatment (due to favorable climate change) (82 subjects) or the 
low growth rate treatment (due to unfavorable climate change) (110 subjects). We understand that making 
games similar to real life contexts can be helpful in strengthening external validity. It has disadvantages, 
however, of focusing the minds of the players on local contexts that are largely unobservable to the 
researchers. For this reason, we present the CPR problem as an abstract public business called “Yehibret 
sira”. In each round, subjects can collect a payment from allocation of effort endowment either from 
private business or Yehibret sira represented by two boxes (see Appendix 4.2). The payoff from each 
                                                 
12 Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015) also used exponential, reverse high and low growth treatments (to see the effect of assortative matching on 
resources dynamics). However, we only stick to high and low growth treatments, because including more treatments become time demanding and 
make the task more complex in the farmers context.  
13 In the classical repeated game the stage game payoff is defined by Ɏ୧ ൌ  െ ୧ ൅ ሺ୧Ȁσ୧ሻ	 ሺσ୧ሻ, where F is a strictly concave function with a 
maximum and ୧ is the amount extracted by player i (see Ostrom et al. 1994, Velez et al. 2009) and mostly uses a one shot game making it less 
informative to capture the effect of ecological dynamics. 
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Yehibret sira and the private business are ETB 0.40 and ETB 0.20 respectively. For the details of the payoff 
structure see online Appendix 4.3.  
The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the ecological variable ߚ (referring to high and 
low growth rate due to favorable and unfavorable climate change respectively), the minimum threshold 
level of the resource ܵҧ, and the initial resource stock (ܵ଴ሻ. As shown by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 
(2015) under the high growth rate of the CPR ቀߚ ൒ ௌҧሺ௡ିଵሻሺௌబିௌҧሻቁ with n-players in an infinite game, the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome is when the resource stock converges to ܵҧ ൅ ߚሺܵ଴ െ ܵҧሻ; while 
when the resource growth rate is low ቀߚ ൑ ௌҧሺ௡ିଵሻሺௌబିௌҧሻቁ, SPNE outcome is when the resource stock converges 
to zero. In our game we choose ߚ to represent these two cases. One can also see the equilibrium outcome 
with norms using the social planners solutions.14 In this chapter, however, we only stick to a model without 
norms.  
4.4.3 Social roles  
Roles are "standardized patterns of behaviour required of all persons playing a part in a given functional 
relationship regardless of personal wishes or interpersonal obligations irrelevant to the functional 
relationship"; while norms are “the general expectations of a demand character for all role incumbents of a 
system or subsystem" (Katz and Kahn 1978: 43). Hence, apart from understanding social norms through 
rule following games, we collected data on social roles to understand how social norms and roles are 
interdependent.  
In a society or a social group  one can find him/herself represented as a set of specific social 
positions (e.g., worker, scholar, schoolboy, husband, and soldier). According to the social role expectations, 
a person is obliged to obey the social demand associated with his social position. In meeting this social 
demand, a person chooses one of several possible variants for executing a social role (Neimann and Hughes 
1951). Accordingly, in our study we define a social role to indicate an individual farmer’s status to play a 
role in a given a community. We took a farmer’s status as chairperson for iddir15, team leader for 
development groups, and being an elder- “shimagile”16 who often mediates local conflicts. Having a social 
role is expected to affect conservation and sustainable use of CPRs through its relationship with subjects’ 
social norm. In this chapter, we try to see how social norms (e.g. the rule following behavior) and social 
roles are related. 
Social role indicator variables are derived from binary questions. We asked each participant 
whether they have a leadership role in development groups, work groups and traditional community 
associations like Idir. An elderly role, on the other hand, takes a value 1 if an individual’s age is above 48. It 
                                                 
14 The social planners solution can be examined by introducing a model with norms in which there is an extra utility for adhering to the rule 
following social norm.  
15 Iddir is an informal local institution for community services like funeral, and other emergency needs in the community.  
16 Shimagile is a term used to locals who are known in mediating conflict and considered as role model in many respects. 
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is expected that having a social role and being an elder are highly associated with rule following behavior. 
Shared values and norms are key triggers of cooperation (Ostrom 1998 and 2000). Individuals’ willingness 
to cooperate might also depend on a set of non-material incentives involved in the solution of these 
dilemmas (Ostrom 2000). 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Relationship between social norm and social role variables 
Social norms like rule following behavior are expected to be related to social roles of individuals. Table 4.2 
shows the association between the social role (i.e. the leadership role in different social groups) and being 
an elder (elderly role) with rule following behavior measured by the switching point in the “route choice” 
experiment.  
Table 4.2. Measure of association between social role and the rule following behavior 
Switching point  
Social-role 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 (No 
switch) 
Total 
No social 
role 
19 36 14 9 4 1 1 0 23 107 
Social role 8 12 13 6 4 1 3 3 34 84 
Total 27 48 27 15 8 2 4 3 57 191 
            Pearson chi2(8) =  20.7729   Pr = 0.008 
Elderly-
role 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Not 
elderly 
20 19 32 20 12 6 3 1 23 136 
Elderly 7 16 7 3 2 1 1 1 34 72 
Total 27 35 39 23 14 7 4 2 57 182 
            Pearson chi2(9) =  19.4656   Pr = 0.022 
The Pearson chi2 tests in Table 4.2 show the presence of high degree of association between rule-following 
behavior and role indicator variables. The numbers of rule breakers (defined as those who switch below 
stage 5) are larger in both non-elders and those having no role in the community. In order to conform this 
association, we further regress the switching point (Switch_at) in the “route choice” experiment on a set of 
socioeconomic and demographic variables (Table 4.3). 
  
 74 
 
Table 4.3. OLS regression results of Route choice (Switch_at) on a set of socioeconomic and demographic 
variables  
 Coef. Std. Err.     P>t      
Sex     0.1866 0.4780 0.697 
Education status     1.9039 0.2418 0.00 
Marital status     0.7971 0.4298 0.065 
Social role    1.1746 0.3644 0.002 
Elder role     0.0695 0.3861 0.857 
Livestock size   -0.0159 0.0496 0.749 
Farm size     2.9510 0.4921 0.00 
Crop harvest in Ha     -0.0301 0.0135 0.027 
Constant  -1.0792 0.8243 0.192 
Prob > F   =  0.0000 
    
 R-squared   =  0.5002     
  
In the regression, we find that having a social role influences significantly the rule following behavior. 
However, an elderly role is not significant though it is positive. Hence, social role are more robust in 
determining rule following behavior.  
4.5.2 Results of the CPR game  
4.5.2.1 State of optimal extraction under rule following behavior and climate change 
As explained in the methods section, subjects were primarily divided into two groups playing the high or 
the low growth treatment. These groups were further divided into groups of three composed of only rule-
followers, only rule-breakers or of mixed types. Out of those who played the high growth treatment (due to 
favorable climate change), 20 individuals (5 groups) form the rule followers’ group, 28 individuals (7 
groups) form rule breaking groups, and 36 individuals (9 groups) form mixed groups. One group dropped 
out due to incomplete information. Figure 4.1 shows the disaggregated outcome of the CPR game.  
 
Figure 4.1. Resources stock over time by treatment (HG=high growth rate due to favorable climate change 
and LG=low growth rate due to unfavorable climate change)  
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We expect that groups of rule followers can preserve the resource indefinitely. The equilibrium outcome of 
the model under favorable climate change17 (Figure 4.1A) is to use the resource indefinitely. Even though 
the players use the resource indefinitely under this treatment, the outcome of the experiment is different 
from the prediction of the model. Comparing average resource use across groups, we find that rule 
followers preserve the resources much better than other groups. The mixed groups are better than rule 
breakers in preserving the resource. Extrapolation of harvest rate under favorable climate change shows 
that rule breakers deplete the resource after the 11th period while rule followers use it indefinitely.  
In Figure 4.1B, we show the state of optimal harvest by subjects under unfavorable climate change. 
The equilibrium outcome under this scenario is to deplete the resource after period 3. Unlike Kimbrough 
and Vostroknutov (2015), due to having high initial resources stocks and smaller effort endowments, there 
are three SPNE under low growth rate treatment.18 The results of the experiment show that rule breakers 
and mixed groups deplete the resource after period 8 and period 7 respectively (Figure 4.1B).  
4.5.2.2 Group-wise comparison of state of optimal extraction under unfavorable climate change 
treatment 
Here we discuss how different groups of rule followers and breakers behave in the dynamic CPR game. This 
is presented in Figure 4.2 and Appendix 4.1.  
                                                 
17 High growth and low growth treatments are synonymously used as favorable and un-favorable climate change respectively. 
18 The equilibrium path in this treatment is to exert maximum effort (୧୲ሻ provided that the available resource stock is higher than ୧୲. 
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Figure 4.2. Group-wise comparison of resources stock over time under favorable climate change treatment 
Note: HG=High growth rate due to favorable climate change 
Under favorable climate change, all rule following groups sustain the resource indefinitely while four (of 
nine) rule breaking groups deplete the resources after 9th and 10th period. However, there are two rule 
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breaking groups (groups 1 and 5 in the upper panel of Figure 4.2(A1 and A2)) that sustain the resources 
indefinitely. For the remaining three rule breaking groups (groups 2, 6 and 9 in A1 of Figure 4.2), 
extrapolation shows that they will deplete the resources after the 12th period. 
Under the low growth treatment (see Appendix 4.1), we had 14 rule follower groups, and 6 rule 
breaker groups.19 In the rule follower groups, only one group (group 1) sustains the resources after the 
tenth period, two groups (group 3 and 11) use the resources until the tenth period. The rest of the groups 
deplete the resource after the 7th and 8th period. Rule breakers, on the other hand, deplete the resource 
after the 7th period. There were no rule breaking groups that sustain the resources until the 10th period.  
In addition to the CPR game results, we further need to conform how average extraction rate of 
individuals is influenced by a set of exogenous variables. This is shown in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4. OLS regression results of average extraction of individuals over a set of explanatory variables 
  Coef.    Std. Err.       P>t 
Demographic 
Sex    -0.656 0.790 0.408 
Age     0.063 0.029 0.031 
Literacy level 0.992 0.469 0.036 
Farm size    0.604 0.868 0.487 
Social role and norms  
Social role -2.671 0.618 0.000 
Elder role -1.860 0.802 0.022 
Rule following -0.249 0.127 0.052 
Village dummies  
Gedamayit 1.244 0.831 0.136 
Yeted 0.636 0.868 0.465 
Laychabi -0.541 0.846 0.523 
constant     17.729 1.468 0.000 
Number of observation  =     191     
F( 10,   173) =    2.95 
Prob > F      =  0.00 
R-squared     =  0.14     
In Table 4.4, one can observe that average extraction of individuals’ is significantly influenced by social 
role and norm variables. In addition, variables like literacy level and age of individuals influence extraction 
rate positively and significantly. The negative and significant relationship of social role, elderly role, and 
norm indicator variables support our argument that, sustainability of common pool resources depends on 
social role (leadership role), elderly role, and social norm (rule following) behavior of subjects. The result is 
in accordance with the experimental results.  
4.5.2.3 Comparison of effort allocation  
Recall that subjects played a game that requires allocation of effort endowment to either the extraction of 
CPRs or to other private activities. Exerting higher effort above the equilibrium level on the extraction of 
commons causes possible degradation and deforestation triggering higher emission of GHG, whereas an 
                                                 
19 Mixed groups are not included here, we only wanted to compare only rule followers and only rule breakers. 
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effort allocated to private activity can enhance farmers’ adaptive capacity through diversifying income 
sources. Accordingly, we compare extraction vs. adaptation effort levels of farmers disaggregated based on 
rule following and rule breaking behavior groups. The outcome is presented in Appendix 4.1. Comparing 
rule followers’ adaptation vs. extraction efforts, one can see that average effort allocation to extraction is 
smaller than the average effort level allocated to adaptation strategy. However, this result varies across the 
different social norms and ecological treatments. For instance, rule followers under unfavorable climate 
change exert higher effort in adaptation strategies than rule breakers.  
4.6 Discussion 
Understanding the role of social norms and ecological variables in cooperative management of commons 
(Ostrom 1990) is the crucial first step in analyzing climate mitigation in forests and common pool 
agricultural lands. A need for integrated approaches to understand the possibility of establishing local 
institutions to manage CPR has been articulated both in the research community and among policy-makers. 
How and why various local institutions are established, as well as the effect of social norms, social roles, 
and climate change on cooperative management need to be addressed in an experimental set up that 
reflects real life practices.  
In the first step, we tried to understand whether social norms and social roles are independent or not. 
This would help policy makers to understand how local level development groups should be organized. The 
results of a Pearson chi2 test show that there is a high degree of association between having a social role in 
the community with rule-following behavior. A possible inference can be drawn from this relationship. 
When individuals are having a social role, they develop a social norm to fulfill the general expectations of 
the system or subsystems (Katz and Kahn 1978). This is supported by the CPR game where rule followers 
preserve the resources better than rule breakers in both favorable and unfavorable climate change 
treatments.  
In the CPR game under favorable climate change treatment (which enables high growth rate of the 
resource) (ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷሻ, the model predicts that the resource can be used indefinitely. However, under this 
treatment, the outcomes of our model and the SPNE are different despite the fact that rule followers use 
the resource indefinitely. Mixed groups, which are randomly matched, are better in preserving the resource 
than rule breakers. The high harvest rates by rule breakers might have been compensated by low harvest 
rates of rule followers in the mixed groups. Group type composition can partly explain observed 
heterogeneous resource dynamics (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015). 
It is also shown that the minimum resources threshold level (ܵҧ) and the initial stock size affect the 
speed of exhaustion. In our model, we have a relatively higher initial stock capacity and lower value of ܵҧ as 
compared to subjects effort endowment, which later affect the rate of depletion and the number of SPNE 
in the low growth treatment. The use of higher initial stock size also helps to compare the results with the 
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findings of Oses-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau (2007) which asserted that it would be impossible to sustain a 
CPR and establish cooperative institutions if users did not expose to the situation of scarcity.  
Comparison of depletion rates between rule followers and rule breakers under favorable climate 
shows that rule breakers deplete the resource after the 11 period. Besides, the rate of harvest by rule 
breakers is higher than rule followers. This is consistent with the findings of Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 
(2015) in a lab experiment using students. Similar studies which found exhaustion of resources under 
different growth treatments include the Forestry Game by Cardenas et al. (2011), and Bru et al. (2003). 
Janson (2010), however, observed a different result. Communication of subjects according to Janson (2010) 
results in cooperative management of resources resulting a sustainable use of the resources. In addition, 
under severe climate change which would hamper growth of resources, realizing cooperative local 
institutions would be challenging.  
We also tried to show how individual players allocate effort endowment to extraction vs. private 
activity. We assume that higher extraction effort results in degradation and deforestation of the commons 
contributing to GHG emissions. Disaggregated effort allocation indicates that there is an overall higher 
effort allocation to private activities (Adaptation_eff) than extraction effort (Extraction_eff). This is shown 
in the appendix 4.1. However, there might be other behavioral mechanisms like reciprocity and trust of 
individuals explain this outcome and hence deserve further study. In general, the results of lower effort 
allocation as compared to private activities highlights the possibility of mainstreaming mitigation strategies 
(restoration and rehabilitation of degraded land forests) into the smallholder farmers’ economy together 
with existing adaptation efforts (see Golub et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2007). However, this does not mean that 
commons are sustainably managed at both high and low growth treatments. There is higher disparity 
among rule followers and rule breakers in the different ecological treatments and even complete depletion 
of the resource by some groups.  
4.7 Conclusion and recommendation  
Researchers and policy makers give little attention to climate change mitigation in developing countries 
since most of atmospheric GHG are emitted from developed countries. However, forecasts show that GHG 
emissions from land use and land cover change, deforestation and degradation will countervail adaptation 
and mitigation. Management of forests and agricultural land is a possible strategy to mitigate climate 
change in developing countries. It is believed that if trees are maintained or reintroduced and judiciously 
managed, together with crops and/or animals, then agricultural and forested lands can be a major sink for 
large quantities of carbon (Albrecht and Kandji 2003). However, addressing climate change mitigation in 
developing countries relies on the characteristics of the available mitigation options. Forests, infrastructure 
for soil and water conservation, and underground and irrigation water are mostly characterized by non-
excludability and exhaustibility. They fundamentally have open access and common pool resource 
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characteristics. Cooperative institutions are expected to play a major role in the management of such 
resources.  
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to understand the social and ecological factors that 
determine cooperative behavior of smallholder farmers to manage and sustainably use common natural 
resources. To understand famers’ behavior, we conducted two separate games: the “route choice” 
experiment to understand social norms like rule following behavior, and a CPR game to understand 
extraction vs. conservation behavior. The “route choice” experiment helps to account for heterogeneity 
and understand how social norms play a role in sustainable management of commons. The games were 
conducted in a framed lab-in the field experiment. The players of the games are farmers having equal 
access to the commons with symmetric information and resource endowment.  
Primarily, we wanted to see how social roles are associated with rule following (social norm) 
behavior. We find that social role and the rule following behavior are highly interdependent. There are 
interventions already designed by government and other agents to address climate change and food 
security in Ethiopia. These include development groups, work groups and water groups. Organizing 
development groups composed of elders and with those that have a social role would help sustain the 
management and sustainable use of commons. Primary screening of the who about of members in terms 
social role and social norm are encouraged to pay greater attention. This is evidenced in the CPR 
experimental results under high growth rate treatment where mixed groups sustain better than rule 
breaker groups. Secondly, the results of the CPR games reveal that rule followers preserve the resources 
much better than rule breakers and mixed groups both under unfavorable and favorable climate change 
treatments. Specifically, we find evidence that under a low growth rate of the resource, rule breakers and 
mixed groups deplete the resources after period 8 and 7 respectively showing that cooperation under 
climate change stressor is hard to obtain. This implies that sustainable management of commons can be 
possible under favorable climate change which could provide sufficient re-growth of the resource. Under 
unfavorable climate change, on the other hand, adaptation options to climate change can potentially 
reverse this trend by offsetting higher extraction efforts through enhancing regrowth.  
Mitigation efforts can also boost cooperative behavior through enhancing re-growth of commons. 
To enhance the carbon sink functions of soils and forests through management of commons, we 
recommend a participatory development approach and inclusive planning. The presence of mixed groups 
(rule followers and breakers) and elders and youth in development groups can help to sustain the use of 
commons. Apart from the existing adaptation efforts, initiating climate mitigation strategies in a 
smallholder economy is recommended. However, it should also be noted that in the broader context of 
development CPR management cannot be confined to carbon sink objectives but has to take into account 
long-run food security of local populations.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 4.1. Optimal harvest and effort allocation to diferent activities   
 
Figure A1 Group-wise comparison of resources stock dynamics under unfavourable climate change 
treatment 
Note LG=low growth rate due to unfavourable climate change  
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Figure A2 Extraction ( Extraction_eff) vs. adaptation effort (Adaptation_eff) allocation of farmers under 
unfavourable (Figures 1 and 2),and favourable (Figures 3 and 4) climate change 
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Appendix 4.2. Experimental aid materials and payoff table 
 
Figuere A 4 Pictorial diagram of the “route choice” experiment  
 
Figure A6. Boxes representing the CPR problem (public business) and private business  
Table A1. Payoff matrix for the CPR game  
Player Card No ____________ 
 
Round number (period)  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
Amount of coupons left 
in the common business  
          
My collection of coupons 
from  private business  
          
My collection of coupons 
from  common business  
          
My earnings from this 
round in ETB  
          
Total earning                             = 
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Appendix 4.3. Instructions for the experimental game session  
Part I of the game  
 
Welcome to this hall.  
 
You are now participating in a decision-making experiment. During your stay, you will make subsequent 
decisions which involve a considerable amount of money depending on your decisions. Therefore, you are 
asked to follow the instructions carefully. Your earnings will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the 
experiment. This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not allowed 
to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then we will come to your 
seat and answer your questions. Any violation of this rule excludes you immediately from the experiment 
and all payments.  
 
Part I  
 
In this experiment, assume that you want to go from the red spot to the green spot (assistant experimenter 
show the pictures). You have two choices to reach the green spot; going either through the zigzag road or 
through the straight road. During the experiment, you can choose either road by ticking a box on the 
experimental paper which is given to you. The rule in this game is to go through the zigzag road. Your 
earnings in this game are depended on your choice of road to reach to the green spot. Specifically, follow 
the demonstration below. After you finish all the 8 rounds one will be randomly selected and you will get 
the respective payoff. 
 
Demonstration 1: You are told that the rule is to go through the zigzag road to reach to the circle spot. Now 
consider that you are in the second round of this game (assistant experimenter show the decision form to 
them), if you choose the zigzag road which is rule following you will get Birr 10, and Birr 12 if you choose 
the straight route. Now you can choose privately you route.  
 
Demonstration 2: Now assume that you are in the third round, and if you choose the zigzag road you will 
get Birr 10, whereas, if you choose the straight road which is against the rule to reach the green spot you 
will get Birr 15. Now you can choose privately you route.  
 
Now we almost done the two rounds; and then after, it is your turn to privately choose the alternative 
routes by seeing the poster in front of you.  
 
This is the end of the instructions for this game. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will answer them privately. Otherwise, please wait quietly for the experiment to begin. 
 
Part II 
 
Instruction for the CPR game  
 
This part of the experiment will consist of several decision making periods. In each period, you will collect 
40 coupons from the two boxes. Your task is to decide whether to take the 40 coupons from either private 
business (the box in the right corner of the hall) or from both of the boxes (a private business box and a 
group business box (YEHIBRET SIRA) (left corner of the hall)). From the private business box you are free to 
take any amount of coupon provided that it could not go beyond the maximum collection 40 coupons. Each 
coupon in the private box represents 0.20 ETB cents. Coupons in the public business represent ETB 0.40 
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cents. Thus, each period you receive the sum of your earnings from your private business plus your 
earnings from the group business (a business owned by the members of the group). 
 
There are 4 people, including yourself, participating in your group. You will be matched with the same 
people for all of this game. Other people in your group will make the same decisions as you.  The private 
business has an unlimited number of coupons that you can take, so it will never run out of coupons. 
However, the group business initially contains a total of 460 coupons. This is the capacity of the group 
business. Whenever any person in your group takes a coupon from the group business, the number of 
coupon is reduced. However, each period, some of the coupon taken from the group business will 
replenish. Specifically, they will replenish according to the following rule: If there are X coupons remaining 
in the group business at the end of a period, the group business will replenish by (460 - X)/8 coupons. Thus, 
at the beginning of the next period, there will be X + (460 - X)/8 coupon in the group business (assistant 
experimenter show the coupons to subjects).  
BUT if the total number of coupon in the group business ever falls to fewer than 30 coupons, the group 
business will not replenish. Finally, if at any point, the group attempts to take more coupon from the group 
business than actually remain in the box, the remaining coupon will be divided across the people who 
chose to take from the group business based on the simultaneous eating algorithm. 
 
Here are two examples to make this clear: 
 
(1) Suppose that at the beginning of the period, there are 460 coupons in the group business box. Then, 
suppose the people in your group, including yourself, take a total of 160 coupons from the group business 
box. At the end of the period, there would be 460 - 160 = 300 coupon remaining in the group business box. 
The group business would then replenish before the next period. Specifically, (460 - 300)/8= 20 coupon 
would be added back to the group business box. 
So, at the beginning of the next period, there would be 300+ 20 = 320 coupons in the group business box.  
 
(2) Now, suppose the next period begins with 320 coupons in the group business, and suppose that the 
people in your group take 140 coupons from the group business. At the end of the period, there would be 
(320 - 140) = 180 coupon in the group business. The group business would then replenish before the next 
period. Specifically, (320 - 180)/8= 17.5 coupon would be added back to the group business. Then at the 
beginning of the next period, there will be 180+17.5=197.5 coupons available in the group business.  
 
In general, first, decide on the number of coupons to take from the private and the group business by 
picking a coupon from the boxes labeled as private and group business. Your collection must sum to 40. 
While you make your decision, the 3 other members in your group will also decide on how many coupons 
to take from the private and group business.  
Second, after everyone has made a decision, your earnings for that decision period are the sum of your 
earnings from the private and group businesses. 
 
As an example, suppose that you take a total of 30 coupons from the private business and 10 coupons from 
the group business. Your total earnings from that period would be 30*0.20 + 10*.40 = ETB 10. Remember, 
the return from the group business is ETB 0.40 cents per coupon drawn and the return from the private 
business is 0.20 ETB cents per coupon. While you are deciding how to allocate your coupons, everyone else 
in your group will be doing so as well. After each session, you will be informed how much is left in the 
group business. This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come by to answer them. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Evaluation of climate change adaptation alternatives 
 for smallholder farmers in the upper Blue-Nile basin 20 
 
 
Abstract: Climate change is expected to have severe negative impacts on the livelihoods of smallholder 
farmers in developing countries. However, smallholder farmers and governments in these regions tend to 
be ill-prepared for changes such as more frequent seasonal droughts and periods of extreme temperatures 
or rainfall. Stakeholders’ evaluation of adaptation options can improve awareness and policy decisions 
regarding climate change. Therefore, in this paper, we present the results of a stakeholder-based multi-
criteria analysis (MCA) of climate change adaptation options for agriculture, natural resources and water 
management in the upper Blue-Nile basin in Ethiopia. We discussed current and potential adaptation 
practices and challenges, potential options, and evaluation criteria with representatives from different 
social groups in a stakeholder workshop. Subsequently, we conducted a survey asking farmers and experts 
to evaluate adaptation options based on a set of potentially conflicting criteria. The PROMETHEE II 
outranking method was then applied to our survey data in order to compare and rank climate adaptation 
options. The outranking results of agricultural adaptation options reveal that rankings based on 
importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary, and mitigation criteria conflict with the rankings on feasibility 
(applicability, affordability and agro-ecosystem relevance) criteria. The conflict in the order of rankings 
arises from the differences in preferences attached to the evaluation criteria by stakeholders. Overall, the 
top ranked agricultural adaptation options are improved soil and land management practices that are 
specific to a given agro-ecosystem. Hence we recommend policy makers in the upper Blue-Nile basin to pay 
greater attention to the criterion “agro-ecosystem relevance” when designing interventions related to 
adaptation to climate change.  
  
                                                 
20 This chapter is based on: 
NigussieY M, E C van Ierland, Edwin van der Werf, X Zhu, B Simane (2016). Evaluation of climate change adaptation 
alternatives for smallholder farmers in the upper Blue-Nile basin. Under review at Ecological Economics.  
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5.1 Introduction  
Since the risks to climate change are real and uncertain, society needs to develop adaptation strategies, 
especially for those who are highly vulnerable (Adger et al. 2003). The consequences of climate change for 
developing countries are more severe than for developed countries due to low adaptive capacity and high 
vulnerability (UNFCC 2006) in developing countries. For example, Ethiopia is heavily dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture, and its geographical location and topography in combination with low adaptive capacity imply a 
high vulnerability to adverse impacts of climate change. Historically, land degradation in the form of soil 
erosion has negatively affected agricultural production and economic transformation of Ethiopia (Balana et 
al. 2010; Pender and Gebremedhin 2007). Rainfall variability and high-temperature episodes are 
accompanied by recurrent seasonal drought and fluctuating run-off to the Nile tributaries (World Bank 
2010; World Bank 2011). Several studies have proposed strategies, both at the micro and the macro level, 
to tackle problems related to natural resources degradation and climate change effects in Ethiopia (see e.g. 
Deressa et al. 2008; Salvatore et al. 2011; Tesso et al. 2012; Tesfaye and Brouwer 2012; Simane et al. 2012 
and 2013; Nigussie et al. 2016). 
Since policy interventions for climate change adaptation require participation of and dialogue with 
stakeholders, stakeholder analysis has become a focus of study in various countries (Chaudhury et al. 2016; 
Dilling and Berggren 2014). Since long-term effects of climate change in Ethiopia are expected to be 
enormous (Conway and Schipper 2011; Simane et al. 2014; World Bank 2010), previous adaptation options 
identified through empirical research and government policies and programs need to be evaluated and 
prioritized by stakeholders’ comprised from different groups. However, there is a lack of stakeholder-level 
evaluation and stakeholder dialogue to identify prioritized adaptation options on the basis of well-defined 
evaluation criteria in the process of adaptation to climate change at different hotspots, such as the upper 
Blue-Nile basin in Ethiopia.21 
We used a stakeholder workshop and a survey of farmers and experts to identify alternative 
adaptation options, select evaluation criteria and collect data. We subsequently analysed these data using 
the PROMETHEE II preference outranking method for multi-criteria analysis (MCA). MCA is a decision-
support tool applicable to choice problems in different contexts under a number of different alternatives 
and possibly conflicting criteria (Hajkowicz et al. 2000). It is an evaluation method used to rank or score the 
performance of an alternative (policy options) against multiple criteria (Hajkowicz 2007). MCA studies can 
help identify alternative options, select criteria and score options, and then assign a weight to each 
criterion to provide a weighted sum that is used to rank options (Janssen and Van Herwijnen 2006). 
Previous studies in the upper Blue-Nile basin failed to evaluate adaptation options by sets of possibly 
conflicting criteria. Especially the agro-ecosystem relevance of an option has been overlooked. Due to a lack 
                                                 
21 The Ethiopian National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA 2007) is a stakeholder level project evaluation framework developed on the basis of cost 
benefit analysis. 
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of resources and skilled labour in Ethiopia, adaptation interventions are designed without considering the 
specific characteristics of an agro-ecosystem (Nyamadzawo et al. 2013; Simane et al. 2012). This gap can be 
filled through an approach that enables stakeholders’ engagement in the different stages of multi criteria 
analysis. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to rank and evaluate possible adaptation options for 
smallholder farmers in the upper Blue-Nile basin using a set of conflicting criteria. We explicitly study the 
agro-ecosystem relevance of each option.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents materials and methods including 
identifcation and evaluation process of adaptation options by MCA. Section 5.3 presents the results of 
identified adataption options and their ranking based on MCA and discusion. We give concluding remarks in 
Section 5.4.  
5.2 Materials and methods  
5.2.1 Multi-Criteria Analysis 
In the literature on prioritization of climate change adaptation options, there are two approaches used to 
arrive at a list of prioritized climate change adaptation options: the overall vulnerability assessment 
framework, and the adaptation assessment and evaluation framework (Champalle et al. 2015). Assessing 
vulnerability to climate change at the regional level is important to understand the risks posed by climate 
change and provides further information to identify measures for future adaptation to climate change 
impacts.  
There are different methods to assess and prioritize alternative policy options in climate change 
adaptation (Zhu and van Ierland 2010). Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is a widely used evaluation technique in 
the literature. In CBA, the benefits and costs of adaptation are expressed in monetary terms, and the net 
benefits are calculated. However, applicability of CBA for many adaptation options is limited since it 
requires monetary measures for benefits and costs in order to assess whether the benefits exceed the costs 
(De Bruin et al. 2009). However, benefits of climate change adaptation do not always have a clear monetary 
value. Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), also requires monetization of costs. These drawbacks of CBA and 
CEA forced researchers to choose MCA, which enables to arrive at a priority list of climate adaptation 
options by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. It has recently been applied in climate 
change adaptation prioritizations to assess climate change policies (e.g. De Bruin et al. 2009; Pearce et al. 
2012).  
There are three approaches in multi criteria analysis (MCA). The first is rooted in multi-attribute 
utility theory. Multi-attribute utility theory requires the identification of utility functions and weights for 
each attribute that can then be assembled in a unique synthesizing criterion (Keeney and Raiffa 1993). The 
second approach in MCA refers to interactive methods. Interactive methods require preference 
information from the decision maker throughout the selection process and require progressive articulation 
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of preferences (see for example Geoffrion et al. 1972). The third MCA approach is the outranking method. 
It focuses on building a relation called ‘outranking relation’, which represents the decision maker’s 
preferences. Ranking of the alternatives has to be done on the basis of pair-wise comparisons of 
alternatives (choices). Examples of well-known outranking methods are PROMETHEE (Brans and Vincke 
1985), ELECTRE (Roy 1973), and MACBETH (Bana e Costa and Vansnick 1997). Cenelli et al. (2014) provide 
an overview of MCA methods for sustainability assessments. 
In this paper, we use the Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment of Evaluations 
(PROMETHEE), which is an outranking method for decision making that allows for ranking of alternatives 
based on a set of evaluation criteria, where each criterion has an assigned weight (Brans and Mareschal 
2005). Examples of applications of PROMETHEE are Palma et al. (2007), who use it to evaluate the 
integrated performance of silvoarable agroforestry on hypothetical farms, and Jactel et al. (2012) who 
analysed the ranking of forest management alternatives in the context of forest damage risk from climate 
change. 
5.2.2 Out ranking procedure of adaptation options  
MCA outranking methods focus on pair-wise comparisons of alternatives where the starting point is a 
decision matrix describing the performance of the alternatives to be evaluated with respect to identified 
criteria (Belton and Stewart 2002). In this paper, the PROMETHEE II method (Brans and Vincke, 1985; Brans 
et al., 1986; Brans and Mareschal 1990, 2002) was used because it enables complete pre-order of 
alternatives, and facilitates the tracing of the final performance rank. The PROMETHEE algorithm starts 
with structuring the decision context (Bana e Costa and Vansnick 1997). This structuring enables the 
identification of a finite set  ൌ ሼଵǡǥ ǡ ୧ǡǥ୫ሽ of alternatives to be evaluated and compared as well as 
the establishment of a set of relevant criteria  ൌ ሼଵǡǥ ǡ ୩ǡ ǥ୯ሽ (Brans and Vincke 1985). Alternatives 
and criteria can then be expressed in an ݉ ൈ ݍ evaluation matrix, in which each row describes an 
alternative and each column describes the performance of the alternatives under each criterion (Brans and 
Mareschal 2005). On the basis of the evaluation matrix, the alternatives are compared in pairs in order to 
determine how one option is to be ranked relative to the other. A general characteristic of PROMETHEE is 
that all ݉ alternatives are compared in a pair-wise manner, separately for each criterion. Let ௞݂ሺܣ௜ሻ be the 
score of climate adaptation option ܣ௜  under criterion k. Then, the preference score of two alternatives ܣ௜  
and ܣ௝ is calculated using the preference function ୩൫୧ǡ ୨൯ǡ ݅ ് ݆: 
୩൫୧ǡ ୨൯ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ Ͳǡifሺ ௞݂ሺܣ௜ሻ െ ௞݂൫ܣ௝൯ሻ ൑ ୩
ͳǡ ݂݅ሺ ௞݂ሺܣ௜ሻ െ ௞݂൫ܣ௝൯ሻ ൐ ୩
ሺ௙ೖሺ஺೔ሻି௙ೖ൫஺ೕ൯ሻି୯ౡ
୮ౡି୯ౡ  ǡ ݂݅୩ ൏ ሺ ௞݂ሺܣ௜ሻ െ ௞݂൫ܣ௝൯ሻ ൏ ୩Ǥ
  (5.1) 
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where, ୩ and ୩ are  respectively the indifference and preference thresholds assuming a linear 
interpolation. The unicriterion net flow ߔ௞ indicates the performance of alternative ୧ against all other 
alternatives for criterion ݇ and is calculated as follows:  
ߔ௞ ൌ ଵ௠ିଵ ൫σ ୩൫୧ǡ ୨൯௝ െ σ ୩൫୨ǡ ୧൯௝ ൯ǡ ݅ ് ݆     5.2 
The multicriteria preference degree for alternative ୧ against alternative ୨ is calculated as the weighted 
sum of the pairwise preferences over the two alternatives for all criteria: 
ߨ൫ܣ௜ǡ ܣ௝൯ ൌ σ ݓ௞୩൫ܣ௜ǡ ܣ௝൯௤௞ୀଵ , ݅ ് ݆      5.3 
where ݓ௞ represents the weight of criterion ݇, with ݓ௞ ൒ Ͳ and σ ݓ௞ ൌ ͳ௤௞ୀଵ . In the presence of ݉ 
adaptation options, the PROMETHEE II outranking method provides two preference flows. The first, Φ+(ܣ௜), 
reflects how strongly an alternative ܣ௜  dominates all the other alternatives ܣ௝ and the second,Φ−(ܣ௜), 
reflects how strongly ܣ௜  is dominated by all other alternativesǣ 
Φାሺܣ௜ሻ ൌ ଵ௠ିଵσ ߨ൫ܣ௜ǡ ܣ௝൯௝ ݅ ് ݆,    (5.4)  
Φିሺܣ௜ሻ ൌ ଵ௠ିଵσ ߨ൫ܣ௝ǡ ܣ௜൯௝ ǡ ݅ ് ݆.    (5.5) 
The net preference flow Φሺܣ௜ሻ  is calculated as follows: 
Φ(ܣ௜) = Φାሺܣ௜ሻ-Φିሺܣ௜ሻ.      (55) 
Finally, alternatives can be ranked by their net preference flow Φሺܣ௜ሻ. We use the Visual PROMETHEE 
software for our analysis. 
5.3 Identification of adaptation options 
The study area is the Choke mountain ecosystem found in the upper Blue-Nile basin, Ethiopia, where the 
landscape is dominated by low-input mixed crop-livestock subsistence agriculture, with cultivation 
extending from the Blue Nile gorge up to nearly the mountain’s summit. Climate change has already been 
perceived in extreme rainfall events and an upward trend of regional temperatures over the past 20 years 
(Simane et al. 2012). It is also observed that there is a strong tendency during July to September that rains 
are imposing a challenge on crops and animals in the Upper Blue-Nile basin (McSweeney et al. 2010; 
Ethiopian EPA 2011). At the national level, both the frequency and intensity of droughts have increased and 
inflicted severe damages on the livelihoods of millions of people (Simane et al. 2014). 
We identified possible adaptation options through literature review and a stakeholders’ workshop 
for the study area. The agricultural sector in Ethiopia has frequently been affected by climate variability and 
change (Tesso et al. 2012; World Bank 2010). In the highlands, soil degradation is very pervasive and almost 
all farmers perceived erosion problems which make many of them to believe in soil and water conservation 
measures as profitable measures (Teshome et al. 2014). Seasons are fluctuating over the past decades and 
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are expected to remain the same in the next 25 years (Conway and Schipper 2011; World Bank 2010; EPA 
2011). As a response to this, in the Upper Blue-Nile basin, agricultural adaptation options like change in 
crop calendar (Simane et al. 2014), conservation tillage (Temesgen et al. 2012), and a list of other 
adaptation options are suggested in Simane et al. (2012).  
In addition to its impact on agriculture, climate change may also have impacts on the provision of 
natural resources. Natural resource management (NRM) is important in improving adaptive capacity of 
smallholder farmers and has both ecological and economic implications (Teshome et al. 2014). Ecological 
benefits of adapting NRM include improved soil fertility, temperature regulation, improved water retention 
and carbon sequestration (Alison 2010; FAO 2011); while economic benefits include improved crop yield 
and fodder production and agroforestry benefits, and less conflict over resources (see Teshome et al. 
2014).  
Third, climate change will affect water resources through changes the patterns of temperature, 
precipitation and river flow upon which agricultural systems in developing countries depend (FAO 2011). 
Despite the fact that there are large uncertainties concerning the impact of climate change on 
precipitation, models predict that there will be more variability in rainfall patterns, with increased 
occurrence of extreme events like intense precipitation or longer periods of dry weather pattern (Bates et 
al. 2008; FAO 2011). Practices that retain the surface runoff in the uplands and lowlands, improved water-
holding capacity of the soil, and practices that increase groundwater recharge and protect the top soil have 
been suggested as water-related adaptation options (e.g. FAO 2014).  
For the stakeholders’ workshop, a team of 20 individuals was carefully selected and invited for a 
one-day workshop. The workshop was organized in the city of Debermarkos in East Gojjam, the heart of the 
upper Blue-Nile basin. Participants were invited by making sure that they represent government (decision 
makers), experts (who are directly involved in the design and execution of programs and projects including 
environmentalists, agriculturalists, water resources and natural resources experts), non-government 
organizations (particularly those who are concerned with environmental conservation), and farmers (who 
are the direct bearers of climate change impacts). Bedru et al. (2010) and Mendoza and Prabhu (2000a, b) 
indicate that a team of 12 persons is sufficient to generate criteria and indicators when carrying out an 
MCA evaluation such as ranking and pair-wise comparisons. During the workshop, a list of adaptation 
options in the Choke Mountan ecosystem was identified, based on stakeholders’ views and perspectives.22 
Based on the literature and the stakeholder’s workshop, we identified the adaptation options listed in 
Table 5.1. 
                                                 
22 Choke mountain ecosystem is the largest stretched watershed found in the upper Blue-Nile basin. 
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Table 5.1. List of adaptation options identified both from literature and stakeholders’ workshop 
Agriculture Water resources related NRM 
Improved varieties  River diversion Carbon sequestration 
Crop rotation  Prevent leaching and erosion Max. water retention 
Composting  Drip irrigation Maximize crop yield 
Change in fertilizer use methods  Water allocation rules Temperature regulation 
Water shed management Use water evicting technologies Minimize conflict over resources 
Farming implements  Hand dig pumping  Minimize risk of pest harbouring 
Introducing new harvest 
periods 
Water efficient technologies Enhance soil fertility 
Use of pesticides  Water harvesting Minimize soil losses 
Integrated farming  
Planting trees with high water store 
capacity 
Agro forestry 
DAP and urea application Use of surface  and ground water Maximize fodder production 
Modification of crop calendar Cash crops using irrigation   
Terracing   
Storing technology    
Reduce tillage   
Budding23   
5.4 Selection of criteria and weights 
To determine criteria and weights to evaluate climate change adaptation options, we first identified criteria 
in the literature and then discussed these in the stakeholder workshop. The criteria need to be non-
overlapping and need to be consistent with the mandate and goals of governments or public agencies 
(Champalle et al. 2015).  
De Bruin et al. (2009) used feasibility (technical complexity, social complexity, and institutional 
complexity), and importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary, and mitigation criteria set to evaluate a list of 
adaptation options in Netherlands. De Bruin (2009), underlined that it is possible to include feasibility with 
importance, urgency, no regret, co-benefit, and mitigation criteria together in the evaluation process, but 
due to the fact that the feasibility issues are too distinct from the criteria on importance, urgency, no 
regret, co benefit, and mitigation, it is preferable to use a separate listing. Caution should also be given to 
the use of different criteria to different sectors (Bhave et al. 2014), and criteria should reflect the specificity 
of the context (UKCIP 2010). Furthermore, in the presence of different actors having different objectives, 
evaluations need to be user-specific. What may be evaluated highly by a farmer for instance may be of little 
benefit to experts (Dolan et al. 2001). In most developing countries strategies are often top down, and 
farmers are less literate and have little bargaining power in the choice of a technology.  
The data to rank and compare different adaptation options were generated from a survey of 
farmers and experts. The survey had the objective to score adaptation options based on sets of criteria. A 
total of 175 individuals composed of farmers (145) and experts (30) participated in the final survey. Farmers 
were selected from four villages found in two agro-ecosystems (AES 4 and AES 5). AES 4 covers midland 
slopping lands, and AES 5 covers hilly and mountainous highlands of the choke mountain ecosystem (see 
                                                 
23 Budding is mostly used to improve productivity of local fruits by taking a bud from a high yield variety and transfer it to locals. 
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Simane et al. 2012). The survey was conducted by trained enumerators who are fluent in local languages. 
Effort was made to make the criteria and the options more transparent and understandable to farmers. 
5.5 Results of identified adaptation options and their ranking based on MCA  
5.5.1 Identified options, criteria and weights for the study area  
In the evaluation process, we first select a feasibility (applicability, affordability and agro-ecosystem 
relevance), and importance, urgency, no-regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria for ranking agricultural 
related adaptation options following de Bruin (2009) and adapting to our research context (UKCIP 2010). 
Accordingly, feasibility in terms of applicability is defined as appropriateness, suitability, and easiness to 
comprehend by farmers; affordability refers to the feasibility of an option in terms of the cost of the 
technology or whether it is within the affordable limit of a given target group; and feasibility in terms of 
agro-ecosystem relevance- refers to whether the mentioned adaptation option is relevant to the agro-
ecosystem under consideration and have the potential to increase ecosystem resistance and resilience. The 
criteria score takes 1 to 3 points, being three the highest feasible among others. Under the importance, 
urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria, we follow the literature from Smit and Lenhart (1996), 
and Füssel (2007) and recently De Bruin (2009). Importance is then referred to the expected benefit that 
can be obtained; urgency reflects the need to act soon and not later; no regret refers to that it is good to 
implement, irrespective of climate change; co-benefits (ancillary) addresses a synergy to other sectors, and 
mitigation benefit. However, one can also argue that some criteria are overlapping and not all are 
completely mutually exclusive (De Bruin 2009). The criteria score takes 1 to 5, being five highly important. 
The importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria are also used to rank adaptation 
options related to natural resources management.  
For water related adaptation options, we used criteria including technical, agro-ecosystem, 
institutional and socioeconomic feasibility. According to Bhave et al. (2014), these criteria sets are essential 
in evaluating water related adaptation options. As a result, technical feasibility–refers to water 
requirement, water supply benefits, agricultural water, technological feasibility, change in surface ground 
water storage, risk reduction, and efficiency/effectiveness; agroecosytem feasibility – related to increased 
ecosystem resistance and resilience, and environmental benefit; institutional feasibility refers to ease of 
implementation, and institutional capacity; and socioeconomic feasibility, refers to stakeholders 
acceptability, scale of beneficiary, intangible benefits, social benefits, implication in reducing vulnerability, 
and strengthening adaptability (Bhave et al. 2014). The criteria score takes 1 to 4 points being four the 
highest feasible among others. More importantly, in this paper we give due emphasis to agroecosystem 
feasibility criterion, following the stakeholders’ workshop and recommendations by UKCIP (2010) on 
context specific, and Füssel (2007) on relevance.  
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Regarding to the weights to a criterion, stakeholders can have different objectives depending on 
their personal values and on their socio-economic circumstances (See Palma et al. 2007). Palma et al. 
(2007) suggested the use of neutral weight to avoid such variation in perception of different stakeholders. 
However, we get an input on the importance of the selected criteria from stakeholders’ workshop and 
previous studies (De Bruin et al. 2009) to introduce a weight to each criterion in our study. As a result, we 
give higher weights to importance and urgency indicating that these criteria are essential (De Bruin et al. 
2009). With regard to the feasibility (applicability, affordability, and agro-ecosystem relevance) criteria, we 
follow the same approach and give highest weight to applicability and technical feasibility. In addition, the 
PROMETHEE method allows us for a wide variety of weights to be applied in an interactive manner and we 
later see the performance of options by changing the weight of agro-ecosystem relevance criterion. One 
can also test the performance of an option under varying weights and test the sensitivity to a change in 
weights. This can be done using the “weight stability interval” of PROMETHE II. The weight stability interval 
of PROMETHEE helps to study the stability and the robustness of the weight attached to a criterion. Table 
5.2 presents actual weights used in the evaluation, and the weight stability interval of the top 3 ranked 
alternatives.  
 Table 5.2. Summary of criteria and weight stability interval for top 3 ranked alternatives 
Options related 
to  
Criteria 
Actual 
weights 
used (%) 
Weight stability 
interval (WSI) in % 
Max Min 
Agricultural  
 
Applicability 50 58.28 26.09 
Affordability 25 50.00 00.00 
Ecosystem relevance 25 44.19 17.24 
Importance 40 61.29 33.33 
Urgency 30 33.96 14.29 
No regret 10 20.88 6.25 
Ancillary benefit 10 12.50 00.00 
Mitigation 10 27.74 5.26 
Natural 
Resource 
Management 
Importance 20 29.41 6.67 
Urgency 20 39.62 17.65 
No regret 20 25.00 00.00 
Ancillary benefit 20 25.00 00.00 
Mitigation 20 33.33 7.69 
Water resources  
Technical feasibility 30 42.04 23.91 
Agro-ecosystem 
feasibility 
40 47.06 31.43 
Institutional feasibility 20 23.81 00.00 
Socioeconomic feasibility 10 23.17 4.55 
The stability intervals indicate the range in which the weight of a criterion can be changed without altering 
the ranking results. The criteria and weights adopted in this paper have, therefore, empirical relevance, 
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because we confirm their relevance through literature, stakeholder workshop, and finally using the weight 
stability interval in Table 5.2. 
5.5.2 “Uni-criterion” analysis and outranking results 
In this section, we present the performance of each adaptation option under each criterion evaluated by 
farmers and experts. Tables 5.3a and 5.3b present the uni-criterion performance of agricultural adaptation 
options. As explained in section 5.2, agricultural adaptation options are ranked and compared based on the 
feasibility (applicability, affordability and agro-ecosystem relevance), and importance, urgency, no regret, 
ancillary and mitigation criteria. Accordingly, in Table 5.3a improved varieties perform highest in 
affordability and agro-ecosystem relevance, and least in applicability criteria. Farming implements perform 
least in applicability and highest in agro-ecosystem relevance. This is in line with the suggestions made by 
Temesgen et al. (2012) in which farmers are willing to adopt conservation tillage- a farming implement 
developed specifically to the upper Blue-Nile basin. Over all, we can say that each adaptation option 
performs differently under different criterion; hence the selection of adaptation options evidently depends 
on the evaluation criteria applied.  
Table 5.3a. Uni-criterion performance of agricultural adaptation options under feasibility (applicability, 
affordability and agro-ecosystem relevance) criteria 
Options  
Criteria 
Applicability Affordability 
Agro-ecosystem 
relevance 
Improved varieties  0.5000 1.000 1.000 
Crop rotation  1.000 0.7143 -0.1429 
Composting  0.8571 0.8571 -0.2857 
Change in fertilizer use method  0.7143 0.4286 -0.4286 
Water shed management 0.5000 -0.0714 0.0000 
Farming implements  -0.3571 0.5714 0.8571 
Introducing new harvest periods 0.0000 0.1429 0.1429 
Use of pesticides  0.2857 0.2857 -0.8571 
Integrated farming  -0.1429 -0.4286 0.5714 
DAP and urea application 0.1429 -0.2857 -0.5714 
Modification of crop calendar -0.9286 0.0714 0.7143 
Terracing -0.5714 -0.5714 0.4286 
Storing technology  -0.3571 -0.7143 -0.7143 
Reduce tillage -0.9286 -1.000 0.2857 
Budding  -0.7143 -0.8571 -1.000 
 
Table 5.3b presents the uni-criterion performance of agricultural adaptation options under importance, 
urgency, no-regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria. Accordingly, crop rotation performs highest in 
importance and least in ancillary benefits. Use of farming implements as an adaptation option performs 
highest in importance and urgency, and least in no regret criterion. Reduced tillage performs highest in 
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mitigation, and least in importance criterion. Terracing performs highest in urgency and no regret and least 
in mitigation criterion. 
Table 5.3b. Uni-criterion performance of agricultural adaptation options under importance, urgency, no 
regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria 
 
Options  
Criteria 
Importance Urgency No regret Ancillary Mitigation 
Crop rotation 1.000 0.4286 -0.1429 -1.000 0.3571 
Farming implements 0.7143 0.7143 -0.8571 0.0000 0.0714 
Integrated farming 0.8571 0.2857 -0.2857 -0.4286 -0.1429 
Terracing 0.4286 1.000 1.000 0.0000 -0.7143 
Water shed management 0.0000 0.5714 -0.5714 -0.2857 0.6429 
Chang fertilizer use methods  0.2857 0.1429 0.4286 0.2857 -0.8571 
Composting  0.5714 0.0000 -0.7143 -0.8571 0.6429 
Intro. New harvest period 0.1429 -0.1429 0.8571 0.1429 -0.4286 
DAP and urea application -0.2857 0.8571 -0.4286 -0.5714 -0.5714 
Budding  -0.4286 -0.2857 0.2857 0.5714 0.3571 
Modification of crop calendar -0.1429 -1.000 0.7143 0.9286 -0.2857 
Use of Pesticides  -0.6429 -0.4286 0.1429 0.9286 0.0714 
Reduce tillage -0.9286 -0.5714 0.5714 0.7143 0.8571 
Storing technology  -0.9286 -0.7143 1.000 0.4286 1.000 
Improved varieties  -0.6429 -0.8571 -1.000 -0.1429 -0.7143 
 
Terracing has long been practiced in the study area, yet ever increasing intensity of farming (Simane et al. 
2014), a fragile environment and climate change in the Upper Blue-Nile basin highlights the importance of 
terracing.  
We argue that evaluation of climate change adaptation options should be seen from agro-
ecosystem relevance and feasibility point of view (see Füssel (2007) on relevance of a criterion and UKCIP 
(2010) on context specificity of a criterion). PROMETHEE II also enables us to use a wide variety of weights 
in an interactive manner. We accordingly further change the weight of agro-ecosystem relevance to 50%, 
as an example24, and identify which adaptation options perform best. Improved varieties, farming 
implements and modification of crop calendar are ranked highest under agro-ecosystem relevance criteria. 
The outranking results of the uni-criterion evaluation procedure shows that improved varieties do not work 
to all agro-ecosystems, and stakeholders claimed that blanket type technology disregards agro-ecosystem 
characteristics. Hence, the development of improved varieties should consider agro-ecosystem relevance of 
a technology. Conservation tillage in the form of improved farming implements are also suggested in 
studies by Temesgen et al. (2012). Temesgen et al. (2012) have also identified that farmers in the Upper 
Blue-Nile basin are willing to adopt improved farming implements. Furthermore, change in crop calendar 
becomes an adaptation options due to an ever changing weather patterns in the study area.  
                                                 
24 Many different choices are possible and can be easily implemented in PROMTHEE II. The systems is available on request and users then can 
analyse the impacts of different sets of weights. 
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In Table 5.4a we present the performance of adaptation benefits of NRM under importance, 
urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation evaluation criteria; while in Table 5.4b, we present the 
performance of water related adaptation options under technical feasibility, feasibility in terms of agro-
ecosystem relevance, institutional feasibility, and socioeconomic feasibility criteria.  
Table 5.4a. Uni-criterion performance of adaptation benefits of NRM  
NRM option 
Criteria 
Importance Urgency 
No 
regret 
Ancillary Mitigation 
Carbon sequestration 1.000 0.7778 1.000 -1.000 0.3333 
Max. water retention 0.5556 0.3333 -0.5556 -0.7778 -0.2222 
Max. crop yield -0.5556 1.000 0.1111 -0.1111 0.5556 
Temperature 
regulation 
0.7778 1.000 -0.3333 1.000 -0.7778 
Min. conflict over 
resources 
0.3333 -0.1111 -0.1111 0.1111 -1.000 
Min. risk of pest 
harbouring 
-0.1111 -0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.1111 
Enhance soil fertility 0.1111 0.1111 -0.7778 -0.3333 -0.5556 
Min. soil losses -0.3333 0.5556 -1.000 -0.5556 -0.2222 
Agro forestry -0.7778 -0.5556 0.7778 0.5556 0.7778 
Max. fodder 
production 
-1.000 -0.7778 0.5556 0.7778 1.000 
 
From Table 5.4a, we can see that carbon sequestration25 performs highest in importance criterion and least 
in ancillary benefits. Agro-forestry and maximizing fodder production, on the other hand, perform highest 
in mitigation criterion and least in importance criterion. In addition to adaptation benefits like agro-forestry 
and fodder production can help mitigate climate change through the carbon sink functions (see for e.g. 
Albrecht, and Kandji 2003).  
Table 5.4b. Uni-criterion performance of water related adaptation options  
Water related options  
Criteria 
Technical 
feasibility 
Agro 
ecosystem. 
feasibility 
Institutional 
feasibility  
Socio-
economic 
feasibility 
River diversion 0.9000 0.8000 -0.6000 0.6000 
Prevent leaching and erosion 0.6000 0.4000 0.4000 0.6000 
Drip irrigation -0.4000 1.000 1.000 -0.8000 
Water allocation rules 0.2000 0.0000 0.2000 0.6000 
Use water evicting 
technologies 
0.9000 -0.6000 0.7000 -0.4000 
Hand dig pumping  0.4000 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000 
                                                 
25 Carbon sequestration was explained to famers as a way out mechanism to the increase in temperature. It was observed that previously highland 
and temperate areas having cold and moderate temperature are now changed in to sub-tropical zones. 
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Water efficient technologies 0.0000 -0.2000 -0.3000 0.2000 
Water harvesting -0.2000 0.2000 -0.3000 -0.2000 
Planting trees with high water 
store capacities 
-0.6000 0.6000 -0.8000 -1.000 
Use of surface  and ground 
water 
-0.8000 -0.8000 0.7000 -0.6000 
Cash crops using irrigation  -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 1.000 
 
In Table 5.4b, where the uni-criterion performance of water related adaptations are compared, drip 
irrigation performs highest in agro-ecosystem and institutional feasibility criteria and least in technical and 
socio-economic feasibility. It is evident that drip irrigation involves both cost and technical considerations. 
However, under sound institutional arrangements and considering the relevance of the technology to the 
specific agro-ecosystem, it is possible to enhance the uptake of drip irrigation technologies (see for e.g. FAO 
2011). River diversion performs highest in technical feasibility and agro-ecosystem, and least in institutional 
feasibility. In the study area, we observed that sound water allocation rules are non-existent and there is 
frequent conflict over water user rights.  
We also compare water related adaptation options performance under the agro-ecosystem 
feasibility criterion. Drip irrigation, river diversion, and use of surface and ground water perform highest 
under the agro-ecosystem feasibility criterion (ranked 1 to 3). The presence of abundant rivers, 
underground and surface water bodies in the Upper Blue-Nile basin makes these three prioritized options 
feasible in terms of agro-ecosystem relevance. FAO (2011) has also shown that climate smart technologies 
deserve to  be viewed from the water lens so that sustainable NRM and emission reduction would be 
possible. Nigussie et al. (2016), on the other hand, found that the presence of sound irrigation practices 
(like river diversion, drip irrigation and use of surface and ground water) have created an enabling 
environment for the adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties.  
5.5.3 Ranking of adaptation options 
5.5.3.1 Out ranking results of adaptation options by farmers and experts jointly 
In this section, we present the complete outranking results of adaptation options. Each adaptation option is 
ranked based on the overall performance under Equation 5.5. The net flow preference ranking of 
adaptation options is indicated in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. In Table 5.5, we present the out ranking results of 
agricultural adaptation options evaluated by feasibility (applicability, affordability and agroecosystem 
relevance), and importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria. The results show that crop 
rotation and watershed management adaptation options have taken a rank from 1 to 5 in both criteria 
settings. Watershed management is seen as both a food security and climate change adaptation strategy in 
Ethiopia (Habtamu 2011), hence the ranking results in both criteria settings assures that watershed 
management is both highly important and feasible. Crop rotation is also found both highly feasible and 
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important, because in the upper Blue-Nile basin, there is an ever increasing land degradation and poor soil 
fertility. Crop rotation is identified as the only cost efficient adaptation option in this context. 
Outranking results by the feasibility (applicability, affordability and agro-ecosystem relevance) 
criteria are shown in Table 5.5. Table 5.5 shows that improved varieties, crop rotation and composting are 
ranked from 1 to 3; while in the importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation criteria, crop 
rotation, farm implements, and integrated farming are ranked from 1 to 3. The outranking results based on 
the two criteria sets, in general, show that prioritized agricultural adaptation options refer to  soil and land 
management issues. Temesgen et al. (2012) indicated that modern farm implements like conservation 
tillage improves crop production, and Teshome et al. (2014) recommends soil and water conservation 
practices on slope categories in the highlands of Ethiopia. 
Table 5.5. Out ranking results of agricultural adaptation options  
Options  
Criteria 
Feasibility (Applicability, 
Affordability and Agro-
ecosystem relevance) 
Importance, Urgency, No 
regret, Ancillary and Mitigation  
Rank Phi Rank  Phi 
Improved varieties  1 0.7500 15 -0.7000 
Crop rotation  2 0.6429 1 0.4500 
Composting  3 0.5714 7 0.1357 
Change in fertilizer use method  4 0.3571 6 0.1429 
Water shed management 5 0.2321 5 0.1500 
Farming implements  6 0.1786 2 0.4214 
Introducing New harvest per. 7 0.0714 8 0.3429 
Use of Pesticides  8 0.0000 12 -0.2714 
Integrated farming  9 -0.0357 3 0.3429 
DAP and urea application 10 -0.1429 9 -0.0143 
Modification of crop calendar 11 -0.3036 11 -0.2214 
Terracing 12 -0.3214 4 0.3000 
Storing technology  13 -0.5357 14 -0.3429 
Reduce tillage 14 -0.6429 13 -0.3286 
Budding  15 -0.8214 10 -0.1357 
Generally, comparison of the two net flow tables shows that the feasibility (applicability, affordability and 
agro-ecosystem relevance) criteria conflicts with importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation 
criteria, excluding watershed management and modification of crop calendar adaptation options which 
have the same outranking result in both criteria sets. An alternative which performs highest in feasibility 
performs least in importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and mitigation and vice-versa.  
In Table 5.6, we present the out ranking results of adaptation benefits of NRM. Benefits like carbon 
sequestration (ecological benefit), maximizing water retention (ecological benefit), and maximizing crop 
yield (economic benefit) ranked from 1 to 3. Studies by Simane et al. (2012, 2013, and 2014) indicated that 
ecological disturbances in the upper Blue-Nile basin are increasing and alarming, and suggested a strategy 
to focus on rehabilitation of the ecology. The priority ranks are therefore confirming this claim.  
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The third category of adaptation options identified in the upper Blue-Nile basin are water related 
adaptation options. The PROMOETHEE II complete outranking result shows that river diversion, prevent 
leaching and erosion, and drip irrigation are ranked from 1 to 3. 
Table 5.6. Outranking results of water and NRM related adaptation options  
Water related adaptation 
option 
 
NRM adaptation options 
 
Rank Phi Rank  Phi 
River diversion 1 0.5300 Carbon sequestration 1 0.6667 
Prevent leaching and erosion 2 0.4800 Max. water retention 2 0.2000 
Drip irrigation 3 0.4000 Max. crop yield 3 0.0556 
Water allocation rules 3 0.1600 Temperature regulation 4 -0.0222 
Use water evicting technologies 5 0.1300 Min. conflict over resources 5 -0.0444 
Hand dig pumping  6 -0.0400 Min. risk of pest harbouring 6 -0.1111 
Water efficient technologies 7 -0.0600 Enhance soil fertility 7 -0.1111 
Water harvesting 8 -0.1200 Min. soil losses 8 -0.1778 
Planting trees with high Water 
store capacity 
9 -0.2000 Agro forestry 9 -0.2111 
Use of surface  and ground 
water 
10 -0.4800 Max. fodder production 10 -0.2444 
Cash crops using irrigation  11 -0.8000    
 
These priority ranks are related to climate smart agricultural practices suggested by FAO (2010). FAO (2010) 
indicate that climate smart agriculture can sustainably increase productivity and system resilience while 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
5.5.3.2 Outranking results of experts’ evaluation  
In a smallholder economy, policies and programs are mostly designed in a top to down approach, and 
without consultation of farmers. It is, hence, essential to present the evaluation results made only by 
experts, and compare it with the evaluation results made by both farmers and experts. Appendices Table 
1A and Table 1B present the PROMETHEE II outranking results of experts’ evaluation. Comparing the 
rankings made by both farmers and experts jointly (section 5.5.3.1) with the evaluation made only by 
experts, we observe that there is difference in rankings. The differences in priority ranks solely arise from 
the difference in preferences of farmers and experts26. For instance, farmers and experts jointly rank crop 
rotation first as an agricultural adaptation option, while experts rank it second under the feasibility 
(applicability, affordability and agro-ecosystem relevance) criteria. Overall, one can argue that the 
evaluation result of the pooled data (farmers and experts) would give better implication in policy making 
because it contains the preferences of both groups. Results will depend on the numbers of each category 
represented in the pooled data.  
                                                 
26 This is to recall that in the pooled data, there are only 30 experts, and the remaining 145 are farmers.  
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
Identification and ranking of adaptation options in a country like Ethiopia have dual benefits: food security 
and adaptation to the negative impacts of climate change. In Ethiopia, it was projected that climate change 
will result in rainfall fluctuation and seasonal variation in patterns as well as high and low-temperature 
episodes. Because of the country’s vulnerability to weather variability and low adaptive capacity, the 
current (2016) El-Niño affects about 15 million Ethiopians causing loss of livestock and crop failure. Though, 
there are micro level, fragmented and uncoordinated interventions, there are still limitations in terms of 
inclusiveness, participation and consensus among different parties who have a stake on climate change. It 
therefore requires to design an approach that brings stakeholders together and prioritize actions based on 
some agreed criteria. As part of this effort, this chapter tried to identify possible adaptation options from 
agriculture, natural resources, and water resources and rank them based on their performance on possibly 
conflicting criteria. Data was generated through stakeholders’ workshop and a survey of farmers and 
experts. In combination with literature study, the stakeholder’s workshop helped us to identify possible 
adaptation options, existing challenges, limitations and vulnerable natural resources; while we used the 
survey to rank and compare the different adaptation options. To analyse the data, PROMETHEE II complete 
outranking approach was used. PROMETHEE II helps to compare and outrank different adaptation options 
with an interactive feature and to test the sensitivity of weights (Brans and Mareschal 2005).  
The findings from the stakeholders’ workshop indicate that soil, and water resources are identified 
as the most vulnerable natural resources and identified as priority settings in the upper Blue-Nile basin. 
Stakeholders have also stressed the importance of agroecosystem specific interventions, which are 
preferred over a standard “blanket system”. A blanket system according to experts is a technology package 
that is designed without considering the specific agro-ecosystem characteristics and relevance to the 
society at large. Stakeholders have also identified soil as the most vulnerable natural resource followed by 
water resources and forests. Lack of finance, awareness and motivation of farmers, population pressure, 
land fragmentation and encroachment, improper land use, inappropriate settlement, inability to reach 
consensus on matters which are crucial in climate adaptation, lack of follow up and upscaling efforts made 
at pilot level, lack of demonstration centers, short-term benefit seeking are also identified as the main 
contributing factors to mal-adaptation in the upper Blue-Nile basin.  
We analysed and summarized the results of the outranking procedure in order to support  decision 
makers in the process of adaptation to climate change. The top five ranked agricultural adaptation options 
evaluated based on the feasibility (applicability, affordability and agroecosystem relevance) criteria are 
improved varieties, crop rotation, composting, change in use of fertilizer methods, and watershed 
management. However, there is a reversal in the rank when the evaluation criteria are changed into 
importance, urgency, no regret and mitigation. This shows that the two criteria choices are conflicting, and 
evaluations made in such a manner can give better information to decision makers, i.e. whether feasibility 
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(applicability, affordability and agroecosystem) or importance, urgency, no regret and mitigation benefits of 
adaptation options are most important to the upper Blue-Nile basin.  
Adaptation of natural resources management practices in response to climate change and food 
insecurity have a list of benefits. The benefits have been evaluated and a preference ranking was made. 
Ecological importance of NRM like carbon sequestration, maximizing water retention, regulating 
temperature and minimizing conflict over resources, and economic benefit like maximizing crop yield are 
the top five ranked adaptation options. In the priority ranking, ecological benefits of NRM have dominated 
the economic benefits. According to Simane et al. (2012), there is frequent ecological disturbance in the 
upper Blue-Nile basin due to high population pressure accompanied by deforestation and land degradation. 
Water resources are also fundamental livelihood bases in the process of climate adaptation to 
climate change under a smallholder economy. Water resources are mostly used as a way out mechanism 
under stressor climatic conditions. The study area is known as  the home of many rivers and streams. 
Possible adaptation options related to water resources are, then, ranked and evaluated based on technical 
feasibility, agro-ecosystem feasibility, institutional feasibility and socioeconomic feasibility. River diversion, 
prevention of leaching and erosion, drip irrigation, water allocation rules, and use of water evicting 
technologies are accordingly the top five ranked adaptation options. These rankings are in line with the 
agro-ecosystem characteristics of the study area found in Simane et al. (2012) and the recommendation 
made by FAO (2013) on climate smart agriculture. Interventions to arrange for water user rights and 
allocation rules are also encouraged to be in place. 
To compare the outranking results made by both farmers and experts, and only by experts, we 
report separate outranking results. The two outranking results informed us that there are differences in the 
order of rankings of adaptation options. The differences in priority ranks mainly arose from the deviation in 
preferences between farmers and experts. This reveals that joint evaluation is necessary to have an optimal 
preference ranking incorporating the evaluations made by farmers and experts.  
Conclusion from this MCA study follows that the upper Blue-Nile basin is currently faced 
multifaceted stressors. Population pressure, land use change, deforestation coupled with climate change 
and variability are among the list of challenges that the upper Blue-Nile basin is facing. It is hence 
imperative to focus and target on adaptation options that are relevant to the specific agroecosystem. 
Reaching  a consensus on the type of criteria (feasibility or importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and 
mitigation) that should be used to evaluate adaptation opitons, and avoiding a blanket type intervention 
would also be essential in the successful implementation of adaptation options.  
Recommendations towards future climate change adaptation and mitigation include avoidance of 
fragmented and independent actions by different sectors; previous programs and interventions, according 
to the results of this chapter, lack greater collaboration, inclusiveness and comprehensiveness. It is hence 
essential to put a priority rank for policies and strategies which have been prescribed through  micro and 
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macro studies through stakeholders’ workshop, dialogue and evaluations. Putting the agenda in to the 
stakeholders’ perspective can help fasten the pace of innovation uptake. In addition, scenario based 
ranking of climate change adaptation is recommended provided that there is accurate climate scenarios in 
developing countries. In this chapter, we managed to have sufficient lists of adaptation options in the upper 
Blue-Nile basin for an empirical examination; however, we did not have an inventory list for other regions 
in Ethiopia or at the national level. Hence, further studies are required to have a full inventory of 
adaptation options in Ethiopia.  
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Appendix  
Table A1. Out ranking results of experts’ evaluation of agricultural adaptation options 
 
Table A2. Outranking results of experts’ evaluation of NRM adaptation options  
Rank option Phi Phi+ Phi- 
1 maximize fodder production 0.7556 0.7889 0.0333 
2 Agro forestry 0.2111 0.4111 0.2000 
3 Minimize soil losses 0.1111 0.3667 0.2556 
4 enhance soil fertility -0.0444 0.3111 0.3556 
5 Maximize crop yield -0.0778 0.3000 0.3778 
6 maximize water retention -0.1000 0.2889 0.3889 
7 carbon sequestration -0.1222 0.1778 0.3000 
8 Minimize risk of pest harboring -0.1222 0.1778 0.3000 
9 Minimize conflict over resources -0.2556 0.2111 0.4667 
10 temperature regulation -0.3556 0.1111 0.4667 
 
  
Rank 
Under feasibility (applicability, affordability, and agro-
ecosystem criteria) 
Under importance, urgency, no regret, ancillary and 
mitigation criteria 
Adaptation option Phi Phi+ Phi- Adaptation option Phi Phi+ Phi- 
1 Crop rotation  0.3750 0.4464 0.0714 Improved varieties  0.5857 0.6000 0.0143 
2 Storing technology  0.3750 0.4464 0.0714 
Watershed 
management 0.3429 0,4786 0.1357 
3 Use of pesticides  0.3750 0.4464 0.0714 Use of pesticides  0.3429 0.4786 0.1357 
4 Farming implements  0.1786 0.3036 0.1250 Crop rotation  0.1714 0.3857 0.2143 
5 
Modification of crop 
calendar 0.1786 0.3036 0.1250 Farming implements  0.1429 0.2643 0.1214 
6 Improved varieties  -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 Composting  0.1429 0.2643 0.1214 
7 
Watershed 
management -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 Integrated farming  0.1429 0.2643 0.1214 
8 Composting  -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 
Chang fertilizer use 
methods  0.1429 0.2643 0.1214 
9 DAP and urea -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 Terracing 0.0571 0.2286 0.1714 
10 Budding  -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 
Modification of crop 
calendar 0.0571 0.2286 0.1714 
11 Integrated farming  -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 Budding  -0.2857 0.1214 0.4071 
12 
Intro new harvest 
per -0.0893 0.0893 0.1786 Storing technology  -0.2857 0.1214 0.4071 
13 
Chang fertilizer Use 
methods  -0,0893 0.0893 0.1786 
Intro new harvest 
period -0.4857 0.1429 0.6286 
14 Reduce tillage -0.2679 0.2500 0,5179 Reduce tillage -0.5071 0.0429 0.5500 
15 Terracing -0.5000 0.2143 0.7143 DAP and urea -0.5643 0.1071 0.6714 
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Table A3. Outranking results of experts’ evaluation of water resources related adaptation options 
Rank   option Phi Phi+ Phi- 
1 Prevent leaching and erosion 0.4600 0.4700 0.0100 
2 water harvesting 0.2400 0.2700 0.0300 
3 river diversion 0.1600 0.2000 0.0400 
3 cash crops using irrigation 0.1600 0.2000 0.0400 
5 hand dig pump 0.1600 0.2000 0.0400 
6 Water allocation rules 0.1600 0.2000 0.0400 
7 drip irrigation 0.0400 0.1700 0.1300 
8 Water efficient technologies -0.2800 0.0800 0.3600 
9 Water storing trees -0.3600 0.1500 0.5100 
10 use of surface and ground water -0.3700 0.0600 0.4300 
11 Use water evicting  technologies -0.3700 0.0600 0.4300 
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Chapter 6 
General discussions and conclusions  
6.1 Introduction  
The threat of climate change to developing countries attracted many scientists and scholars to invest their 
time and effort to find out possible adaptation options. Accordingly, in the literature, challenges and 
barriers of adaptation and mitigation to climate change are identified. As part of this global effort, we need 
to improve our understanding of decisions related to adaptation to climate change by examining the 
behavioural, social, ecological, and agro-ecosystems’ factors that determine decisions related to adaptation 
to climate change. Decision theory focuses on the behavioural mechanisms in relation to individuals’ and 
social preferences. The understanding of behavioural mechanisms for public policy making and 
development programs is receiving more and more attention. This provides the opportunity to understand 
behavioural mechanisms in decisions related to adaptation to climate change. The thesis studies economic 
decision making on climate change adaptation by looking at behaviour of smallholder farmers in a 
developing country, Ethiopia.  
To understand the behavioural mechanisms in decision related to adoption of climate innovations, 
we generated data using lab-in-the-field experimental approaches combined with a survey, focus group 
discussion, and a stakeholders’ workshop. The thesis focused on understanding the complex interactions 
that undergird the relationship between climate innovation adoption and behavioural and personality 
factors. It also studied the linkage between the different stages of technology adoption, i.e. information 
acquisition, learning from social groups and networks, and adoption decisions. The thesis also gave a 
prioritization rank of adaptation options based on stakeholders’ survey.  
Finally this chapter draws conclusions from the results of the different chapters of the thesis and 
puts them in a wider context. Behavioural mechanisms like risk and time preferences, social norms, and 
personality traits affect the process of innovation uptake as a response to the serious threat of climate 
change to developing countries. The process of climate change adaptation is a complex and dynamic 
phenomenon going beyond the scope of conventional economics. Behavioural economics can assist to 
understand the challenges posed by climate change by relaxing the behavioural assumptions found in 
rational choice theory. The following sections present the main findings from each chapter and related key 
debates in the literature on the topic, discussing their implications for both policy and future research. 
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6.2 Answers to the research questions 
6.2.1 What behavioural factors determine decisions related to adoption of climate innovations in a 
smallholder economy? 
The importance of understanding social and individual preferences from environmental and social changes 
perspectives is growing (see Iversen 2001; Guiso and Paiella 2008). In this regard, economics science is 
becoming so fortunate to combine both field and laboratory experiments. Experimental approaches were 
for a long time almost absent in economics, but attention is now  growing and experiments are becoming 
an important tool to understand the principles which govern economic decision behaviour (see Plott 1991; 
Gneezy and List 2006; Gneezy and List 2006). New insights from behavioural economics help to solve some 
of the puzzles that remain in conventional economics.  
So far, experts and policy makers were prescribing innovation packages for smallholder famers 
through understanding of socioeconomic, demographic, and natural resources determinants. Repeated 
failures in innovation (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Reynolds 1988; UNDP/FAO 1988) underline the 
importance of understanding risk and time preference of farmers (Brekke and Johansen-Stenman 2008). 
Risk of failure of a technology accompanied by low applicability, affordability and relevance (see Gibbons 
2004 and Choi et al. 2010), and the importance of time preferences in some technologies (Liu 2013) 
undermine the relevance of previous approaches. Many studies (e.g. Lusk and Coble 2008; Klemack and 
Yesuf 2008; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009) have tried to address issues of risk and time preferences using 
simple gambles and mostly in a laboratory setting using student subjects. Later, more attention was given 
to the application of different forms of experimental settings including lab-in-the-field experiments by 
drawing participants directly involved in the domain of the analysis (see for e.g. Ihli et al. 2013; Liebenehm 
and Waibel 2015).  
Chapter 2 focused on the risk and time preferences of smallholder famers to comprehend the 
adoption of climate innovations in Ethiopia. In developing countries, the innovation uptake tends to be 
slow and has consequently often resulted in technology failure. We tried to understand climate innovation 
adoption decision behaviour by examining farmers’ risk and time preferences in a lab-in-the-field 
experimental setting. In Ethiopia, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics like age, wealth, 
education and ownership of assets are identified as important factors in decisions related to the adoption 
of farm technologies (see for e.g. Pender and Gebremedhin 2007; Deressa et al. 2009; Gebregziabher et al. 
2014). There are also some studies which tried to address risk and time preferences using simple gambles 
and game plays (see for e.g. Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009; Klemack and Yesuf 2008). In this regard, we need to 
improve our understanding on behavioural mechanisms in decisions related to climate innovation 
adoptions, and interpret the results. Chapter 2 makes a contribution to the literature on innovation 
adoption through a better understanding of risk and time preference behaviour using multiple price 
elicitation exercises in a lab-in-the-field experiment.  
 108 
 
Starting from the works of Binswanger (1980), different experimental elicitation methods have 
been introduced to arrive at risk and time preference parameters. The Holt and Laury (2002) multiple price 
elicitation exercise experimental approach often used to capture risk and time preference parameters of 
individuals. Under multiple elicitation exercises, subjects are exposed to a situation of decision making that 
involves both risk and time preferences. We employed a multiple price elicitation exercise to estimate 
subjects’ risk and time preference parameters, and further tried to understand the implications on 
decisions related to climate innovations adoption. 
From the experimental results we found that famers are highly risk averse, and have high rate of 
time preferences. The average risk aversion parameter and discount rate of smallholder farmers found in 
Chapter 2 are 0.57 and 0.58 (58 percent) respectively. The results conform to the results of previous studies 
in developing countries (see Yesuf 2009; Ihli et al. 2013; Liebenehm and Waibel 2015). The experimental 
results have led us to a greater understanding of adoption of climate innovations as part of the larger food 
security and climate change adaptation objectives in developing countries. We accordingly framed 
adaptation decisions into three main categories: (i) Farm related, (ii) Off farm, and (iii) Institutional climate 
innovations. In the multivariate probit (MVP) model, we found evidence that high risk aversion and high 
rate of time preference parameters elicited in the field-in-the-lab experiment negatively and significantly 
influence smallholders’ decisions to adopt farm related climate innovations. Furthermore, individuals’ high 
rate of time preferences influence adoption decisions related to off-farm climate innovations positively and 
significantly. Farmers might need to allocate their effort and time to opportunities that bring immediate 
benefit (off-farm opportunities) than investments in farm related innovations which involve time and 
allocation of resources.  
In standard economics, risk preferences and endogenous time preferences are considered as fixed 
characteristics of individuals. Recently, there is growing evidence showing that preferences are evolving 
over time (see Druckman and Lupia 2000). To confirm the hypothesis and further understand whether 
institutional aspects affect risk aversion and high rate of time preferences, we further interpreted results by 
estimating risk and time preference parameters under homogenous and heterogeneous agent case. The 
later estimation results helped us to understand how the different socioeconomic, demographic, 
institutional, and agro-ecosystem characteristics are explaining risk and time preferences of individuals’. 
Accordingly, the EUT CRRA estimates of the risk aversion parameter indicate that institutional 
arrangements like credit access significantly and positively determine the risk aversion parameter. We also 
considered how shocks (drought and flood experience) and location (representing differences in agro-
ecosystems) are correlated with risk behavior. The correlation coefficient between risk loving behavior and 
location dummy “Machakil” is strong (0.317) compared to other locations. Socioeconomic and 
demographic variables are also found important in determining risk aversion parameter. Sex, age, family 
size and income are found significant in the first stage OLS regression of the risk aversion parameter. With 
 109 
 
regard to individual rate of time preference, we find that there is low correlation between individual rate of 
time preference and willingness to invest on tree planting (0.177) and water harvesting (0.194) as an 
adaptation option.  
6.2.2 How do personality traits, learning, and recursive relationship of innovations determine adaptation 
decision to climate change?  
In Chapter 3, we extended the analysis of Chapter 2 to further understand how formal and informal local 
institutions such as social groups (e.g. the group of homophilic adopters) and social networks facilitate 
learning. We also dealt with individuals’ personality traits, because personality traits would possibly affect 
individuals’ information search and inquiry process to further aid decision makings (see De Raad and 
Schouwenburg 1996). Learning from social groups and social networks, in combination with personality 
traits, are expected to play an important role in decisions related to climate innovation adoption. In 
addition, we studied how farm related technologies are related recursively, i.e. whether the adoption of 
one technology creates an enabling environment to the adoption of another.  
Learning and experience sharing from social groups and social networks can change the high risk 
aversion and rate of time preference behaviour observed in Chapter 2. The presence of stock of homophilic 
adopters and other stocks of adopters in a social network can create a platform for learning. People learn 
from their peers and neighbours either for a positive concern or negative concern (Fehr and Camerer 
2005). Learning for a positive concern from social groups and networks can facilitate decisions to adopt 
climate innovations. People can also learn from the experience of past shocks. Learning behavior is 
dynamics and complex. A large body of literature is available on the different theoretical approaches of 
learning (see Elias 1997; Wilson 1997; Camerer and George 2003). Due to the methodological challenges 
and complexities in some of the learning theoretical approaches, the use of proxy measures is getting more 
and more attention in the literature. Lindner (1987) argued that firm level innovation adoption can be 
explained by proxies like costs of acquiring information, education level, distance to the nearest current 
adopter and availability of extension services. In Chapter 3, therefore, we used proxy measures of learning 
to understand decision making behavior. 
The process of innovation adoption decision has distinct stages: information inquiry stage, 
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation (Rogers 2003). The information inquiry stage is 
critical, because it opens the opportunity to acquire new skills and share experiences from social groups 
and networks. Accordingly, we focused on understanding how the information inquiry process is affected 
by one’s personality traits. We further analysed how the interaction terms between personality traits and 
information inquiry influence decisions related to adoption of farm related adaptation options.  
In Chapter 3, we interpreted results both from descriptive statistics and empirical models. We 
primarily analysed the correlation results between one’s personality traits and the process to acquire 
information. For instance, the correlation analysis shows that willingness to participate in training is 
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associated with the personality traits of high agreeableness, high cconscientiousness, and low openness. 
Extension contact regarding high yield varieties is related to high agreeableness, high emotional stability, 
high cconscientiousness and high openness. Extension contact regarding soil and water conservations 
(SWC) and environmental protection are related to low conscientiousness and high conscientiousness.  
The findings from the different learning procedures (learning from past shocks, learning from 
hemophilic groups, and learning from adopters in a social group and network) show that there are different 
sizes of adopters for different technologies. The number of adopters of irrigation technologies in a social 
network is higher in the sampled farmer households than other technologies. In addition, inclusion of 
learning indicator variables indicating the size of adopters in a social group and network, and number of 
homophilic adopters of a particular technology (homophilic adopters of irrigation, SWC, and HYV) in the 
trivariate model results in a significant positive impact on the adoption decisions of farm level adaptation 
options.  
The findings of the interaction terms between one’s personality traits and information inquiry 
indicator variables had also been explained in the trivariate probit model. Interaction terms between 
agreeableness and extension service related to SWC (AGREE_EXTSOILC), emotional stability and extension 
service on environmental conservation (EMOTI_EXTENVI), and conscientiousness and extension service on 
environmental conservation (CONSC_EXTENVI) significantly determine adoption of farm related irrigation 
technologies. An interaction term between extraversion and extension service related to environmental 
conservation (EXTR_EXTENVI), significantly determine adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties. An 
interaction term between extraversion and experience sharing (EXTR_EXPS) significantly determined 
adoption decision of SWC technologies. People with certain type of personality have different tendency 
towards information inquiry. Apart from the indirect influence through information inquiry process, 
personality traits could also have a positive or negative influence on decisions related to adoption of farm 
related climate innovations. For instance, high conscientiousness personality trait influences positively and 
significantly the adoption decision of SWC; high emotional stability influences adoption decision of 
irrigation technologies negatively and significantly; and high openness personality trait influence negatively 
and significantly the adoption of HYV.  
In addition, we observed a recursive relationship of farm related technologies which is an 
additional contribution to the literature on innovation adoption. We found that the adoption of HYV 
depends on the a priori adoption of SWC technologies and irrigation technologies. Therefore, the findings 
shed light on the importance of recursive relationship of the three main farm related technologies. We 
stress that it is not only socioeconomic, demographic and behavioural factors that limit adoption decision 
but also the recursive relationship of technologies. 
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6.2.3 Do social norms and ecological variables determine cooperative behaviour of smallholder farmers in 
the climate resilient management and use of common pool natural resources? 
Synthesising the behavioural mechanisms with regard to climate innovation adoption is only addressing 
half of the impediments in the process of neutralizing climate change impacts in developing countries. 
Natural resources, directly or indirectly make up much of the livelihood structure of smallholder farmers in 
developing countries. However, open and common pool natural resources have frequently been affected 
by congestion and overharvesting (Ostrom 1990). They are characterized by non-excludability and 
exhaustibility. The mechanism that is suggested in the literature for the sustainable management and use 
of commons is organizing a cooperative local institution. The formation as well as the possibility of realizing 
local institutions in the management and use of commons has remained a debate in economics and other 
social sciences. The studies by Ostrom (1990) and Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015) have examined the 
hypothesis that social norms and ecological factors are key drivers limiting successful common pool 
governance. Game theoretic and behavioural economics approaches have so far been used to understand 
how local institutions are formed to sustainably manage and use common pool resources (CPRs). 
Cooperation in the case of commons is not only determined through material benefits, but also by social 
norms and preferences like rule following or breaking, and the ecological characteristics of the resources 
(see Ostrom 1990 and Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2015). Ecological characteristics of the resources 
depend on climatic conditions, because climatic conditions have direct influence on re-growth of natural 
resources. Higher growth and replenishment rate may compensate the higher extraction efforts exerted by 
resource users.  
According to Burns and Flam (1987), social norms are the rules of behaviour that are considered 
acceptable in a group or society. A society has both institutionalized and non-institutionalized rules 
embedded in the system. It is essential to understand individuals’ social norms in order to plan for the 
formation of local institutions for the management and use of CPRs. Furthermore, understanding climate 
change impacts on the re-growth of CPRs and on cooperation behaviour would improve our understanding 
of the interactions that exist between the environment and society. Chapter 4, therefore, extends the 
findings under Chapters 2 and 3, and scales up our understandings on social preferences, social norms and 
the social role in the formation of cooperative local institutions. We also drew a conclusion on the 
possibility of carbon sinks by common pool forests and agricultural lands. There is an increasing tendency in 
developing countries in terms of higher greenhouse gas emissions due to deforestation and land use land 
cover changes. In addition, developing countries are recently following an ambitious growth strategy to 
counteract the increasing demand due to high population growth. The growth strategies are, however, 
contributing to higher greenhouse gas emissions largely, and predicted to increase in the near future (see 
Stern 2007).  
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We used lab-in-the-field experiments to understand social norms (rule following behaviour) and 
cooperative behaviour in the management and use of commons. We conducted a “route choice” and 
dynamic CPR experiment to comprehend on rule following and cooperative behaviour of smallholder 
farmers. Both games involved symmetric material incentives and information access. The dynamic CPR 
game was conducted under two treatments: favourable and unfavourable climate change scenarios.  
Primarily, Chapter 4 attempted to understand the association between social roles and social 
norms (rule following and breaking) of subjects. Accordingly, we found evidence that subjects with a rule 
following social norm tend to depend more on their social role and their role as an elderly person. The 
number of rule breakers is larger in both non-elders and those having no role in the community. In the 
dynamic CPR game, on the other hand, groups of rule-followers preserve the resource indefinitely under 
sufficient re-growth of the resource due to favourable climate change. Comparison of effort endowment 
allocation to private activities over extraction of CPRs shows that there is a general higher effort allocation 
to private activities than extraction.  
Furthermore, we run a regression analysis to further analyze the experimental findings. The 
regression analysis revealed that the average extraction levels of individuals are significantly influenced by 
social role and norm variables. In addition, variables like literacy level and age of individuals influence 
extraction rate positively and significantly. The significant influence of social role, elderly role, and norm 
indicator variables support our argument that sustainability of common pool resources depends on social 
role (leadership role in traditional community gatherings), elderly role, and social norm (rule following) 
behaviour of subjects. 
The findings in Chapter 4 also gave us an explanation to the question posed in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 2, we claimed that individual and social preferences are partly social and environmental constructs. 
Empirical findings in the literature suggested that preferences are ever changing and are partly social and 
environmental constructs (Druckman and Lupia 2000). Learning is possible through social groups and 
networks, because social interactions create an enabling environment for learning. We accordingly confirm 
this claim in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, we found evidence that preferences like learning behaviour is 
shaped by social groups and networks. In addition, in Chapter 4 we understand that rule following 
behaviour is highly associated with social role and elderly role that an individual plays in the community. 
Social preferences like altruism and reciprocity behaviour can develop over time. Social roles and elderly 
roles can possibly enhance the positive concern (rule following) of one’s social norms and preferences. The 
presence of rule followers in a local institution under favourable climate change can sustain common pool 
resources.  
Understanding social norms and ecological variables in cooperative management of commons 
(Ostrom 1990) is the crucial first step in analyzing climate mitigation in forests and common pool 
agricultural lands. The possibility of climate change mitigation through carbon sinks on common agricultural 
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and forested lands in developing countries was also highlighted in Chapter 4. Cooperative sustainable 
management of common agricultural and forested lands can improve the function as carbon sinks, possibly 
contributing to the global climate change mitigation effort.  
6.2.4 What are the priority ranks of climate adaptation options in the Upper Blue-Nile basin?  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis have devoted much time to identify the behavioural factors in decision 
related to climate innovation adoption, and cooperative CPR management in Ethiopia. In Chapter 5 we 
tried to understand climate change adaptation process from stakeholders’ perspectives. To avail a 
technology package suitable to the interest of the beneficiaries, it needs a participatory opinion sharing and 
dialogue with groups representing decision makers from different backgrounds. Stakeholders can have 
valuable information about climate change adaptation and this can assist in prioritization and ranking. 
Screening adaptation options based on suitable and context specific criteria is only possible through 
participatory stakeholders’ survey and evaluation. Selection of appropriate evaluation criteria is the first 
step in the process of stakeholders’ level evaluation and analysis. Technology packages in developing 
countries are often not designed specific to a given agro-ecosystem. Sometimes such technology packages 
are referred to as [blanket] technologies, and they may not be suitable under different agro-ecological 
circumstances. Evaluation of adaptation options based on agro-ecosystem relevance criteria was 
considered in Chapter 5.  
Stakeholders’ based evaluation of climate change adaptation options has been the focus of many 
studies (see De Bruin et al. 2009; Bernardini 2010; Gough and Shackley 2006; Janssen and van Herwijnen 
2006; Pearce et al. 2012; Debeles et al. 2009). Few et al. (2006) have underlined that stakeholders’ level 
opinion and dialogue can help to plan climate change adaptation interventions. Accordingly, we analyzed 
experts and farmers evaluation of NRM, water related, and agricultural related adaptation options in the 
upper Blue-Nile basin. Adaptation options have been identified from previous studies, stakeholders’ 
workshop, and from Chapters 2 to 4. The evaluation criteria are identified both from literature and 
stakeholders workshop. Relevance of the criteria to the context and sector was given emphasis in the 
analysis.  
We come up with two rankings based on stakeholders’ evaluation: uni-criterion and multi-criteria 
rankings. The uni-criterion based ranking results showed that adaptation options perform differently under 
different criterion. Adaptation options should therefore be viewed based on their performance under the 
different criteria sets. It is also important to consider adaptation options from the perspectives related to 
the objectives and expectations set by beneficiaries. The complete outranking results, on the other hand, 
resulted in a significant difference in priority rankings between evaluations made by experts only, and by 
both farmers and experts. The question remains as to which rankings we should follow. The great 
divergence in the evaluation results of the two groups partially gave us a potential explanation for the 
failure of previous technology packages. What is evaluated important by farmers may be less relevant to 
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experts. For instance the highly ranked agricultural adaptation based on feasibility criteria set evaluated by 
farmers and experts jointly are improved varieties, crop rotation,and composting; while the highly ranked 
and evaluated options by experts are crop rotation, storing technologies, and use of pesticides. Joint 
evaluation, therefore, would offer an approach to reduce the polarity, because it incorporates views from 
both groups. 
6.3 Discussion and missing elements 
To facilitate climate innovation uptake and cooperative management of common pool natural resources, 
we tried to understand behavioural fundamentals, personality traits, social norms and roles, and the 
recursive relationship of different farm related technologies. We also tried to attest the list of identified 
adaptation options by stakeholders’ survey and evaluation. This has been done throughout the chapters of 
the thesis; yet the institutional aspect and many other aspects that we still know little about are not yet 
fully covered. Institutional innovations are shown to be important for adaptation to climate change; and 
more importantly the findings in Chapter 2 highlight the importance of socioeconomic, institutional and 
agro-ecological shocks in the formation of preferences of individuals. 
Institutional facilities like access to market can help to diversify income sources through availing 
alternative off-farm income sources to the rural poor. Farmers having access to markets can have 
alternative off-farm income sources which would help them reduce their dependency on subsistence 
farming. Availability of diversified income sources through the market mechanism can improve high risk 
aversion and high rates of time preference of farmers related to technology adoption (Yesuf and Kohlin 
2008). Institutional support in terms of crop and livestock insurance are also recommended as an 
instrument to reduce risk aversion and high rates of time preference. For instance Greatrex et al. (2014) 
find that Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) project in Kenya and Ethiopia demonstrates innovative 
approaches to ensuring poor nomadic pastoralists in challenging circumstances. Absence of a well suited 
formal and informal financial institution also limits the pace of innovation uptake. Studies by Anang et al. 
(2015) have argued that the presence of micro and small scale lending and borrowing institutions inferred a 
positive influence on technology adoption. In addition, local formal and informal institutions can also act as 
a learning hub and centre for information sharing (Simane et al. 2012). It is hence essential to undertake a 
further systematic analysis of the institutional aspect to understand its influence on shaping preferences as 
well as facilitating climate innovation uptake. Framed and natural experiments can help understand how 
institutions facilitate preferences as well as decisions related adoption of climate innovations. 
We also know little about learning behaviour. Learning behaviour takes many forms, and it is 
complex. To understand the complex human behaviour, it is important to follow an approach that can 
uncover the cognitive map of subjects. Studies related to neuroeconomics can shape our understanding of 
learning behaviour through a thorough analysis of the brain, and how neuroscientific discoveries guide 
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models of economics related to decision making (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2005). Furthermore, behaviours 
like envy, reciprocity and altruism would have a direct influence on sustaining climate innovations. An 
experimental explanation of individuals’ and communities’ social preferences in a wider context would 
improve our understanding of climate innovations.  
In Chapter 3 we tried to understand decision behaviour related to adoption of climate innovation. 
The possibility of learning through social groups, networks, and homophilic adopters are examined in 
Chapter 3. We also brought the concept of personality traits, in to the literature of climate innovation 
adoption. We hypothesized and tested how information inquiry is associated with one’s personality traits. 
The psychological foundation of personality traits tells us that personality traits are constant throughout 
the life of an individuals’. There are, however, recent developments in the formation of personality traits. 
Fisher (2016) indicated that people are malleable; and if one needs to score high in one of the personality 
traits, it is possible to make progress by working hard on it. By understanding the personality of smallholder 
farmers, one can create a group by pairing them suit with their personality traits. Such an approach can 
sustain programs like climate change adaptation innovations. Development programs in developing 
countries involve the formations of groups such as water user groups, development groups, and work 
groups. In addition, we brought the importance of personality traits into understanding of innovation 
adoption through their influence on one’s information inquiry process. Different strategies need to be 
devised to different groups based on their personality; because people have different tendancy towards 
the search and inquiry of informations. The personality foundation of innovation diffusion in developing 
countries needs further remark using larger data sets. 
In Chapter 3, we also observed a recursive relationship between the different farm-related 
technologies. HYV are developed under a suited and controlled system. Practical challenges emerge during 
the diffusion stage of a technology. The variability in agro-ecosystem in terms of soil and natural resources 
characteristics hampers the adoption of HYV. Traditional agricultural management systems should combine 
with the use of agro-ecosystem based management strategies (According to Altieri and Nicholls 2013). 
Productivity, sustainability and resilience can best be achieved through agro-ecosystem based adaptation 
strategy. According to our results, improving soil and water conservation works, and irrigation technologies 
(some HYV need specific water (irrigation) and soil requirements (Ramamasy and Baas 2007)) can fasten 
the uptake of HYV. However, we believe that these results may bit be generally valid as there might be 
small sample bias. It gives an opportunity for further research to examine the relationship in a more 
comprehensive manner and using larger data sets.  
Scenario based treatment of behaviour under varying and uncertain climate change is also 
indispensable. Studies on climate change are mostly based on scenarios, because climate change is slow 
and complex process and lot of things including human behaviour can change in many ways over time. 
Social and economic conditions are also dynamic which make it difficult to have accurate forecasts. Climate 
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scenarios are recently published for the coming 100 years plus in many countries. In Ethiopia, however, 
there are limitations to having appropriate climate scenarios (Calow et al. 2013). Understanding 
cooperative behaviour under a set of specific established climate scenario would also be possible and can 
give a better outlook to understand climate adaptation and mitigation processes. Stakeholders’ preference 
ranking under uncertainty and varying climate scenarios deserve further scrutiny in developing countries.  
The findings in Chapter 5 gave us a wider understanding of priority setting and ranking of 
adaptation options in developing countries, and specific to the upper Blue-Nile basin in Ethiopia. It is 
imperative to assume that the sustainability of climate adaptation intervention can be gauged by the 
degree to which the different stakeholder’s are taking part in the design, implementation, and evaluation 
stages of adaptation planning. Evaluating adaptation initiatives is important for tracking whether the 
identified options are feasible or important, urgent, no regret, ancillary or having mitigation benefits. This 
would have implication for successes and failures in climate innovation diffusions so that it would be 
possible to foster learning. Further more, it is evident that climate adaptation is often about integrating 
climate aspects into other policy fields, hence a criteria that assess the interlinkages between different 
policy objectives like noreget (co-benefits) and mitigation benefits are of particular importance.The 
involvement and participation of different groups in priority setting and evaluation criteria development of 
climate adaptation options, can thus be considered to be a prerequisite for achieving the objectives of 
creating a climate resilient smallholder economy. Future stakeholder level studies under varying climate 
change scenarios are possible provided that there are sound climate scenarios for Ethiopia and other 
developing countries.  
6.4 Conclusions  
Africa is vulnerable to future climate change and Ethiopia is often cited as one of the most extreme 
examples (Conway et al. 2007). Policies and strategies are already prescribed in different contexts to 
address climate change impacts in developing countries. As part of this effort, we need to improve our 
understanding of decision behaviour related to adaptation to climate change based on behavioural and 
experimental evidences. Thus, the thesis demonstrates the instruments to understand the behavioural 
factors underlying the process of adaptation to climate change in developing countries by a specific study 
for Ethiopia. 
The fundamental challenges that limit the pace of adaptation have long been the subject of 
research. Adequate local adaptation requires the understanding of the interactions between the 
environment and society. Fundamental challenges like socioeconomic, demographics, and natural resource 
characteristics were identified as key factors for decisions on adaptation to climate change. Perspectives 
related to social and individual preferences, and the interactions with the environment need to be 
understood to design appropriate adaptation policies. This thesis adopted experimental based preference 
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elicitation exercises to understand the relationship between preferences (social and individual) and 
decisions related to adaptations to climate change, and cooperative management of CPRs. We focus on 
three fundamental and interrelated decision problems in the process of adaptation to climate change: 
Decision problems at individuals level (farmers), cooperative level (group of farmers), and stakeholder’ level 
(farmers and experts). In the thesis we argue that the success of adaptation effort depends on the level of 
understanding of these three decision problems. We were interested in the behavioural mechanisms that 
undergird decision problems related to climate change adaptation. The adaptation kit will always be 
incomplete if we fail to address one of the three decision problems. It was clearly shown that 
understanding individual behavioural mechanisms by itself is not sufficient; it should also be followed by a 
study to understand the environmental and social factors that contribute to the formation of preferences.  
We follow an approach to understand individual level preferences, the mechanisms how 
preferences are formed, and approaches to unlock the negative concerns. We also entail to understand 
group behaviour through understanding cooperative management of commons, and stakeholder level 
decision making. The thesis accordingly, combined a list of interrelated experimental, survey, and 
stakeholders’ evaluation methods to generate data and address the research problems envisaged in each 
chapter. Accordingly, the conclusions are formulated as follows:  
x Climate change adaptation involves choices which involve both risk and time preferences; and 
these preferences can be explained using behavioural economics (Brekke and Stenman 2008). We 
followed an experimental approach to elicit risk and time preference behaviour and linked the 
results in decision related adoption of climate innovations. We accordingly conclude that: (i) 
Adaptation options can be framed in to farm, off-farm, and institutional climate innovations 
separately, and should not deliver all as a single package, because farmers are not making decisions 
simultaneously, (ii) High risk aversion and high rate of time preference could be addressed through 
the institutional facilities (like access to credit, market and, institutional climate innovations), and 
by improving the social (social learning and experience sharing) and environmental system 
(rehabilitation of the degraded land, water bodies and forests).  
x In Chapter 3 we brought the concept of personality traits in to the literature of innovation 
adoption. We also stressed on the importance of traditional social groups and networks, and the 
presence of homophilic groups as fundamental learning centres, through which it is possible to 
diffuse climate change adaptation innovations to farmers. We accordingly conclude that adaptation 
to climate change could be successful if: (i) We understand the influence of one’s personality trait 
on his/her search and inquiry process of information regarding technology adoption, (ii) We create 
a favourable environment for learning through participation in social groups and networks, (iii) 
Adoption of HYV is preceded by an a priori adoption of SWC and irrigation technologies. 
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x The importance of social norms and roles in the sustainable management and use of CPRs is 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. Apart from social norms and social roles, we also showed the effect of 
climate change on the formation of cooperative local institutions through its direct effect on re-
growth and replenishment of CPRs. Accordingly, we conclude that social norms and roles are 
important in realising a climate resilient cooperative local institutions to sustainably manage 
common pool natural resources. Members of a local cooperative institution in the management 
and use of CPRs should therefore be comprised of rule followers, elders, and individuals having a 
social role. In addition, we also conclude that, to realize climate mitigation through carbon sinks in 
common pool agricultural and forested lands in developing countries, attention should be given to 
the social and ecological determinants of cooperative CPR management.  
x Developing countries traditionally follow a top down approach for policy and strategy making. An 
inclusive and coordinated stakeholder level dialogue and opinion sharing can help identify priority 
adaptation options. In Chapter 5, we presented and analysed stakeholder survey and evaluation of 
climate change adaptation in developing countries context and specific to Ethiopia. Context specific 
criteria like agro-ecosystem relevance criteria were given emphasis in the analysis. Stakeholders 
can also bring the different debates and interests together and open an opportunity for dialogue. 
The stakeholders’ workshop showed that natural resources like soil, forests, and water resources 
are identified as highly vulnerable segments. The results of multi criteria analysis, on the other 
hand, showed that different groups have different views and priority to the different adaptation 
options. We therefore conclude that joint evaluation (both by experts and farmers) of adaptation 
options can be considered as a prerequisite for successful adaptation.  
x Finally, we draw a conclusion on the approach we followed. The use of experimental approaches is 
getting more and more attention, because sometimes it is difficult to acquire data using 
conventional methods. However, caution should be given in the use and application of field 
experiments in developing countries. In developing countries, using farmers as subject of analysis 
can have benefits in terms of external validity and drawing inferences. Field experiments are 
however highly sensitive to contamination and at times very hard to be managed as a perfectly 
controlled experiment. It is also challenging to frame sophisticated experimental protocols with 
farmers. In multiple elicitation exercises, there is a problem of multiple switching. The low level of 
literacy and cognitive capacity are negatively affecting the performance in sometimes complex 
experimental tasks. There is sometimes a complete discrepancy between a behaviour observed in 
lab and real life practices. Decisions in real life depend on many factors including information 
seeking, time and support, and most importantly on heuristics and framing (Loewenstein et al. 
2008). There is also high cost consideration in conducting field experiments, because most 
experiments like natural experiments involve real life practices. Experimenter bias in the process of 
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demonstration the choice problem is also a potential source of inadequacy. Though there are no 
fine tune solutions to all challenges of field experiments, different scholars have suggested to 
combine experimental results with survey, qualitative studies, and sometimes to use natural 
experiments. Accordingly, we conclude that grounding the experimental results with key informant 
and focus group discussion would improve our understanding of decision behaviour. In addition, 
applications of qualitative and quantitative approaches like MCA analysis, and enhancing 
educational and institutional facilities to smallholder farmers are important mechanisms to reduce 
the drawbacks in experimental approaches.  
6.5 Policy implications 
Policy implications are drawn from the empirical and experimental results. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated 
the importance of institutions in facilitating learning mechanisms. Preferences like risk and rate of time 
preference are a result of social and environmental constructs. The presence of institutions like credit 
access and social services like education can improve risk aversion and high rate of time preferences. 
Institutions can enhance social, environmental and market interactions. We believe that fostering new 
ideas and organizing farmers in local institutions can enable information sharing and learning schemes. It 
would also be possible to bring sustainable adaptation mechanisms through off-farm and institutional 
innovations to smallholder farmers. The introduction of off-farm innovations suitable to a specific agro-
ecosystem is found plausible in the study area (Simane et al. 2012). Policy makers are therefore encouraged 
to pay greater attention to the behavioural mechanism of  “institutional facilities” to encourage uptake of 
climate innovations. Institutions can facilitate climate adaptation efforts through availing opportunities to 
reduce high risk aversion and high rate of time preferences. Creation of an enabling environment for 
institutions, for instance, designing institutional climate innovations suitable to a particular agro-ecosystem 
can unlock negative concerns towards technologies. 
The relevance of social groups and networks in innovation diffusion is highlighted in Chapter 3. 
Encouraging social groups and networks through capacity building programs would enhance and upgrade 
the state of innovation diffusion. Informal local institutions like, work groups, development groups, and 
informal traditional gatherings should be encouraged and supported to facilitate adoption of climate 
innovations. Social groups and networks are systems that hub both new and indigenous knowledge. In 
addition, we recommend that the adoption of HYV has better proceeded by the adoption of SWC and 
irrigation technologies. Institutions working in food security and climate change agenda should give due 
focus to the relationship between different technologies as well as encourage an environment suitable for 
technology diffusion. For instance, government and non-government organizations working on food 
security and climate change better invest on SWC and irrigation works as an entry for HYV. HYV can help to 
realize food security and improve adaptive capacity to climate change impacts.  
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In Chapter 4 we observed that social role, social norm and ecological variables are important 
determinants in realizing local institutions for the management and use of CPRs. To introduce sustainable 
local institutions in the context of CPRs, attention should be given to the composition of members in local 
institutions. Composing groups from elders, youth and rule followers can help sustain local institutions. 
Furthermore, to realize climate change mitigation through sustainable management of CPRs in developing 
countries, it is essential to understand the behavioural and ecological factors affecting cooperative 
behaviour. Common pool forests and agricultural lands can act as carbon sinks. It is, therefore, found 
important to include the possibility of carbon sinks in the strategy package of developing countries. 
Interventions in the management and use of common pool forests and agricultural lands have dual 
benefits: food security and carbon sink functions. Hence, developing countries should give due focus to the 
management problem of CPRs both for food security and carbon sink objectives. 
The stakeholders’ evaluation result shows that natural resources related adaptation options are 
prioritized highest, making agro-ecosystem relevance criterion as a centre piece in the evaluation process. 
To rescue agriculture both from anthropogenic and climate change impacts, policy makers should give 
greater attention to natural resources related adaptation options. In the study area, natural resources 
degradation reaches to the point of no return, resilience is unlikely, and population pressure is mounting. 
As a way out mechanism, attention should be given to natural resources fundamentals. Therefore, it is 
encouraged to follow an approach that enables to bring stakeholders together and analyse climate change 
adaptation options at a larger scale. 
6.6 Recommendations for further research 
The thesis has raised important research questions relevant to decisions related to adaptation to climate 
change. However, in each chapter there are issues that deserve further attention. This opens an 
opportunity for future research. The following topics could be relevant for further study: 
1. The role of institutions in the formation of preferences  
In Chapter 2 we showed that the presence of a working institution can improve the negative 
concerns related to technology adoption. A further investigation of behavioural mechanisms by 
adopting a framed field experimental approach would also be interesting. Experiments can also be 
developed to understand the role of institutions on the formation preferences. Studies on social 
preferences like envy, reciprocity and altruism would also be interesting to understand the complex 
and dynamic interactions between society and environment due to climate changes. Hence, a 
further experimental explanation of individuals’ and communities’ social preferences in a wider 
context would improve our understanding of adoption decisions related to climate innovations.  
2. Learning behaviour related to adaptation to climate change 
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In Chapter 3, we showed that the presence of social groups and networks improves learning. The 
approach we followed is very simple. However, learning behaviour is dynamic and complex. A 
further analysis using experimental neuroeconomics can shape our understanding of learning 
behaviour through a thorough analysis of the brain, and how the discoveries from experimental 
neuroeconomics guide economic decision makings related to adaptation to climate change.  
3. Climate scenarios and uncertainties  
Chapters 4 and 5 draw a conclusion without taking into consideration the role of uncertainties and 
climate scenarios in decisions related to cooperative CPR management and stakeholders’ 
evaluation of adaptation options. Provided that there are reliable climate scenarios, it would be 
interesting to frame MCA studies and cooperative CPR problems under uncertainty and varying 
climate scenarios.  
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Summary 
The literature on climate change adaptation in developing countries focused on the socioeconomic and 
demographic determinants of adaptation decisions to climate change. We need to improve our 
understanding on the effect of individual and social preferences on decisions related to adaptation to 
climate change using field experimental approaches. We use field-in-the-lab experimental evidence 
combined with survey, personality test, and  multi criteria analysis for various categories of stakholders. 
The data were generated from one of the hotspot areas in developing countries: the upper Blue-Nile basin, 
Ethiopia. The evidence covers the behavioural mechanisms ranging from individual and social preferences 
to personality traits. We also tried to understand how preferenes of different types are formed by 
examining the effect of social and environmental factors on preference formation. Adaptation options are 
also examined from an “agro-ecosystem” perspective 
In Chapter 1 we introduce the concepts used in the thesis and give a general objective, research questions 
and outline. 
Chapter 2 focuses on how individual preferences like risk and time preference influence adaptation 
decisions to climate change. We elicited risk and time preference parameters of subjects using a lab-in-the- 
field experiment. Later, the findings are incorporated to a larger household data to understand how risk 
and time preference influence household’s decisions related to adoption of farm, off-farm, and institutional 
climate innovations. We  find that, farmers are highly risk averse and have high rates of time preference. 
Inclussion of risk and time preference parameters in an MVP model results in a negative significant 
relationship with adoption decisions. This reveals that adaptation to climate change is a challenge in a 
smallholder economy under high risk aversion and high rate of time preference of farmers. It was also 
observed that risk aversion and rates of time preference are highly correlated with agro-ecosystem 
characteristics giving further evidence that preferences are shaped by both social and environmental 
constructs.  
In Chapter 3 we tried to understand the concepts like personality traits, social groups and networks, 
and their role in the process of learning to adapt. We measure farmers’ personality traits using a simple 
personality test and comprehend how personality traits influence one’s information inquiry in the process 
of adoption decision related to farm climate adaptation options. Social groups and networks can play a 
great role in facilitating learning, and experience sharing in the smallholder economy social system. We 
understand the fact that learning can shape one’s attitude, and some personality traits may hamper the 
pace of innovation diffusion through their negative influence on farmers information inquiry process. 
Learning is also possible through traditional and informal social groups and networks which further 
facilitates the uptake of innovation uptake. In addition, we see how the different farm related innovations 
are interlinked. We find evidence that the adoption of high yield crop and livestock varieties are recursively 
related to the adoption of SWC and irrigation technology.  
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In Chapter 4 we look into cooperative behaviour of farmers in the management and use of common 
pool natural resources. Common pool natural resources make up the larger livelihood base of smallholder 
farmers in developing countries and can help realize a climate resilient economy. Hence, sustainable 
management and use of commons through cooperative local institutions is a means to sustain livelihood 
structure of famers. We used lab-in-the-field experiments to understand the influence of social norms and 
preferences, and ecological variables on cooperative management and use of common pool natural 
resources. We find evidence that rule following behaviour depends on the social role, and elderly role that 
an individual plays in the community. In turn, rule following behaviour and the presence of favourable 
climate change are found  pivotal in sustaining the commons. The presence of favourable climate change 
enables regrowth and replenishment of degraded common pool natural resources. The formation of local 
institutions are suggested to follow an approach that make up members composed of elders, youth and 
rule followers and breakers. The possibility of carbon sink is also highlighted in Chapter 4. Common pool 
agricutural and forested lands can possibly act as carbon sink functions if they are managed through 
cooperative local institutions.  
In Chapter 5, we put stakeholders opinion and dialogue into perspective and draw a conclusion on 
the priority rankings of adaptation options. Therefore, stakeholders’evaluate agriculture, NRM and water 
resources related adaptation options based on a set of possibly conflicting criteria. Agriculture, natural 
resources and water related adaptation options are livelihood bases for smallholder economies,  like the 
one in Ethiopia. The list of possible adaptation options are identified from the literature, stakeholders 
workshop, and previous chapters. The results show that soil and farm land management related adaptation 
options are ranked highest. Further more, soil, forest and water resources identified as highly vulnerable, 
and require a strategy to rehabilitate and improve resilience from climatic shock events. It was also 
indicated in Chapter 5 climate change adaptation interventions should consider the involvement of both 
farmers and experts in the planning, implementation and evaluation stage, because we find evidence that 
priority ranks of different groups are different and it is necessary to further discus the differences with 
policy makers and then to chose the best options. In addition, evaluation of adaptation options should 
consider the agro-ecosystem relevance of an option when designing an evaluation criteria. This would help 
to design an adaptation technology based on agroecosystem characteristics, whcich will be better than 
simply applying a blanket package.  
In this thesis, we have shown the importance of considering decision problems at three levels: the 
individual level (farmers), cooperative level (group of farmers), and stakeholder level (farmers and experts) 
in the planning of adaptation strategies to climate change in developing countries. Failure to understand 
the social and individual preferences of farmers would have a negative consequence in mainstreaming 
climate change adaptation through climate innovations.  
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